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ABSTRACT
The 1648 landmark signing of the Westphalian Treaties which famously implemented the principle 
of cuius regio, eius religio has, for International Relations (IR), meant that relatively little attention 
has been paid to religion as an influential force in international relations. A “turn to religion” 
amongst a growing body of IR scholars, fueled by post-Cold War studies and empirical events, has 
sought to change this by  placing religion within the study of IR. With a view of adding to this 
debate, this thesis examines the role of religion in Israeli, Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign policy 
during the respective leaderships of Menachem Begin (1977-84), Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-89) 
and Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1975-1995). It does so by drawing on extensive primary material, 
including private and public discourse of the leaders in question, as well as existing literature from, 
primarily, Middle East Studies and Religious Studies. The thesis argues, and shows with reference 
to its empirical findings, that the leaders’ religious beliefs shaped their respective world-views and, 
by extension, their foreign policy doctrines and foreign policy  outcomes. Moreover, it  shows that 
religion played an important role in legitimizing the leaders themselves as well as their respective 
foreign policies. In this context, the thesis furthermore shows that, for the foreign policy leaders, 
religion assumed distinct meanings which were seemingly shaped according the context in which 
they  operated. Importantly, the thesis argues, this does not uncritically support the long-standing 
assumption in IR scholarship that religion is epiphenomal, and/or a tool of instrumentalisation. With 
reference to Constructivist literature and a dynamic definition of religion developed for this project, 
the thesis rather explains that the malleable nature of religion can and does interact with variables 
like material security  to shape, and sometimes drive, conceptualisations of national interest and 
foreign policy outcomes. The project concludes that religion’s role is multi-faceted, and, more to it, 
that the foreign policies of Khomeini’s Iran, Begin’s Israel and Fahd’s Saudi Arabia cannot be fully 
understood without it.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“God has proven to be alive and well beyond all question”
- Karen Armstrong on 9/11, 2001 attacks.1
1.0 Introduction and rationale
Armstrong’s opening quote echoes what in many of the social sciences has long been a topic of 
debate,  but  in  International  Relations  (IR)  only  emerged  as  such  in  the  post-9/11,  2001  era. 
Although IR scholars have discussed religion within the broader context of Constructivism since the 
early  1990s,  they  have  done  so  indirectly,  subsuming  religion  under  broader  categories  like 
“culture” or “identity”, most famously, perhaps, in the context  Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
(1993) thesis, which, as Fox (2007) observes, “buried the religious aspect of [its] argument in the 
term civilization, probably because of International Relations theory’s tendency to avoid directly 
addressing the issue of religion.”2   Toward the turn of the century, religion started to feature more 
explicitly on IR’s research agenda thanks, in no small part, to efforts by  then Doctoral students 
Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos of the London School of Economics and Political Science; 
their conference entitled Religion and International Relations has since been called “path breaking 
[showing] incredible foresight and courage”,3 which says as much about the conference’s content as
it does about the state of IR at the time, as far as the discipline’s discussion of religion is concerned.
It was however the explicit religious motivation behind Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, which truly forced religion onto the IR agenda. Household IR names now 
acknowledged religion’s importance for international relations, just as they admitted the challenge 
6
1 Armstrong, K. (2009) GOD. Foreign Policy. 175. p. 55.
2 Fox, J. (2009) Integrating Religion into International Relations Theory.  In Haynes, J. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Religion and
Politics. Oxon and New York: Routledge. p. 288.
3 E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2013) The “Turn to Religion” in International Relations. [Online] Accessible via:  http://
www.e-ir.info/2013/12/03/the-turn-to-religion-in-international-relations-theory/ [Accessed 20 March, 2015].
that it  posed for IR as a discipline. Keohane, for example, noted that “all mainstream theories of 
world politics are relentlessly  secular [ignoring] the impact of religion, despite the fact that world- 
shaking political movements have so often been fueled by  religious fervour.”4  In what has come to 
be called IR’s “post-secular debate,” a consensus formed around this sentiment with scholars setting 
out to unveil the roots of the international system in order to make sense of IR’s neglect  of religion. 
This endeavor overwhelmingly traced back to the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (whose 
realm,  his  religion)  implemented  by  the  Peace  of Augsburg  in  1555  and  consolidated  by  the 
Westphalian Treaties in 1648, whereby  religion, whose extension across Europe had been fought for 
since the Protestant Reformation, was removed from the international sphere and became the 
prerogative of each ruler to impose within his own political realm. Representative of this view, 
Philpott (2002) argued that the Westphalian proclamation of sovereignty  as the form of political 
authority along with Augsburg’s cuius regio, eius religio principle had a secularizing effect on the 
international system by virtue of them limiting the influence that the Catholic Church yielded on 
politics either directly or through the Holy  Roman Emperor. In addition, states, although still able to 
promote the work of churches and religion within their realm, would increasingly refrain 
from doing so. This was most conspicuously evident  with states’ promotion of religious freedom; 
a principle strongly influenced by  the Protestant Reformation of 1517, adopted first by 
revolutionary  France and America, and subsequently throughout the Western world at large. 
Moreover, as states promoted religion less actively, Europe’s religious powers would exercise 
fewer, if any, temporal prerogatives both nationally, and much less transnationally. These 
interrelated secularizing trends consolidated  in  Europe,  and  were  exported  internationally, 
during  the  centuries  following Westphalia, producing what Philpott terms “The Westphalian 
Synthesis”; that is, the modern authority  structure of the international system characterised by the 
7
4 Keohane, R. O. (2002) The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and “Liberalism of Fear”. Dialogue IO.
1 (1). p. 29.
general rule of non-intervention in the governance of other states (notable exceptions, such as 
interventions on the part of Cold War superpowers, notwithstanding). IR would come to reflect this 
perception of a secular international system with its main Realist theory, in its Hobbesian, classical 
and Waltzian variant, holding that states are concerned with gaining relative military power, 
including the forces, population, technology, wealth and taxation power needed to support it, in 
order to maximize their security.5
Against this understanding of the international system, the 9/11, 2001 attacks became viewed by 
some as the “return” of religion to international relations. Petito & Hatzopoulos (2003) depicted this 
view in almost  apocalyptic terms, asserting that  “religion was the object that needed to vanish for 
modern international politics to come into being” and that “the rejection of religion [seems] to be 
inscribed in the genetic code of the [IR] discipline.”6 Thomas (2000) asserted that, in light of
increasing importance of religion to international relations, IR scholars should start to “take religion
seriously.”7    Others  have  since  challenged  the  conventional  understanding  of  the  international 
system  as  one  in  which  religious  and  political  realms  have,  until  recently,  been  separated, 
suggesting rather that religion persisted in the international political realm throughout and beyond 
the seventeenth century. Barnett (2011), for example, shows that Christian missionaries from the 
sixteenth century  onwards facilitated European colonialism, just as the latter facilitated the 
proselytizing  ventures  of  missionaries.  Colonialism  not  only  gave  missionaries  confidence  to 
venture onto once inhospitable lands, but indeed compelled them to do so, as opting out would 
stand  in  contrast  to  their  proselytizing  purpose.  Missionaries’ evangelization,  establishment  of 
schools as well as the advances in health and science that  they brought with them, in turn, and 
perhaps unwittingly, proved to natives the superiority of European civilization, as was part of 
8
5 Philpott, D. (2002) The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations. World Politics. 55 (1). p. 66-95.
6 Petito, F. and Hatzopoulos, P. , Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile. p. 1.
7 Thomas,  S.  M.  (2000)  Taking  Religious  and  Cultural  Pluralism  Seriously:  The  Global  Resurgence  of  Religion  and  the
Transformation of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 29 (3). p. 816.
colonial administrators’ strategy to exert power and control of colonies. Moreover, by  making 
domestic populations susceptible to European ideas, such as the moral economics of Adam Smith, 
the missionaries’ “civilizing efforts” facilitated the job and profits of foreign investors who came 
along with colonial administrators. Barnett furthermore points to The World Missionary Conference 
held in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1910 as a more recent example of colonialism’s missionary 
dimension and, by extension, Christianity’s role in shaping the Western international order. With 
reference to conference proceedings, he shows that the economic and political elites in attendance 
saw missionary activity as a critical element of Western expansion and that, although religious and 
political authorities were considered and discussed as distinct categories, there was an appreciation 
that they together could perform the civilizing mission that would facilitate a Western-led 
international order.8
In a similar vein, Hurd (2011) shows the Christian roots of Kant’s moral philosophy that has so 
profoundly influenced the Liberal world order. She argues that Kant’s universal, moral principles 
held that, for sectarian differences between Catholic and Protestant Christians to be overcome, 
morality  was to be grounded, not in ecclesiastical theology, but in the individual. Crucially, this 
formulation did not dismiss the metaphysical dimension presupposed by  all moral agents. Rather, it 
proposed a “generic form of Christianity” which carried traces of Christian ecclesiastical theology 
in that it, firstly, placed singular conceptions of reason and command morality above question; 
secondly, held Kantian philosophy as the ultimate authority on reason; thirdly, defined sectarianism 
within Christianity  as the greatest danger to morality and, finally, delegitimized a non-Kantian, non- 
theistic perspective in public life. By virtue of these traits, Kant’s fourfold morality  retained the 
Augustinian command model and was, as such, a form of “rational religion”. To drive home this
9
8 Barnett, M. N. (2011) Another Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion. In: Snyder, J. (ed.) Religion and
International Relations Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 91-115.
point, she refers to Theodor van Leeuwen’s assertion that “the idea of a secular basis for politics 
is not only culturally European but specifically  Christian”; for van Leeuwen, “secular culture 
was...Christianity’s gift to the world.”9
For both Hurd and Barnett, then, the “secular” is not  so much a break with the past as it is an 
extension of it, and it is the co-constitutive relationship between the “secular” and the “religious” 
that has created the international order; not a separation of the two whereby  politics was conducted 
at the expense of religion. Though their understanding of religion’s role in international relations is 
different  than that of Philpott (2002), Petito and Hatzopoulos (2003) and others, and while it 
certainly holds important implications for how we understand religion as a category  of analysis (a 
discussion that will be taken up in chapter 2), it does not discount that the IR discipline has 
developed within a secular ontology. As Fox (2007) rightfully observes, religion need not have been 
absent  from  international  relations  for  IR  scholars  to  have  been  “blinded  by   their  secular 
paradigms” to pay attention to it.10  Indeed, since the emergence of Realism as the dominant IR 
theory  following the First Great Debate, the discipline has prioritized material factors - whether 
from a positivist or post-positivist epistemology - at the expense of ideational, and much less 
religious, ones. Realism in both its classical- and neo-variants has been challenged, of course, above 
all from scholars in the Liberal and Constructivist camps. However, scholars in these camps have 
overwhelmingly  promoted an equally materialist  alternative in the case of Liberalism, and, though 
recognizing  the  importance  of  ideational  factors  like  religion,  subsumed  the  latter  within  the 
broader category of identity in the case of Constructivism.11   In this light, it becomes clear why
10
9 Hurd, E. S. (2011) Secularism and International Relations Theory. In: Snyder, J. (ed.) Religion and International Relations Theory.
New York: Columbia University Press. p. 66-7.
10 Fox, J. (2009) Integrating Religion into International Relations Theory.  In Haynes, J. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Religion and
Politics. Oxon and New York: Routledge. p. 276.
11 See i.e. Fox, J. (2006) The Multiple Impacts of Religion on International Relations: Perceptions and Reality. Politique étrangère. 4. p 
1059-1071 and Haynes, J. (2007) An Introduction to International Relations and Religion. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, p.
1-30.
important international events with ostensibly religious dimensions, such as the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran or Pope  John  Paul  II’s  challenge  to  Communist  regimes  of  Eastern  Europe, have 
overwhelmingly  been depicted as events where religion is but an instrumental tool to yield political 
power, in case of the Islamic Revolution, or epiphenomenal, in the case of the USSR’s collapse.
Increasingly, post-secular scholars suggest  that  the main IR theories not only should, but indeed 
could accommodate religion, though there are some noteworthy exceptions to this trend amongst 
the  post-secular  debate’s  earlier  works. As  Bellin  (2008)  observes,  the  volumes  by  Petito  & 
Hatzopoulos (2003) and Fox & Sandler (2004) between them call for a “paradigm shift” in IR to 
acknowledge  the  centrality  of  religion  in  international  relations;  a  move  that  she  rightly 
characterizes as “majestic ambition” which appears more aimed at (redundantly) convincing 
audiences that  religion matters, rather than understanding how and when it  does.12   By and large, 
however, post-secular scholars agree that IR’s main theories can serve as useful tools, either as 
standalone theories or as part of an eclectic theoretical framework, and do so without their 
intellectual  coherence  being  disturbed.  Realism,  for  example,  though  ideological  factors  like 
religion may not be able to overrule the material interests so central to Realist thought, they could 
assert causal power on foreign policy  where material and structural factors permit; that is, so long as 
a state’s vital security  or economic interests are upheld.13    Furthermore, with its flexible 
conceptualization of “interest,” “power” and “rationality,” Realism in its classical strand, offers a 
role for religion as part  of such key concepts. Within this understanding, maximizing the national 
interest can mean bolstering a state’s religious legitimacy in a given social and political context.14
Liberalism, with its focus on international institutions and norms, could equally accommodate
11
12 Bellin, E. (2012) Faith in Politics. New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics. World Politics. 60 (2). p. 338-9.
13 Ibid. p. 340-1.
14  Sandal, N. and James, P. (2010) Religion and International  Relations  theory: Towards a mutual understanding. European Journal  of 
International Relations. 17 (1). p. 8.
religion by incorporating transnational religious organizations like the Catholic Church and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference.15  Assuming that religion classifies as an ideational factor, 
Constructivism provides perhaps the most natural intellectual terrain on which to explore religion’s 
role in international relations, given the eminence that this IR paradigm gives to ideational factors 
in determining structures and events in international politics.
The post-secular debate remains pertinent today, more than a decade after the attacks of 9/11, 2001 
that captured the attention of IR scholars around the study of religion and IR, and almost two 
decades after Petito and Hatzopoulos’ founding conference on the same topic. Prominent 
publications in recent years, including Snyder’s edited volume Religion and International Relations 
Theory (2011) and Shah, Stepan & Toft’s Rethinking Religion and World Affairs (2012) suggest that 
the topic is far from a fad, as do ongoing research programs like Brown University’s Religion and 
Internationalism project, set up in specifically to address the post-secular debate,16       and    the 
sponsored section of the 2015 International Studies Association, dedicated to the study of religion 
and IR on the grounds that paper proposals in recent  years “indicate a widespread interest” in this 
topic.17   Empirically, too, religion’s importance to international relations seems a long way from 
retreating.  As recently  as October 2015, the leader of Israel’s Yesh Atid Party, Yair Lapid, when 
asked to characterize the unfolding violence between Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank, said 
that the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict is now “more religious [...] it is about Islam and
Jews.”18  In a similar vein, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which more than a year after
12
15 Ibid. p. 19.
16 BROWN  UNIVERSITY  (2015)  Religion  and  Internationalism  Project.  [Online]  Available  from:   https://www.brown.edu/
academics/humanities/initiatives/religion-and-internationalism-project. [Accessed: 1 March, 2015].
17 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION (2015) Religion and International Relations Section. [Online] Available from:
http://www.isanet.org/ISA/Sections/REL [Accessed: 15 February 2015].
18 British Broadcasting Corporation. 2015. HARDtalk with Yair Lapid [Online]. [Accessed 29 October 2015]. Available from:  http://
www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b06nxsjd/hardtalk-yair-lapid-leader-yesh-atid-party-israel
Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately  destroy”19    continues to gain recruits and consolidate 
territory, a n d is increasingly discussed in terms of the substantive religious dimension of its 
political and military strategy, as opposed to its leaders’ indiscriminate quest for expansive political 
power.20
While scholars in the post-secular debate have indeed moved beyond descriptive accounts to 
discussing how IR theory provides heuristic tools with which to examine religion’s role in 
international relations, studies which invoke empirics to do so are few and far between. Some do 
exist, to be sure, including a Doctoral thesis by  Bettiza (2012), The Global Resurgence of Religion 
and the Desecularization of American Foreign Policy, 1990-2012, which conceptually and 
empirically  explores the effects of religion on US foreign policy, and examines those within a 
Historical Sociological approach to Foreign Policy Analysis.21  Sheikh (2012) is another prominent 
example; she conceptualizes a substantive understanding of religion with reference to Security 
Studies insights, and applies it (albeit in limited detail) to the study of militant Islamism. The post- 
secular debate could benefit from, and advance through, more such studies, however, and it is in 
this vein that the present project seeks to make its contribution. As the examples of events with 
ostensibly  religious dimensions mentioned thus far in the chapter indicate, the sources of religion’s 
influence on international relations are more than one and include, for example, non-state (Al 
Qaeda) or institutional (Pope John Paul II) ones, just as religion manifests, not in a single generic 
form, but in distinct forms like Christianity and Islam.22 This offers a range of possibilities as far as
research enquiry and design are concerned.
13
19 NEW YORK TIMES (2014) Obama's Evolution on ISIS [Online] Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/
world/middleeast/obama-isis-strategy.html?_r=0 [Accessed: 1 October, 2015].
20  See i.e. McCants, W. (2015) The ISIS Apocalypse: The History Strategy and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. New York:  St. 
Martin's Press and Wood, G. in THE ATLANTIC (2015) What ISIS Really Wants. [Online] Available from: http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/ [Accessed: 1 October, 2015].
21  Bettiza, G. 2012. The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Desecularization of American Foreign Policy, 1990-2012. PhD 
Thesis, London School of Economics.
22 How we should define “religion” merits an intricate discussion, which is taken up in the following chapter (2).
1.1 Research question, argument and contribution
Approaching the study  of religion’s role in international relations from a foreign policy perspective 
is, in my view, particularly interesting as foreign policy, notwithstanding the ostensible significance 
of non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, remains the basis for how states, or the agents that represent 
them, interact with each other and, by extension, determines the dynamics of the international 
system to a significant extent, whether in a regional or global context. Moreover, approaching the 
study of religion in international relations through multiple case studies which capture distinct 
religions, seems to me, crucial because it allows for the identification of potential patterns of 
regularity  across time and/or space which for myself and, I expect, IR scholars, is of particular 
interest as such scientific enquiry  is what distinguishes our discipline from, for example, the 
humanities, which, as identified earlier, have already shown and established the importance of 
religion.
The Middle East provides a relevant focus of a study  into religion’s role in foreign policy for 
reasons that may seem obvious given the region’s many religiously-defined states and the frequent, 
if constant, religiously-charged rhetoric employed by their leaders. Such characteristics do not, of 
course, say  much about whether religion, in these contexts, features but superfluously or holds 
deeper  meaning(s),  though  such  a  critique  would  apply  to  any  given  regional  focus. A more 
constructive note would be that said characteristics do not distinguish the region from other parts of 
the world with similar characteristics, such as South Asia where both Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
official Islamic Republics whose leaders frequently  employ Islamic discourse, distinct though such 
discourse may be from that employed by Islamist non-state actors within those same countries. 
However, unlike South Asia, the Middle East, which I take to stretch from Maghreb in the West to 
the Arabian Peninsula in the East, comprises of states with distinct religions and major religious 
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denominations. As I discussed above, such a dimension is significant in an IR study of this kind 
because it allows for patterns of regularity across religions, if they exist, to be identified.
As will be discussed in detail further ahead in this chapter, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, which 
respectively represent a Jewish,23   Shi’a Islamic and Sunni Islamic state, lend themselves well as 
case studies for that reason, and, especially so, during the period following the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war, when all three of those countries, as well as the region in general, witnessed an intensification 
of existing religious ideologies and the birth of new ones. This became reflected in the rise to power 
of foreign policy leaders who were markedly different than those of the status quo, with Menachem 
Begin forming two consecutive religious-nationalist coalitions in Israel following the latter’s 1977 
and 1984 elections, and with Ayatollah Khomeini founding the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 
following the Islamic Revolution that had been brewing for years prior. Saudi Arabia, though 
exhibiting more continuity  given its conservative monarchical rule, saw its King Fahd change his 
title from “His Majesty” to the “The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” to reflect an 
intensification of religious sentiment within the country. Based on these observations, and 
underpinned by IR’s post-secular debate, I have developed the following research question:
What was the role of religion in Israeli foreign policy under Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin (1977-1984), Iranian foreign policy under Ayatollah 
Khomeini (1979-89), and Saudi Arabian foreign policy under Crown Prince, 
later King, Fahd bin Abdulaziz (1975-95)?
As will be discussed in more detail further ahead in this chapter, I have approached this question 
through  a  Constructivist-Foreign  Policy Analysis  (FPA)  framework  as  it,  with  its  components 
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23  “Jewish” is a loaded term that does not necessarily  take on a religious  meaning and, if it does, may do so in a way that  intertwines 
with  factors such as nationalism. As will  be detailed further ahead in this chapter, “Jewish”, in the context in which it is discussed in 
this thesis, does entail an important religious dimension, hence its inclusion.
respectively prioritizing ideas and individual agency, provides an intellectual terrain, as well as a set 
analytical tools, to understand the role of religion in foreign policy. The choice to centre the 
research  question  around  Begin,  Khomeini  and  Fahd  reflects  those  leaders’ disproportionately 
strong influence on foreign policy, whether by constitutional design (Iran and Saudi Arabia) or by 
forceful personalities (Begin), as well as the importance of religion to all three leaders, despite their 
notable differences in education and vocation. It also reflects a necessity, for a project like this one, 
of a research focus such as that of leadership, in order that the findings yielded are substantive ones 
which show how religion matters in international relations.
In the thesis’ case studies, I argue, and show, that the leaders’ religious beliefs, or religious tradition 
in the case of Fahd, are not only part of their respective world-views but that they  shape them in a 
significant way which reflects in their foreign policy doctrines and, by extension, their foreign 
policy outcomes. In the case of Menachem Begin, that  means that his belief, which I show is partly 
based on religion, in the Jewish people as a grand people whose redemption will occur as a result of 
its presence on Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), reflects in a foreign policy doctrine of territorial 
maximalism vis-a-vis the Palestinian territories24    and full, contractual peace with neighbouring 
states to ensure the Jewish people’s sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael. It moreover means that two of 
Begin’s main foreign policy decisions, the Camp David Accords and invasion of Lebanon, cannot 
be fully understood without reference to Begin’s religious beliefs. In the case of Khomeini, it means 
his religiously-derived belief in the righteousness of the Islamic Republic of Iran and an Islamic 
world order, reflects in a foreign policy doctrine that  is fiercely  anti-Western and focused on 
exporting the Islamic Revolution which, in turn, is tied to consolidating the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. Two of Khomeini’s main foreign policy decisions, prolonging the Iran-Iraq war and his fatwa
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24 It is possible to dispute whether Begin’s policy vis-a-vis Judea and Samaria would classify as “foreign” policy, as he saw those areas 
as part and parcel of Eretz Yisrael. However, several scholars (e.g. Sprinzak,1989; Tessler,1986 and Weissbrod, 1981) do discuss 
the issue in such terms and, moreover, the international borders which denote the West Bank as Palestinian indeed render the matter one 
of foreign policy.
(religious  ruling)  against  Salman  Rushdie,  can  thus  only  be  understood  in  the  context  of  his 
religious beliefs. In the case of Fahd, his safeguarding of the religio-political symbiosis between the 
Ulema (Islamic clergy) and House of Saud, though arguably more a reflection of a necessary 
tradition than his personal faith, reflects in his foreign policy  doctrine focused on assuming a 
leadership role in Arab-Islamic affairs. Fahd’s opposition to the Camp David Accords and support 
of the Palestinian issue more broadly - both of which were rendered Islamic, rather than strictly 
Arab issues, through Khomeini’s discursive efforts - can thus not be understood outside the context 
of religion, most importantly the religio-political symbiosis. While another of Fahd’s foreign policy 
outcomes - his invitation of US troops into the Kingdom in the context of Operation Desert Storm 
and the subsequent Gulf War - reflects all but a need for defence assistance to combat Iraqi 
aggressors,  Fahd’s  efforts  to  legitimize  this  foreign  policy,  which  included  petitioning  several 
fatwas from the Kingdom’s Ulema, cannot either be understood without reference to the Saud- 
Wahhab alliance.
In each of the case studies, I furthermore argue that religion comprised an important discursive tool 
with which the leaders legitimized their foreign policies to the public, and I show that the meaning 
of religion, as framed by the leaders, corresponded to the context in which it  was invoked. In the 
case of Begin, this meant framing the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty  (Camp David Accords, Framework 
I) with Biblical references containing themes related to peace amongst nations, and framing Israeli 
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria (Camp David Accords, Framework I) with reference to Biblical 
excerpts denoting the Jewish people’s rightful claim to those territories. In the context of the 
invasion of Lebanon, it meant framing the losses of lives in broad, spiritual terms. For his part, 
Khomeini, used historical analogies invoking important Shi’a Islamic figures, events and concepts 
to frame the Iran-Iraq war’s purpose, its resulting material and personal losses, and its termination, 
just  as  he  stressed  Sharia  (Islamic  law)  in  the  context  of  his  fatwa  against  Salman  Rushdie. 
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Similarly, Fahd framed his opposition to the Camp David Accords in terms of Islamic duty, just as 
he framed his invitation of US troops as a necessary means to protect Islamic interests and lands.
According to these findings, I conclude that the role of religion in foreign policy for each of the 
case studies is two-fold. First, religion takes on the role of shaping the worldview of the foreign 
policy decision makers and by extension also their foreign policy doctrines and foreign policies. I 
do not claim that there is always a strong causal link between religion and foreign policy  outcome, 
though such a link should certainly not be dismissed in some cases, but rather that the foreign 
policy outcomes in question must necessarily be made sense of with reference to the leaders’ 
religious beliefs or, in the case of Fahd, the religious tradition that shaped his worldview. Second, 
religion takes on the role of a discursive tool which legitimizes the leaders’ foreign policies to the 
public. In this context, I engage in a broader discussion about religion as a malleable concept whose 
meaning, does not (necessarily) manifest in rigid pro- and pre-scriptions of behaviour, but  affords 
the individuals believer a multitude of seemingly contradictory  interpretations. Accordingly, I argue 
that when Begin, Khomeini and Fahd use religion to frame their foreign policies in ways that, at 
times, seem irreconcilable with one another, they do not necessarily  do so in a disingenuous way 
that undermines their religious beliefs. It may, of course, be the case that they do so; that  can only 
truly  be known by  them. However, in such an event, they  do so with a view to legitimize a foreign 
policy which, in itself, is contrived by way  of religion. This further reinforces my answer to the 
research question, which is that  the foreign policies of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd cannot be 
understood outside the context of religion.
The contribution of this thesis is two-fold. First, in discussing religion’s role in foreign policy from 
within a Constructivist-FPA framework, the project shows how religion matters in international 
relations.  This   moves   IR’s   post-secular   debate   beyond   its   current   observations   which 
18
overwhelmingly  discuss that religion matters and which, by  and large, is yet to move beyond the 
discussion of IR theory’s suitability for the study of religion in international relations, to its 
application. Second, by  showing that religion is a malleable concept which can nonetheless be 
studied as a substantive phenomenon (discussed in depth in chapter 2 and demonstrated throughout 
the case studies), the project offers a conceptual contribution to the post-secular debate whose 
scholars are yet to move towards building consensus around a standard definition of religion, which 
has negative implications for identifying patterns of regularity across studies.
 Alternative explanations 
Scholars from other analytical angles would most  certainly find alternative explanations to my 
findings and argument. A modernist account, for example, would hold that religion’s role in foreign 
policy is an instrumental one in that it  is employed by  leaders to suit their material interests. Halliday 
(2003) discusses how, in the case of Islam - as a political phenomenon, not a theology  - this is seen by 
Islamic symbols and doctrines being put differently to different societies and at different moments in 
time.25  When religion is employed, despite differing interpretations, it is represented as a true reading 
of doctrine, which he describes as a “constant redefin[ition] and reselect[ion] to serve contemporary 
purposes.”26   A given interpretation is designed, he argues, to meet both needs and interests of those 
responsible for the interpretations.27  Roy (2007) similarly stresses that the relationship between Islam 
and politics is not a single, timeless one, but  rather one that has been manifested in sociologically 
diverse ways that, oftentimes, is in line with preferences of leaders.28  The understanding that 
modernist scholars like Halliday and Roy have of Islam as a malleable concept that is subject to 
differing interpretations, and that manifests differently across socio-political conditions, is not  at  odds 
with that  which this thesis employs of religion in general, including Islam. The modernist position 
19
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p. 207.
26 Halliday, F. (2000) Nation and Religion in the Middle East. London: Saqi Books. p. 9. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Roy, O. (1994) The Failure of Political Islam. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. vii. 
does differ, however, in holding that such malleability  and distinct manifestations of religion are a 
result of instrumentalism employed to suit  material interests. This is similar to the Realist - especially 
in its neo-variant - treatment of religion’s role in international relations (discussed in more detail on 
pages 9-10) which prioritizes material factors at the expense of ideational and - much more - religious 
ones. As Halliday and Roy would argue, such a view holds that if the latter occur at all, they do so as 
efforts to reinforce material security. Whilst this thesis disputes neither the idea that religion’s pre- and 
pro-scriptions wax and wane across time and space, nor that leaders employ religion discursively  to 
rally support around their desired political outcomes, it  differs from materialist interpretations in that 
it does not consider such actions and discourse as departures from religion itself. This understanding 
is based on the view that religion is a malleable concept whose interpretation necessarily depends on 
contextualization within socio-political circumstances for the true meaning of religion to unfold (this 
is the subject matter of chapter 2 “Thinking about Religion: Key Definition and Concepts). As this is 
the case, the waxing and waning of interpretation becomes the essence of religion. As the case studies 
in chapter 4-6 will demonstrate, the leaders in question certainly depict the role of religion in different 
ways depending on that which they are discussing, and where they are doing so.  But, as all were men 
of religion  - also demonstrated in the case studies -  such actions and discourse do not constitute 
departures from religion.
Another alternative explanation may come from the ethno-nationalist school of thought, and would 
hold that religion operates as but one of many factors which, collectively, motivate a leader who 
belongs to an “ethno-nation,” to act in a particular fashion that is in line with his aspirations for the 
latter and its people. Specifically, it is what Anthony D. Smith calls “mythomoteur” - a compound of 
the French words for “myth” and “engine,” or “constitutive political myth” that is thought to give the 
people of an ethno-nation their sense of purpose.29  It  is propelled by a specific understanding of the 
ethno-nation conceived, by Smith and in the ethno-nationalist school of thought more generally, as a 
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29 Smith, A. D. (1988) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford & Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
nation that comprises of people with a shared ethnic ancestry as well as features like language, 
religion, symbols and traditions, and to which membership  depends not on political affinity  or 
possible assimilation, but on ethnic descent. In this ethno-nationalist  understanding, religion does not 
operate in isolation. An ethno-nationalist account of the foreign policy  of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd 
would undoubtedly  be an analytically  rich one. However, by subsuming religion into more general 
categories it would, like Constructivists analyses of religion have hitherto done (see more on this on 
page 10), not  hone in on the role of religion in foreign policy. As I have reiterated throughout this 
introductory chapter, the purpose of this thesis - indeed what its contribution lies in -  is to address 
religion as a stand-alone variable and seek to explain its role in foreign policy  on that basis. This is 
rendered problematic, of course, when - as chapter two discusses - religion is a variable that is defined 
by its malleability, which in turn is defined by the socio-political context in which religion operates. 
This means that  an analysis of religion’s role cannot, and should not, be separated from contextual 
factors. Though an overlap with Smith’s argument above exists here, the purpose of this thesis is not 
to explain religion’s role in foreign policy with reference to culture in which religion features, because 
the gap in IR literature that this thesis seeks to address is precisely  one created by studies that have 
done either that (Constructivist studies, in particular) or have avoided the discussion of religion 
altogether (Realist and Liberalist studies, in particular).
   
1.2 Methodology, case selection and case design
The marginalization of religion’s role in the study of IR is, as we have seen above, attributable to 
both ontological and epistemological tendencies in the discipline: IR scholarship  has generally 
overlooked religion as an influential factor given its “secular” reading of international relations and, 
moreover, largely focused on conducting analysis whereby  states are taken to be unitary  actors 
which behave rationally  and in response to systemic-level forces. An shift  away from the “secular” 
study of international relations can be implemented through scholarship, such as the present  one, 
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which lucidly includes religion as a variable of study. This means more than simply including 
religion as a supplement to the analysis; an “add and stir” approach that scholars like Hurd (2011) 
and Sheikh (2012) have rightfully warned against, as it would not significantly move the analysis 
beyond description or, as Sheikh (2012) puts it, “does not contribute to clarifying relations between 
religion and IR.”30  On the other hand, treating religion “seriously” should not mean emphasizing its 
role in international relations to an extent whereby it is rendered disproportionally  important. As 
Jervis (1994) points out in his review of Goldstein & Keohane’s edited volume Ideas and Foreign
Policy: beliefs, institutions and political change (1993), setting a null hypothesis which seeks to
disprove that material interests can account entirely for state behaviour, as the authors in question 
do, sets a task that is “much too easy” and “make[s] a straw man of the materialist position” by 
guaranteeing to highlight the importance of ideas. As Jervis notes, if any unexplained variance from 
the material explanation will is attributed to ideas, they are bound to appear important;31   treating 
religion in this way, would incur a similar problems. The research design laid out  in the following 
sections has been developed with these important caveats in mind.
Research design and case selection
The research question has been approached through three case studies which respectively focus on 
Israeli, Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign policy  under the leaderships of Begin, Khomeini and 
Fahd. A multiple-case study design was chosen over a single, intensive case-study  one in order to 
overcome the main drawback commonly associated with the latter, namely  that the idiosyncratic 
features of a single case shape the research question.32   In this study of religion’s role in foreign 
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31 Jervis, R. (1994/95) Review of Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change. Political Science Quarterly. 109 (5). p. 907-909.
32 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. p. 
69-70.
policy that upon encouragement from post-secular scholarship seeks to take religion “seriously” the 
use of multiple case studies has therefore been deemed all the more appropriate. The case studies 
were not selected with a view to yield explicitly comparative findings, but  so that  inferences may be 
drawn from the individual cases in order to identify patters of regularity  across them. George & 
Bennett note that “case selection is an opportunistic as well as a structured process.”33     Their 
observation adequately  reflects the selection of the Middle East as a regional focus for this project, 
as the latter is generally understood to be characterized by ideological, often with an explicit
religious dimension, fervour. George & Bennett go on to note, cases where a variable - in this case 
religion - is “at an extreme value” are particularly useful for heuristic purposes.34   Israel, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia have been selected as case studies because they stand out as emblematic of the 
characterization mentioned above in that  all three states define themselves and their forms of 
government with reference to religion, in one way or another.
This is most evident in the case of Iran which, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, has been an 
Islamic Republic whose executive authority is, by constitutional law, a Shi’a cleric of the highest 
rank and whose constitution requires state compliance with Islamic law in domestic and foreign 
affairs. With regards to the latter, §16 under Article 3 of the Islamic Republic’s 1979 constitution, 
holds that the country’s foreign policy  is “[framed] on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal 
commitment to all Muslims, and unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world.”35       In 
Saudi Arabia, although the leading figures in the royal family - not the clergy - hold executive 
office, the former run the state’s affairs according to the Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic law. 
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35 CONSTITUTION  OF THE  ISLAMIC  REPUBLIC  OF  IRAN  (1979) Available  from:  https://faculty.unlv.edu/pwerth/Const- 
Iran(abridge).pdf. [Accessed: 10 September, 2014.]
Indeed, the first Article of the constitution holds that the Kingdom “is a sovereign Arab Islamic state 
with Islam as its religion; God’s Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet [...] are its constitution [...]”36
With regards to government principles, Article 8 similarly  states that the “Government in the 
Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  is  based  on  the  premise  of  justice,  consultation,  and  equality  in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”37
The case of Israel is more complex. While proclaimed a “Jewish state” in its Declaration of
Establishment, the meaning of “Jewish” is particularly intricate and has indeed taken on different
meanings for different Governments and, by extension, their foreign policies. This has to do with 
Jews being an ethno-religious group, rather than a strictly religious one, as a result of which 
“Jewish” encompasses secular, historical and/or religious meanings. The wide-ranging constituents 
whose support was needed for the Declaration of the Establishment of Israel in 1948 indeed had 
different  views of what should constitute the Jewish state, with the secular left wanting to forego 
any reference to Divine providence and religious Jews, as well as those “anchored” in “Jewish 
tradition”, wanting to include one. The consensus-building document finally included a reference to 
Tzur Israel (or, Rock of Israel); a phrase typically used as a “euphemism for God”, but one that is 
vague enough to allow for non-religious interpretations, as well.38   As chapter 2 and 4 will show, 
Menachem Begin’s right-wing Likud government was religiously inclined in its interpretation of the 
“Jewish” state, and much more so than the Labour-led governments which preceded him.
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Within-case design
The within-case study design is inspired primarily by the work of George & Bennett (2005), which 
proposes that case studies be focused and structured, as such a design render case study findings 
relevant beyond their immediate context without, importantly, preventing idiosyncratic features of 
stand-alone cases from being addressed. This in turn overcomes the critique by Rosenau (1968) and 
others that, where case studies lack “scientific consciousness”, their otherwise interesting findings 
do not produce orderly  cumulation of knowledge.39   For this project, which seeks to advance the 
post-secular debate, in important part, by deriving patterns of regularity from substantive empirical 
findings, a focused and structured case study design is particularly appropriate. 
The case studies of this project are focused in that they concentrate on the foreign policy  of specific 
leaders within a bounded period of time. For Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively, that means a 
focus on the foreign policy of Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1977-84), Ayatollah Khomeini 
(1979-89) and Crown Prince, later King, Fahd bin Abdulaziz (1975-1995). The focus on leadership 
has been adopted primarily based on the observation that the leaders in question yielded 
disproportionate influence on foreign policy.40  By no means does this imply that they were above 
the influence of government dynamics and, even less, public opinion and systemic factors. Indeed, 
the influence of such factors, however, leadership  is, in these cases, by far the most decisive and the 
study thus merits to be approached through its lens.
Moreover, this focus is strengthened when coupled with the observation that the leaders were ardent 
believers, in the case of Khomeini, observed religious tradition in the case of Fahd, and fell 
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40  The leaders’ influence on foreign policy varied across the case studies; this is detailed in chapter 3.
somewhere  in  between  in  the  case  of  Begin.41       Khomeini,  for  example,  held  the  position 
Marja’ (source of emulation) and was regarded by his followers as Imam, a meaningful title 
bestowed only  upon those regarded as rightful successors of the Prophet Muhammad.42     Less 
personal and more resultant of social and political tradition, but  meaningful in its own right, Fahd 
changed his official title from “His Majesty” to “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” shortly after 
ascending to the throne in 1982.43  Finally, Begin proclaimed that “the Bible is our Mandate” as the 
basis  for  his  territorial  maximalist  policies,44   just  as  his  electoral  victory  was  considered  by
Orthodox Rabbi, Meir Kahane, as a “miracle of miracles” because Israel would finally  have as its 
Prime Minister “a man [who] actually speaks the “one little word [God]” that we have waited to 
hear”.45     More  to  it,  Begin,  Khomeini  and  Fahd  led  their  states  during  a  religiously-charged 
historical period, with Islamist sentiment burgeoning regionally, and right-wing Zionism of religio- 
nationalist character thriving inside Israel and in the Jewish Diaspora. As chapter 3 details, this 
largely resulted from Israel’s decisive victory in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 which, in 
delegitimizing the hitherto dominant pan-Arabist ideology, stimulated Islamism and, in turn, 
convinced many Jews of Godly intervention. Both trajectories were furthermore strengthened by the 
Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979.
The case studies of this project  are structured in the sense that they  have each been developed 
according to the same three overarching research criteria, inspired by  the Constructivist-FPA 
theoretical framework (detailed later in this chapter), as well as the thesis’ conceptualization of 
“religious beliefs” as comprised by a community of believers (“religion”) and, interrelated, the 
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individual’s personal religious experience (“faith”) (detailed in chapter 2). The research criteria, 
though in reality interrelated, have been separated conceptually in the research design for the 
purpose of facilitating a structured study that enables the cumulation of knowledge and inference 
across cases. The first research criterion is understanding how the leader’s religious beliefs forms 
part of his worldview. It is based on the perceived need, inspired by the cognitive branch of FPA 
literature, to understand the psychological environment of the decision maker, in order that we may 
make an informed evaluation about how he frames the information that he is presented with in a 
given context.46    Addressing this criterium involves addressing a range of sub-criteria as well, 
including how and what experiences, circumstances and people shaped his faith? Which doctrinal 
interpretive tradition did he subscribe to? and how did faith fit into, and was shaped by, other facets 
of his worldview? These sub-criteria are inspired particularly by Constructivism’s emphasis on 
intersubjective ideas and the importance of “a community  of believers” (“religion”) in shaping of 
the leader’s religious beliefs, but also by the “operational coding” approach initiated and 
popularized by  FPA scholars Leites and George, respectively, which holds that leaders‘ belief 
system, including their motivational biases, influence leader’s decision making.
The second research criterion is understanding how the leader’s religious beliefs influence his 
foreign policy doctrine, including his perception of national interest. This is inspired by  FPA and 
Constructivist literature on the role of beliefs and shared ideas on leaders’ formation of national 
interest. It overlaps with the third and final research criterion, whereby the case studies look at how 
the leader’s religious beliefs reflect in his foreign policies. For Israel, the foreign policies include 
the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee; for Iran, Khomeini’s policy  vis-a-vis the 
Iran-Iraq War and his fatwa against Salman Rushdie; and for Saudi Arabia, Fahd’s policy vis-a-vis 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and Operation Desert Shield and Storm. This criterion is approached 
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through the understanding of religious beliefs as malleable and shaped by the contexts in which 
their interpreter operates (detailed in chapter 2). As such, addressing this research criterion does 
not necessarily involve identifying a strong correlation between the leader’s religious beliefs and his 
foreign policy decisions (although it could); but inferring where a relationship between the two is 
likely to exist and how. Achieving this involves addressing sub-criteria like does religion interplay 
with other ideational factors, such as nationalism? Which material conceptions of security might be 
important? and, in doing so, weighing relevant primary  and secondary sources against each other to 
derive the most plausible inference.
 Overcoming limitations
A number of “issues” posed by the conceptual framework merit clarification and are addressed in 
detail here. The most protruding is that of researcher bias. How can we ascertain that there is indeed 
a relationship  between a leader’s religious beliefs, his foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy 
decisions? As Jervis (1994), amongst others, points out, an “agreement” between foreign policy 
outcome and a specific idea, does not necessarily imply a causal link between the two or, I would 
add, even a relationship or connection between them.47   This is rendered even more complex when 
considering the multifaceted and malleable nature of religious beliefs including the latter’s 
intertwining with ideologies like secular nationalism but also its shaping by  material factors like 
economic or military security. The answer is that such a “risk” cannot be overcome entirely; or, as 
Tetlock (1998) articulates, “No matter what one does, one runs the risk of standing accused of either 
political naïveté or of surreptitiously advancing an activist agenda [...]”48   No one apart from the 
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leaders themselves would be able to ascertain the basis on which they acted and indeed whether 
their religious rhetoric, on which observers judge their motivations and intentions, is spoken 
truthfully. Nonetheless, various methodological steps can be taken to mitigate this enough that the 
resulting  analysis  is  balanced  and  offers  a  valuable  interpretation.  One  such  step  is  the  case 
selection: as noted above, the leaders in question were chosen in part due to their religious beliefs 
featuring in a significant way, whether as a result of ardent personal conviction and dedication as in 
the case of Khomeini, social and political tradition, as in the case of Fahd, or somewhere in between 
as in the case of Begin. A second, related step is triangulation between sources and methods: each 
case study offers thick description through a range of materials, including primary sources like 
archival documents, diary entries, public and private discourse as well as secondary analysis by 
observant scholars and people who have worked alongside the leaders in question, offering essential
insight into the latter’s religious beliefs and personalities.
It is worth clarifying here that this project is less aimed at making a causal claim between religion 
and foreign policy, than it  is with explaining the relationship between the religious beliefs of Begin, 
Khomeini and Fahd and their respective foreign policies. By no means does this discard the 
existence of such a link. However, as chapter 2 details, religion and the religious beliefs of leaders 
are malleable and their pre- and pro-scriptions are thus contingent upon the context in which they 
operate. Given the prominence of religion in the leaders’ worldview, a causal link between the latter 
and the foreign policy outcomes is therefore assumed to exist, but  the focus of the project - and the 
more interesting question - is to explain this relationship rather than simply asserting it. 
Specifically, this means fully understanding how religion figures in the leaders’ worldview and 
foreign policy  doctrine and how it, as a variable, interacts with contextual factors to shape foreign 
policy outcomes.  Through its triangulation of methods and sources the study  aims at descriptive 
inference, understood, as Gerring (2012)  puts  it,  to  be  “a  [form]  of  argumentation”  that  is  “not 
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(or  only  secondarily)  [a charaterization] of the sort of evidence available for causal inference.”49 
Nor is this method aimed solely at understanding, as descriptive inference is often understood to be, 
but can perform explanatory functions by identifying patters in the social world that  may indeed 
have causal implications. A major benefit follows from the descriptive inference approach, namely 
that it allows for, indeed emphasizes, analysis in which nuances are accommodated. That is crucial 
for this study where religious beliefs, which by their very nature are a malleable and 
multifaceted “variable”, must necessarily  be analyzed in a highly contextualized way. To be sure, 
descriptive inferences are subjective  to  the  extent  that  they  emphasize  certain  dimensions  and 
by  extension  produce  a particular narrative; however, this subjectivity is much lower than, say, a 
form of argumentation which narrowly looks for a causal relationship between variables, potentially 
at the expense of accuracy.50  Moreover, this methodology is entirely  accommodated by a 
Constructivist-FPA theoretical framework, developed in the section below, whose components 
respectively aim at understanding and explaining and which, moreover, do not make 
substantive claims about the nature of agents or content  of social structures but rather provide a 
framework for thinking about
those properties.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
Constructivism and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) make up the theoretical framework through 
which the thesis’ research question is approached. The latter has, alongside the thesis’ 
conceptualization of “religious beliefs” as comprised by a community of believers (“religion”) and 
the individual’s personal religious experience (“faith”), inspired the three research criteria developed 
in the previous section, which in turn provide the structure for the thesis’ case studies.  As the 
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sections below will unpack in more detail, Constructivism alerts us to the importance of shared, 
intersubjective ideas in shaping notions of national interest. This is useful insofar as it provides an 
intellectual terrain for understanding how “religion,” conceived as a community  of believers to 
which the foreign policy decision maker belongs, shapes perceptions of national interest. 
Constructivism falls short, however, of offering intellectual tools with which to understand if and 
how a decision maker’s “faith,” or their personal religious experience, may influence foreign policy 
decision making. Here, FPA literature - especially its Political Psychology and Cognitive branches - 
offers valuable insight by highlighting the importance of decision makers’ belief system and 
cognitive functions like “unmotivated bias” in determining their foreign policy decision making. The 
sections below outline the intellectual premises of Constructivism and FPA, emphasizing where 
relevant how and why they have served to inspire the research criteria around which the thesis‘ case 
studies are structured. The usefulness of the Constructivist-FPA framework in understanding the role 
of religion in foreign policy is picked up again in the thesis’ conclusion (chapter 7), where it is 
discussed in the context of the thesis’ empirical findings. 
Constructivism
A number of scholars introduced above in the context of the post-secular IR debate, including 
Barnett   (2011),   Bellin   (2008),   Hurd   (2011)   and   Sandal   &   James   (2010)   point   towards 
Constructivism as a highly suitable framework within which to study religion in international 
relations. Exploring the fundamental assumptions held across diverse strands of Constructivism, 
and provided that religion is understood to be an ideational factor (explored chapter 2), one can see 
why. Constructivists have a “subjectivist” understanding of the political and social world in that 
they  view the world as made up of “social facts”, such as sovereignty and rights, which have no 
material reality in and of themselves, but whose existence depend on agents’ collectively held belief 
31
in and about them. As such, ideas matter crucially  in the Constructivist ontology, and it is the 
understanding by  people and states of the world, including their ideas about themselves and others, 
that determine the way  they act. This distinguishes the Constructivist ontology from the Materialist 
one, which holds that it  is the physical world - above all, the autonomous material forces in it  - that 
determine the behaviour of agents and states. Where neo-Realists and -Liberals would typically, in 
this regard, debate about whether material forces determine, for example, arms races or institution 
making, Constructivists make no substantive claims about the nature of agents or content of social 
structures and interactions; they rather provide a framework for thinking about those properties.51
From this premise, it does not necessarily follow that Constructivists disagree with the neo-Realist 
and neo-Liberal view that military  equipment and money constitute power. Critical Constructivists 
like Weldes (1996), for example, stress the intricate link between ideas, on the one hand, and 
security-oriented state interests, on the other. Ontologically, the latter are not thought to be to 
“naturally” given or shaped by material forces, even in cases like the Cuban Missile Crisis where 
US foreign policy could be perceived in such a way. Rather, she is concerned with showing, 
national interests are socially  constructed by  a small elite who “thinks into being” the national 
interest and legitimizes it, to themselves and others, through discourse.52    Conversely, some 
Constructivists emphasize how social internal structures can prompt states to develop national 
interests that run counter to material conceptions of national interest. In her book National Interests 
in International Society (1996), Finnemore shows how states construct their national interests, and 
subsequently  their behaviour, according to an international social structure defined, not  by  material 
conceptions of power, but international organizations and the norms they  promote. With reference 
to UNESCO, the Red Cross and the World Bank, she shows how states have been socialized into 
perceiving the norms forward by these institutions, as part of their national interest; norms that, 
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from  a  Materialist  perspective,  would  be  trumped  by  conventional  understandings  of  state 
interests.53  In other words, what separates Constructivists from Materialists and Structuralists is not 
what they think about issues like national interest, power and norms - Weldes and Finnemore are 
examples of how these can vary greatly between Constructivists - but that they  understand those 
issues to be socially mediated.
Crucially, Constructivists hold that the ideas shaping international politics are intersubjective ones, 
shared between people and irreducible to the individual.54  While surely embedded in the individual 
human brain, ideas are meaningful only  when they are collectively held in which cases they can 
constitute powerful forces of international politics. National identity, for example, itself collectively 
imagined, comprises the powerful prism through which agents perceive their interests and the basis 
on which they act.55    Equally, social structures are thought to be simultaneously imagined and 
reinforced by agents’ reference to them. Tied to this, is the notion of change. For Constructivists 
like Adler (2006) it is but “a slight exaggeration to say that if Constructivism is about anything, it is 
about change”;56     change referring to alterations in social structures as well as social processes 
initiated by agents.57  Whether patterns in international politics change often or are relatively  stable 
(though never static) is debated amongst Constructivists and dependent, in no small part, on where 
they  fall on the agency-structure spectrum. All are premised, though, on the ontology that change 
depends on shared ideas and not necessarily, as Materialist theories would have it, on changes in the 
distribution of material objects like money or natural resources.58  And while contingent 
generalizations or claims about patterns of regularity in international politics indeed comprise much 
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of Constructivist literature, the Constructivist ontology stresses, above all, the social construction of 
processes; their substantive outcome is of secondary concern.
Equally crucial to the Constructivist ontology is the idea that agents, mostly thought to be states, 
and structures, are co-constitutive: international norms, for example, are simultaneously  imagined 
and reinforced by agents’ reference to them and practice of them. The two - agents and structures - 
are neither static nor separated, but continuously  and profoundly co-constitutive, in that the former 
“creates” new structures and institutions just as those same structures and institutions socialize and 
influence agents.59    Constructivism’s intellectual premises outlined thus far - including its 
subjectivist nature, the primacy  of ideas in shaping perceptions of the national interest and the 
possibility of change in those ideas, as well as the co-constitutive nature of agents and structures - 
provide an excellent terrain on which to explore religion’s role in foreign policy decision making. 
This is so not just because religion is considered an ideational factor, and thus potentially  assumes a 
critical role in a Constructivist analysis; but importantly also because Constructivism emphasizes 
the continuous interplay, or co-constitution, of shared ideas and structures and the potential change 
which may result from that. The latter thus accommodates the conceptualization of “religion,” 
explored in chapter 2, as a community of believers who share a particular religious interpretative 
strand, just as it  accommodates religious doctrine as a malleable concept that, far from being static, 
is shaped by  - and itself shapes - contextual factors. These premises of Constructivism have 
inspired, especially, the thesis’ second research criterion to “understand how leader’s ‘religious 
beliefs’ - that is, the interplay between his personal faith and the community of believers to which he 
belongs  - influence his perception of national interest.”  
Despite Constructivism’s emphasis on the co-constitution of agency and structure, Constructivist 
scholars tend to yield more towards either end of the structure- agency spectrum, possibly 
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because, as Wendt (1987) highlighted in Constructivism’s early days, “we lack a self-evident way 
to conceptualize [agency and structure] and their relationship”.60  In his article, Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State (1994), Wendt discusses how interaction of states on the 
systemic level can influence state identities, and by extension their interests, to generate 
cooperation between them and ultimately  an “international state.” Constructivism’s idea of co-
constitutive properties of agents and structures is rendered throughout his argument; however, 
although drawing on domestic sources of states’ identity formation, Wendt takes “a state-centric 
approach” and largely focuses his analysis on the systemic level.61    As Hurd (2008) points out, 
focusing a Constructivist analysis on the state, or any other unit of analysis, is sometimes necessary 
in order that a certain argument may be brought to bear. However, given that the Constructivist 
ontology  which holds that social interaction on and between all levels of analysis is complicit in the 
creation of identities, interests, social structures, processes and practices, it is not viable  to  isolate 
the  units  of  analyses  entirely.  As  Hurd  puts  it,  “there  is  no  impetus  in Constructivism  for 
a  zero-sum  debate  over  “which”  level  provides  the  most  leverage  over puzzles.”62 In the case 
of an analysis which studies interactions at the systemic-level and takes state-units for granted, a 
neglect to explicate how the historical construction of states as sovereign entities occurred may have 
implications for the overall analysis. That  said, assumptions and choices regarding which aspects of 
a puzzle to problematize is encouraged, if unavoidable, in a Constructivist analysis.63  As noted at 
various points in the chapter thus far, this project employs a focus on leadership  due to the 
disproportionate influence yielded by  Begin, Khomeini and Fahd on the foreign policies of Israel, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively, as well as the need for a project like this one to employ a 
narrow research focus in order to yield substantive findings. Whilst the Constructivist ontology 
allows for us to understand the role of religion, as an ideational factor, in foreign policy- the how 
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question - it does not necessarily  provide the conceptual tools to explore the why; for this purpose 
FPA offers a valuable, complimentary approach.
        Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)   
Like Constructivism, FPA stresses subjectivity, albeit with an overwhelming focus on individual 
agents acting alone or in groups. This has been the primary objective of FPA since its inception as 
an IR-subfield in the 1950s: to move beyond the notion of states as unitary, rational actors 
responding only  to material, systemic forces - unpacking the “black-box”, as it were - to focusing 
on the decision makers constructing foreign policy and the array of explanans influencing them. IR 
has come a long way since the 1950s, and it is now widely  acknowledged - implicitly or explicitly - 
across the discipline that we need to look beyond, below and across states to make sense of patterns 
in international politics. As Alden & Aran (2012) note, even Realism, in its neo-Classical variant, 
now deliberately integrates variables like perception, leadership, domestic structures that structural 
Realism steered far away from.64     The proliferation of Constructivist scholarship following the 
USSR’s collapse in the 1990s has played no small part  in this development and is for that reason the 
IR theory  which, it is increasingly argued, is the most compatible with FPA.65    Even with its 
flexibility regarding which unit  of analysis to conduct a given analysis around, Constructivism, due 
to its focus on social meanings and structures, does not come close to fleshing out how those same 
constructs are experienced by the individual decision maker as a result of his or her belief system 
and, through his or her negotiations and decisions, are felt in the foreign policy of a state. As 
Tetlock (1998) points out, this dimension is necessary:
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If we seek explanations of why national decision makers do what they do, 
we will have to supplement the insights of macro theories [...] with micro 
assumptions about decision makers’ cognitive representations of the policy 
environment, their goals in that  environment, and their perceptions of the 
normative and domestic political constraints on policy options.66
FPA has a wealth of analytical and conceptual tools to offer in this regard, especially  its scholarship 
on Political Psychology. Three paradigmatic works laid the foundation for FPA in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, all of them emphasizing the need for an agent-specific approach to understanding 
foreign policy and foreign policy decision making. In Decision-making as an Approach to the Study 
of International Politics (1954), Snyder, Bruck & Sapin argued that, in order to make sense of 
foreign policy outcomes, one must first understand the operating environment as it is perceived by 
policy makers according to their ideas and values, amongst other factors, and they tasked scholars 
with reconstructing the world, as viewed through the eyes of decision makers. In a complementary 
study, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics (1956), Sprout 
&  Sprout   argued   that   foreign   policy   makers   reach   decisions   based   on   their   subjective 
“psychological environment” as it  is that which shapes their perception of the “operational 
environment”. In Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy (1966), Rosenau emphasized the 
possibility of actor-specific theory of integrating various levels of analysis.  Though developing as a 
critique of the dominant Realist theory, these works remained within a rationalist framework which 
assumed leaders to act to in a way which assumed national interests to be dictated by systemic and, 
especially,  material  forces.67    Nonetheless,  they  stimulated  what  would  become  a  much  more 
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nuanced  research  strand  dedicated  to  understanding  the  psychological  and  societal  milieux  of 
foreign policy decision making.68
The belief system of decision makers has received critical attention in FPA literature and has been 
found to influence perceptions in a way different from that propagated by rational choice models. It 
is elaborated upon here, as it  has greatly inspired the research criteria around which the thesis’ case 
studies have been organised (more on this further below, and in the thesis’ conclusion). The main 
study of the importance of leaders’ belief systems on their policies is by George (1969), who 
popularized the concept of “operational coding” developed first by Nathan Leites in A Study of 
Bolshevism (1953).69  The latter discussed how Lenin’s motivational biases (detailed below) and the 
cultural psychological and cultural milieu of revolutionary Russia comprised a particular set of 
conceptions - an “operational code” - according to which the Soviet elite developed its strategy. 
From this study, George noted that:
[...] beliefs and premises [serve] as a prism that  influences the actor’s 
perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and 
estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, 
standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and 
tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.70
His re-examination of the operational code analysis suggests that a decision-maker’s beliefs can be 
coded  as  a  political  belief  system  with  a  set  of  philosophical  beliefs,  such  as  “What  is  the 
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“essential“ nature of political life?” and “Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or 
conflict?”  guiding  the  decision  makers’ perception  of  a  given  situation.  Equally,  instrumental 
beliefs like “What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?” and 
“What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?” form part of the 
political belief system as a prescriptions for the best way of achieving philosophical goals.71   He 
posited that a set of ten standardized research questions, inspired by philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs, could serve as “a heuristic” for analyzing the perceptive prism of any individual; a sort of 
“instrumental rationality” model bounded by a system of beliefs.72   Due to his view (and he posits, 
that  of  Leites,  too)  that  decision  makers  do  not,  mechanically   draw  on  a  set  of  “recipes  or 
repertoires  for  political  action”,  operational  coding  approach  should  be  considered  in  a  more 
nuanced way than the term implies. One reason for this is that belief systems are subject to change, 
although the extent to which they change depends on the rigidity of the decision maker’s 
personality.73   Operational code analysis has been applied widely following George’s study across a 
range of empirical contexts, with operational codes serving as both independent and dependent 
variables. Schafer & Crichlow (2000), for example, attribute shifts in US foreign policy with 
changes to Bill Clinton’s operational code and, as another example, Walker, Schafer & Narfleet 
(2001) correlated Jimmy Carter’s changing beliefs to the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian 
hostage crisis and events Horn of Africa.74  These  studies,  and  others  like  them,  propose  that 
decision  makers’ beliefs  function  as  causal mechanisms in foreign policy decision making. They 
are supported by various insights from cognitive psychology which, taken together and separately, 
hold that policy makers, like all individuals, seek to process incoming information in ways that 
simplify representations of reality, and  allow  them  to  reason  within  their  respective 
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“bounded  rationalities.”  The  concept  of “unmotivated bias”, for example, holds that, through a 
belief system, a set of cognitive dispositions is generated that shapes how an individual processes 
incoming information making him or her responsive only, or primarily, to information that is 
consistent with existing beliefs. In events where incoming information is overwhelmingly complex, 
or poses a challenge to existing beliefs, decision makers,  through “motivated biases”, actively cling 
to their existing belief system as a result of their psychological need to avoid negative emotions 
such as fear and stress, and their desire to reduce cognitive dissonance.75    Moreover, policy makers 
are prone to draw on historical analogies, metaphors and extrapolations, selected consciously  or 
subconsciously to support or confirm their existing beliefs. These reference points help  to frame 
incoming information in a way which, rightly or wrongly, offers direction and a course of action for 
the decision-maker.76   While beliefs are not thought to  be  completely  unchangeable,  cognitive 
mechanisms  like  unmotivated  biases  and historical analogies strongly  add to the perseverance of 
existing beliefs.77  Together, the premises of FPA outlined thus far alert us to the importance of 
the individual decision maker’s psychological environment, or belief system, in influencing 
his perceptions of the operational environment and, ultimately, his foreign policy  decision 
making. Collectively, they have inspired, especially, the formulation of the case studies‘ first 
research criterion to “Understand how the leader’s religious beliefs form part of his 
worldview.” What exactly comprises the leaders’ religious beliefs and world-views, and how 
that reflects in their foreign policies, is detailed in the respective case studies, and discussed 
further in the thesis’ conclusion.
Jervis (1976) combines this array of cognitive insights to show that the beliefs of decision makers 
serve as the basis on which they  perceive - or misperceive - the “operational environment”. His 
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study, and insights from social and cognitive psychology regarding beliefs in general, are important 
because they allow us to address the “why” question. As Richard Snyder stated in the early  days of 
FPA:
If one wishes to probe the ‘‘why’’ questions underlying the events, 
conditions, and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then 
decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as 
to say  that the ‘‘why’’ questions cannot be answered without analysis 
of decision making.78
The “why” question is interesting, if crucial, for this project and others like it, that seeks to go 
beyond speculating about the role of ideas in foreign policy, to identifying the sources of those 
ideas.79  As Tetlock (1998) notes “social psychology explores the thoughts, feelings, and actions of 
human beings.80   These insights are not enough in and of themselves, however, as it remains 
problematic to generalize from the individual-level to the international one. This issue opens a 
broader question about the ontological compatibility between the cognitive branch of FPA and 
Constructivism; specifically, whether FPA’s focus on individual agency as it exists largely unrelated 
to social structures, and Constructivism’s focus on intersubjective ideas as well as a co-constitutive 
agency-structure nature can be combined in a single research agenda. A synthesis between the two 
should not  be taken for granted; nonetheless, there is an implicit  or explicit  acknowledgement in 
some of FPA’s seminal works about how perceptions, ideas or beliefs of the individual decision 
maker are necessarily produced through interaction with the social, which indicate that a fruitful 
conversation between nominally agent-centric FPA and social Constructivism is indeed possible. 
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Rivera’s The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (1968), for example, notes that the 
individual’s beliefs are necessarily anchored in a larger reference group and what that group 
perceives as being real. Similarly, Janis’ Group Think (1971) argues that social reality is collectively 
constructed in that group dynamics are found to influence decision making.81    Allison makes a 
similar argument in his Essence of Decision (1971) where he shows that bureaucratic structures 
influence, if impede, governmental decision making in a crisis situation. Leites (1953), too, in his 
study of Bolshevism, looked to the norms from the cultural milieu of the intelligentsia and 
revolutionary  underground in Russia at the turn of the 20th century, to understand biases in Lenin’s 
personality.82    Altogether, these works indicate that FPA indeed provides a terrain on which to 
include the social, albeit with a heavier focus on the individual and more in terms of the 
domestic than the systemic, thus making way for an FPA-Constructivist  synthesis. This is even 
more so if we broaden our view of FPA beyond its cognitive research strand, where it  becomes clear 
that the belief systems of decision makers are not the only sources influencing foreign policy. In 
democratic states, influences emanate from domestic public opinion, bureaucratic politics, small 
and large group dynamics within which decision makers work and the media.83  Even autocrats like 
Saddam Hussein do not act independently, but depend on complex bureaucratic structures for the 
“successful” running of their state.84
Epistemologically, too, Constructivism and FPA have differentiable positions, as observed above, in 
that the former is interpretivist in its aim to understand, and the latter is objectivist in its aim to 
explain. But neither approach is so rigidly  unified as to be unable to accommodate one another. 
While there are certainly Constructivist scholars, like Wendt, who employ positivist  epistemologies 
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aimed at understanding, others like Onuf, aim towards explaining. FPA scholars are similarly 
disunited: despite its behaviouralist origins which favoured scientific study of human decision 
making whereby  ideas were treated as causal, rather than constitutive, their epistemological identity 
is now largely eclectic.85  In sum, constructivism and FPA are sufficiently flexible for some of their 
strands to synthesize in analysis; yet sufficiently different  so that they both bring value and neither 
can be discarded for this project. Specifically, that means that Constructivism offers an 
understanding of how the social world shapes the decision maker’s conception of religion, and FPA 
an explanation of how the individual decision maker feeds in turn feeds that perception into foreign 
policy decision making. A synthesis between post-positivist Constructivism and FPA, like the one 
adopted by  this project and encouraged by scholars like Houghton (2007), is thus not only  possible 
but indeed conducive to the type of full analysis that would do justice to researching religion’s role 
in foreign policy.
1.4 Structure of thesis
I develop the thesis’ argument over five chapters, followed by a discussion and conclusion. I start 
by developing a definition of religion (chapter 2), based on the perceived need for a nuanced, yet 
substantive understanding of religion, as opposed to functionalist (“religion is what religion does”) 
or essentialist  ones, which - I show - are flawed due to their respective focus on religion’s effects 
only, and disregard of important nuances within so-called “world-religions.” Based on a cumulative 
analysis that draws on insights from Religious Studies, Theology, Sociology  and not least the post- 
secular IR debate, I develop a definition of religion which understands the latter to comprise an 
interplay  between an individual’s “faith” and the interpretive tradition of the “belief-community” to 
which that individual belongs; I term this “religious beliefs;” a term that I moreover employ 
throughout  the  thesis. Apart  from  overcoming  the  drawbacks  of  functionalist  and  essentialist 
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understandings  of  religion,  this  definition  moves  beyond  IR’s  conventional  understanding  of 
religion as “a set of privatized beliefs” that hitherto has done little to understand the role of religion 
in an international relations context, if not added to the misunderstanding of it. Before applying this 
definition to case studies on Begin’s Israel, Khomeini’s Iran and Fahd’s Saudi Arabia, I “set the 
scene” (chapter 3) for the thesis’ empirical part  by  providing an overview of the Middle East 
region’s socio-political climate during the period following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war until, 
roughly, the early  1990s when the Second Gulf war ended, showing that a decisive increase in 
religiosity  and well as religious discourse and behaviour on the part of political leaders and 
movements took place. I show that, in Israel, the Jewish state’s decisive victory in the 1967 war 
prompted the establishment of a so-called “settler movement” comprised of several groups that 
called for Israeli sovereignty  over territories captured during the war, and did so overwhelmingly, 
though not exclusively, on religious grounds; a sentiment that in turn was a decisive contributor to 
the political success of Menachem Begin’s Likud party and indeed facilitated the religious- 
nationalist government that he formed following the 1977, and 1981, Israeli elections. I show that, 
in Iran, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic which 
resulted from it, succeeded a period of intense anti-Westernism in the country that went hand-in- 
hand with an ardent religious fervour; one that would furthermore persist throughout  most of Iran’s 
war with neighboring Iraq and intensify following Khomeini’s death-threatening fatwa against the 
British novelist, Salman Rushdie. I finally show that in Saudi Arabia, religious ideologies flourished 
along with religious practice in the already religiously conservative Kingdom, following an attack 
of religious extremists on Mecca’s Grand Mosque in 1979; a sentiment that  was only intensified by 
Khomeini’s religious discourse emanating across the Persian Gulf and, even more so, following the 
commencement of the second Gulf war when foreign, “infidel troops” were stationed in the 
Kingdom. In the chapter, I furthermore show that Begin, Khomeini and Fahd, apart from operating 
within these religiously charged environments, operated within decision making structures that gave 
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them a large degree of autonomy as far as foreign policy is concerned. I include this section, not 
because the thesis focuses strictly on the decision making of those leaders, but to “justify” the thesis 
assessing the foreign policies of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia throughout the prism of the leadership 
of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd.
In the first  of the thesis’ case studies (chapter 4), Religion and Foreign Policy in Israel under 
Menachem Begin (1977-84), I argue that Begin’s religious beliefs shape his worldview in no 
insignificant way, as well as his foreign policy  doctrine and, by extension, also his foreign policy 
vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee. Specifically, I show that 
Begin’s religious beliefs - comprised by his individual “faith” and its interplay with the neo- 
revisionist  “belief-community”  (the  latter  not  strictly  religious,  as  the  chapter  will  discuss)  - 
reflected in his ardent  insistence on Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in 
the context of the Camp David Accords and also, albeit indirectly, in his militant insistence to 
destroy the PLO in the context of Operation Peace for Galilee. I additionally argue, based on a 
range of primary  materials that, by employing religious references in his public discourse, Begin 
legitimized - whether to himself or his domestic constituencies - his foreign policies, especially 
given that he invoked such discourse during times of domestic discontent. Despite the observation 
that such discourse was somewhat contradictory, I discuss that his religious discourse was 
nonetheless very possibly a genuine reflection of his religious beliefs.
In the second of the thesis’ case studies (chapter 5), Religion and Foreign Policy in Iran under 
Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-89), I make a similar argument; that Khomeini’s religious beliefs - the 
outcome of his individual “faith” and its interplay  with the interpretive tradition of the Twelver 
Shi’a  “belief-community”  to  which  he  belonged  -  profoundly  shaped  his  worldview  and  by 
extension also a foreign policy doctrine which was premised on consolidating the Islamic Republic 
45
and spreading the Islamic Revolution; a doctrine that, in turn, reflected in his continuation of the 
Iran-Iraq war past Iran’s nominal victory  in 1982, as well as in his death threatening fatwa against 
British novelist, Salman Rushdie. I moreover argue, and show, that Khomeini legitimized himself 
and his foreign policies with reference to religious discourse, invoking themes of jihad and 
martyrdom specific to, especially, the Shi’a interpretive tradition of Islam. Whilst  such discourse 
carried contradictory messages and indeed prescribed contradictory  actions vis-a-vis foreign policy, 
I argue that such discrepancies can be explained with reference to Islamic concepts like maslahat 
(expediency) and ijtihad (right to interpretation), and thus represent a development of Khomeini’s 
religious beliefs, rather than a departure from them.
In the thesis’ third and final case study (chapter 6), Religion and Foreign Policy in Saudi Arabia 
under Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (1975-1992), I argue that the Wahhabi “belief-community” to 
which Fahd belonged comprised an important part of his worldview, though less as a result of his 
individual “faith,” than of the historic religio-political agreement forged between eighteenth century 
leaders of the Saud dynasty and Wahhab tribe, which Fahd, as a leading royal figure, necessarily 
had an interest in living by. This aspect of Fahd’s world-view interplayed with another important 
component which, for Fahd as a Royalist, demanded equal interest, namely a strong alliance with 
the US, whose expertise and support in defense and military matters, the Kingdom depended for its 
material security. Fahd’s worldview translated, roughly, into a foreign policy  doctrine that aimed to 
maintain a strong US-Saudi Arabian alliance as well as a leadership role in inter-Arab affairs, 
particularly in matters with a Islamic dimension; a doctrine that furthermore reflected in Fahd’s 
foreign policy vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords and Operation Desert Storm and the Gulf War that 
succeeded  it.  On  this  basis,  I  argue  that  Fahd’s  foreign  policy  cannot  be  understood  without 
reference to religion, though the connection between his individual “faith” and foreign policy is far 
from as direct as in the cases of Begin and, especially, Khomeini. But like those leaders, Fahd 
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employed religious discourse to legitimize himself and his foreign policies and, doing so, reinforced 
his identity as an Islamic leader of an Islamic Arab Kingdom. On this basis, I argue that religion 
constrained Fahd from pursuing his preferred moderate foreign policy vis-a-vis the Camp  David 
Accords, and delegitimized him in the eyes of religious extremists when he invited “infidel” troops 
into the Kingdom in the context of Operation Desert Shield.
The thesis’ conclusion (chapter 7) discusses the abovementioned case-study findings and outlines 
avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
THINKING ABOUT RELIGION: KEY DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to 
be perfect is to have changed often.
- John Henry Cardinal Newman86
2.0 Introduction
The  opening  quote  by   Newman  is  excerpted  from  his  illustrious  work  The  Development  of 
Christian Doctrine (1845) where it forms part of a larger argument that interpretation of doctrine is 
necessarily shaped by the contemporary socio-political milieu but can be so without breaking with 
its fundamental principles. Newman wrote in the early 1840s under decidedly European and 
Catholic87   conditions; his argument, however, applies far beyond that immediate context. Indeed, it 
foreruns IR’s post-secular debate in which scholars unanimously dismiss the essentialization of 
(any) doctrine and, to varying degrees, suggest that religion’s role must be thought about in the 
context of other factors; an ontology that, in turn, has conceptual and methodological implications 
for the study of religion in IR. As such, Newman’s quote sets the scene for exploration of the theme 
of this chapter which comprises the conceptualization of religion.
The chapter opens with a detailed discussion about definitional issues as they pertain to religion; a 
discussion that is enriched by insight from Religious Studies, Theology, Sociology and not least the 
post-secular IR debate, and which, in turn, is rendered complex by  those same insights. It firstly 
examines IR’s conventional definition of religion as a privately held set of beliefs separate from the
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86 Newman, J. H. C. (1960) An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. 2nd edition. New York: Image Books. p. 63.
87 Newman wrote On The Development of Christian  Doctrine (1845) during his period of reflections on transitioning from Anglican to 
Catholic priesthood. He converted to Catholicism in 1845, in the same year that On the Development of Christian Doctrine was 
published and, although Protestant while producing the manuscript, Newman’s work is widely thought to be one written from a Catholic 
perspective.
realm of politics, derived from the discipline’s reading of international relations in the post- 
Westphalian order. It  does so with a view to show that such a Western-centric reading, apart from 
being at fault for perpetrating scholarly  biases, is unsuited to approaching the study  of religion as it 
pertains to a context other than that of seventeenth century Europe, and particularly  one that  is non- 
Western. Attempting to understand the role of   religion, like this project does, in Middle Eastern 
societies and their politics through a prism which holds that  phenomenon to be a set of privatized 
beliefs would, then, be thoroughly off the mark.
The chapter goes on to show that a comprehensive understanding of religion, attempted by  various 
scholars (discussed below) as an effort to overcome narrow and politicized definitions, is 
problematic for the opposite reasons. While its generality  largely, albeit not entirely, mitigates 
issues pertaining to Eurocentrism, the definition it  derives is necessarily too vague to serve as a 
useful analytical tool, to the extent that it encompasses phenomena like nationalism or Nazism that 
are, despite their overlapping elements and histories with religion, distinct  ones (though not 
necessarily ones that should be studied differently). Other efforts to develop separate substantive 
definitions of each world religion, conversely, prove themselves to be intellectually  implausible, in 
part, because they do not account for, sometimes contradictory, nuances within religious doctrines 
despite their substantive approach, and, partly, because they are too rigid to capture the doctrinal 
changes which occur in line with contextual ones. Finally, functionalist approaches which do not 
approach the study of religion by  way of any  particular conceptualization, but rather examine its 
effects in isolated contexts, while applaudable insofar as they largely mitigate the drawbacks of 
Eurocentrism, essentialism and generality, in solely taking religion to mean as its effects suggest, 
does not advance the scholarly study of religion in a substantive way to the extent that this project 
seeks to do.
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Informed by this cumulative analysis and inspired particularly  by Sheikh (2012), the chapter arrives 
at a conceptualization of religion whereby  the latter is taken to be a phenomenon which can be 
studied substantively with reference to, not  an overarching religious doctrine, like Islam, but  a 
community  of believers within a specific doctrine, such as, Twelver Shi’ism. I term this 
“community-religion.” Agents within belief communities are furthermore thought to hold individual 
understandings, based on factors like their upbringing and education, of what their community- 
religion pre- and pro-scribes in terms of beliefs and/or action. I term the personal, religious 
experience, “faith”. I use “religious doctrine” to refer to what is usually  understood as world 
religions, such as Judaism, Christianity or Islam in the most general sense. Inspired largely by 
Newman’s work described above, I moreover conceive of community-religion, faith and religious 
doctrine as fluid constructs, but ones that, nonetheless, retain certain fundamental elements, 
facilitating a substantive study. With these distinguishable definitions of terms, the project thus 
overcomes, insofar as it is possible, understandings of religion that are inadequate for the study of 
that phenomenon in IR due to being Euro-centric or essentialist, on one extreme, and generalist or 
functionalist, on the other.
Equally importantly, it provides an ontology within which the theoretical framework outlined in the 
previous chapter was devised. Constructivism, with its focus on intersubjective processes in the 
formation of ideas, as well as the interplay between agency  and structure, in many  ways 
complements various of the dimensions unveiled during the cumulative analysis of religion. 
Specifically, it allows us to understand intersubjective ideas about beliefs and/or practices, as they 
pertain to, and are shaped by, belief communities. Moreover, with regards to foreign policy 
outcomes, it offers an intellectual ground on which to explore the interplay between said ideas and 
contextual factors which, as Newman and indeed the title of his seminal work alludes to, hold great 
importance for the development of doctrine. For a project  like this one, which takes three foreign 
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policy leaders as its main variable of study, Constructivism nonetheless falls short of offering a full 
range of analytical tools. Specifically, its focus on shared ideas forego a focus’ on the individual 
decision maker. Here, FPA offers a complementary set of analytical tools as it, like Constructivism, 
focuses on social processes, but does so with a focus on human decision making, including the 
psychological environment, personality characteristics and cognitive biases of individuals, all of 
which  are  avenues  in  which  personal  faith  figures. Although  not  without  its  ontological  and 
epistemological discords, as outlined in the previous chapter, a synthesis between Constructivism 
and FPA thus offers a range of tools with which to conduct a full analysis.
2.1 Defining religion
Moving beyond the Westphalian understanding of religion
The intricacies involved in defining religion and the implications that arise from the way its 
“resurgence” on the political scene and in international relations is discussed has received due 
attention in IR’s post-secular debate. With the exception of some initial contributions (discussed 
below), that debate is geared toward ridding IR of the idea, which has hitherto dominated in its 
scholarship, that religion exists, or ought to, as a doctrine of ideas in a realm separate from that  of 
politics. This idea has long been rejected, if it was ever entertained, in disciplines like Religious 
Studies, Theology, Philosophy, Middle East Studies and, to a lesser extent, Sociology,88    but has 
generally  been part  of the vernacular in IR. It is so, as a result of the authority  that the Treaties of 
Westphalia, which famously implemented the cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion)
principle, holds in the discipline as a prerequisite for the development of the modern world order as
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88 Secularization theory, which holds  that  societies will secularize as they modernize, was dominant in Sociology for much of the latter 
half of the twentieth century. One of its hitherto most vocal proponents, Peter Berger (1996), has since admitted that secularization 
theory was “essentially mistaken”, and cited a comprehensive range of empirical events, from Vatican II to Islamic and Evangelical 
revivals worldwide, as the source of his new perspective that the world is, in fact, de-secularizing (Berger, P. (1996) Secularism in 
Retreat. The National Interest. 46. p. 3.)
it emerged in seventeenth century  Europe and, subsequently, around the world.89  By and large, IR’s 
interpretation of the Westphalian principle has, along with Enlightenment writings and the 
secularization thesis that  have informed the discipline, taken religion to be a set of beliefs that are 
privately held and practiced.90
In the context of the post-secular debate, this dominant interpretation has been challenged by Petito
& Hatzopoulos who adopt bold statements like “religion was the object that  needed to vanish for 
modern international politics to come into being”91   in the edited volume of the equally  bold title 
Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (2003). Or, like Philpott’s assertion in 
his article The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations (2002), that the 
“[Westphalian synthesis] was shaken [by] a figure whose identity is public religion - religion that is
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89 There are notable exceptions to  this  understanding; scholarship exists which challenges the claim of Westphalia as the progenitor of 
modern nation-state sovereignty. Buzan  & Little (2000), for example, point out that city-states with sovereign principles existed prior to 
the signing of the Westphalian Treaties (Buzan, B. & Little, R. (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 167-188.), as  does the perhaps most obstinate critic of the conventional 
understanding of Westphalia’s significance, Krasner, who additionally highlights that aspects of medieval Europe persisted after the 
Treaties’ signing (Krasner, S. D. (1993) Westphalia and All  That. In Goldstein, J. & Keohane, R. (eds.) (1993) Ideas and foreign 
policy: beliefs, institutions and political change. Ithaca:  Cornell University Press. p. 235-264.) Krasner’s critique is merited to an extent, 
according to  Farr (2005) who acknowledges that the papacy and feudal aristocracy that had hitherto enjoyed  ecclesiastical  and political 
hegemony still  retained some power after the Treaties’  signing (Farr, J. (2005) Point: The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-
State. International Social Science Review, 2005, Vol. 80 (3/4), p. 156.); and to Philpott, who outlines how monarchs in Britain, France 
and Sweden gained supremacy over the church and territorial rivals from the 14th to  mid 17th century (so, surpassing the date of the 
Peace Treaties) (Philpott, Daniel (2000) The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations.  World  Politics.  52.  p.  210-1). 
Even  in   light   of  such  discrepancies   that   challenge  the  commonly  held  view  of  the Westphalian Peace as marking the origin of the 
modern system of international relations, both Farr and Philpott agree that  the conventional understanding withstands a large part of its 
criticism. To Farr (2005: 159) “[...] the Peace of Westphalia remains the foundation  of modern international relations”, and to Philpott 
(2005: 208-13) the signing of the Treaties, at the very least, marks the consolidation of the modern international system.” Prior to  the 
Treaties of Westphalia being signed, medieval Europe was characterised by religious wars wrought by the Protestant Reformation that 
manifested as a result of growing public discontent with the ruling Catholic Church. Until the reformation’s outbreak in 1517, (to a large 
extent also under its  duration and to a smaller extent, after), the Holy Roman Empire had substantial  powers that enforced religious 
uniformity. The Westphalian Treaties did not explicitly deny religion a role in the state system; however, religion’s exclusion from 
politics was largely facilitated  by their inclusion of the principle that no institution above the state would henceforth be entrusted  with 
the authority to interfere in religious matters, as well as by the principle of non-interference into religious matters  between states. 
Additionally, as it was the case with the sovereignty  principle, medieval European warfare changed character following signing of the 
treaties (Philpott, D. (2000), The Religious Roots  of Modern International Relations, p. 208-240). This is not to say that religious wars 
did not occur after Westphalia; however, European warfare would never again be characterised by the intervention for religion to the 
extent that it was before 1648 (Holsti, K. J. (2004) Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional  Change in International Politics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 124.) and the secular principle of raison d’etat replaced religion as the main driver of foreign policy 
(Thomas, S. M. (2005) The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul 
of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 55.)
90  See e.g. Keohane, R. O. (2002) The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and “Liberalism of Fear”. 
Dialogue IO. 1  (1). p. 29;  Fox, J. (2009) Integrating Religion  into International Relations  Theory.   In  Haynes, J. (ed.) Routledge 
Handbook of Religion and Politics. Oxon and New York: Routledge. p. 288; Philpott, D. (2002) The Challenge of September 11 to 
Secularism in International Relations. World Politics. 55 (1). p. 66-95. All of these are discussed in detail in chapter 1.
91 Petito, F. and Hatzopoulos, P. (eds.) (2003) Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan. p. 1.
not privatized within the cocoon of the individual or the family but that dares to refashion secular 
politics and culture.”92     Such statements have admittedly helped to shed light on a previously 
ignored aspect  of IR which, as highlighted in the previous chapter, is increasingly necessary in 
order to understand international relations. However, by  framing religion in terms of its “return” 
and invoking a binary of “public” versus “privatized”, the abovementioned scholars are, although 
giving unprecedented and warranted importance to religion, reproducing the categories with which 
IR has hitherto used to treat  that  phenomenon, namely as a realm distinct from that of politics. 
Insofar as the purpose of the post-secular turn in IR should be to move beyond merely bemoaning 
the discipline’s disregard for religion, as critics like Bellin (2008) have commendably pointed out, 
such efforts do not move us toward a better understanding of what religion is and how to approach 
the study of it, in the context of international relations.93
A first step  towards overcoming this binary is to show that religion is conceivable as a fluid 
construct whose meaning waxes and vanes over time and, importantly, can come to be perceived as 
“fixed” by the authority which defines it. For example, Christianity in seventeenth century Europe 
compared to contemporary European understandings of it, has changed drastically. Not in the 
simplistic sense that religion was removed from the public sphere and relegated to the private one. 
But in the more profound sense that it has changed from being a thoroughly social phenomenon, 
which defined a community  of believers; to a body  of beliefs held privately by the individual 
believer. This means that the European wars of religion were not primarily about clashes over 
doctrinal disputes which, once removed from public life, were resolved; they were in defense of 
communities defined by a social religion.94   This re-modeling of Christianity was instigated by 
newly emerging European states that, following the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, worked to
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93 Bellin, E. (2012) Faith in Politics. New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics. World Politics. 60 (2). p. 338-9.
94 Thomas,  S.  M.  (2000)  Taking  Religious  and  Cultural  Pluralism  Seriously:  The  Global  Resurgence  of  Religion  and  the
Transformation of International Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 29 (3). p. 815-841.
transfer citizens’ loyalty  from ecclesial powers to state ones. In this sense, the idea of religion as a 
set of privately  held doctrines or beliefs was, as Thomas (2000) argues, an “invention” necessary 
for the modern international order to emerge, made possible both due to Christianity’s malleability, 
or what state leaders perceived as such, as well as political leadership.95
The notion that religion is a fluid concept whose meaning is maneuvered by  the powers that be (or 
want to be) is driven home by the etymology of religion. The meaning of religion or its classical 
latin precursor, religio, has changed significantly from its inception in the pre-Christian era. At that 
time, Cicero linked religio to the latin verb relegere - to re-trace - and religio came to refer to 
retracing the rituals of one’s ancestors; a verb largely  synonymous with traditio. While a multitude 
of traditions in the, then, pagan Roman empire, were accepted as part  of religio, early  Christians 
were considered atheists as their traditio was unrecognizable. This changed, however, as Christian 
power grew in the Roman Empire;   Christian discourse sought to divorce the meaning of religio 
from that of traditio, and the early Christian writer Lucius Lactantius, arguing against Cicero’s 
etymology, linked religio to the verb religare - to bind together. Through the writings of Marsilio 
Ficino in the fifteenth century, religio came to connote a bond between one God and man, until it, in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became associated with a set of propositions just as it, 
importantly, took a plural form, denoting that there was more than one religio.96    Similarly, the 
understanding of religion as a set of individual beliefs started emerging in the late fifteenth century 
when the meaning of the latin term religio changed from a set of practices embedded in the 
ecclesial community, to various virtues supported by practices of the ecclesial community. Further 
ahead, in the early  sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religio came to refer to a system of beliefs 
that could exist independently from the ecclesial communities; a meaning that was consolidated by
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96 Hurd, E. S. (2011) Secularism and International Relations Theory. In: Snyder, J. (ed.) Religion and International Relations Theory.
New York: Columbia University Press. p. 72-3.
i.e. Hugo Grotius’ De Veritate Religionis Christianae (1622) and William Chillingworth’s The 
Religion of Protestants (1637), which promoted thinking about what  the Christian religion taught, 
rather than what it simply was.97
As the etymology of religion shows, and though often done in the post-secular debate and beyond, 
divorcing a given understanding of religion from the context in which it has been defined and the 
authorities - political and scholarly alike - who define it, is an unviable intellectual endeavor. 
Moreover, it is one that threatens produce, or reproduce, scholarly biases which insinuate Western 
superiority in cultural and developmental terms. From an Orientalist perspective, using the terms 
like “resurgence of religion” to describe instances where religion features “socially”, as Islam often 
does implicitly  suggests, as Bosco (2002) argues, that Islam’s present is akin to Christianity’s past 
from which liberalism and secularism has offered an escape.98  Such statements are detectable even 
in  scholarship   whose  authors  are  alert  to  the  inherent  politicization  of  defining  religion:  for 
example, Thomas (2000), whose argument that religion as a private set of doctrinal beliefs was 
“invented” by political authorities to usher in the liberal world order, writes that:
We risk misunderstanding the global resurgence of religion if we apply a 
modern concept of religion to non-Western societies where this transition is 
incomplete, or where it is being resisted as part of their struggle for 
authenticity  and development. If the global resurgence of religion and 
cultural pluralism are to be taken seriously, then a social understanding of 
religion  and  its  importance  to  the  authenticity  and  development  of
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Transformation of International Society. p. 819-23. For an early enquiry into the etymology of religion, see i.e. Hoyt, Sarah F. (1912) 
The Etymology of Religion. Journal of the American Oriental Society. 32 (2). 129-139.
98 Bosco, R. M. (2009) Persistent Orientalisms: the concept of religion in international relations. Journal of International Relations and 
Development. 12. p. 92.
communities  and  states  should  be  recognised  as  part  of  any  post- 
Westphalian international order.99
Thomas writes, plausibly, that applying our modern concept of religion to understanding how the 
latter operates in non-Western societies will not adequately capture “religion” as it manifests in its 
“social”  form.  But  by  depicting  the  “transition”  from  “social”  to  “modern”  as  one  that  is 
incomplete, as though inherently  desirable, Thomas wanders straight into the Orientalist waters that 
Bosco warns against. As noted in the previous chapter, Hurd (2011) has observed that, in a Christian 
context, the “religious” and “secular” cannot readily be separated because the so-called secular age 
of Enlightenment is in many, significant ways a continuation of Christian Europe under the Holy 
Roman Empire;100   Barnett (2011) makes a similar argument by  arguing that Christianity was part 
and parcel of European expansionism from the sixteenth century and beyond and is evidenced in 
many contemporary human rights documents.101   As such, any attempt to define religion within the 
religious-secular binary  is, as Hurd points out, inevitably a political move because by defining the 
“secular” (as “rational”, for example) one defines the “religious” to mean the opposite (“irrational”, 
in this case).102   So is the case if we, like Thomas, have one definition for religion in the “modern” 
Western sense and another for religion in its “social” non-Western sense.
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Toward a comprehensive understanding of religion
The politicized implications of employing different categories of “religion” raise the question of 
whether a comprehensive definition of religion may be developed, and applied, that mitigates any 
implicit or explicit biases while, at  the same time, provides a substantive tool with which to 
approach the study of religion. Various scholars have made attempts to do so. Haynes (2014), for 
example, writes that  religion comprises the features of transcendence (relating to supernatural 
realities), sacredness (a system of language and practice that organizes the world in terms of what is 
deemed holy, and ultimacy (relating people to the ultimate conditions of existence.)103  Along similar 
lines, Horowitz (2009) defines religion as “a set of beliefs generally regarding the supernatural and 
involving  practices  designed  to  explain  and  justify  existence”,  to  which  he  adds  that  such  a 
definition “[...] may  be most useful when discussing the major Abrahamic religions.”104  Similarly, 
but in a more detailed way, Shah, Stephan & Toft (2012) write that  most definitions of religion 
includes one or all of the following elements:
A belief in a supernatural being (or beings); prayers and 
communication with that being; transcendent realities that might 
include some form of heaven, paradise or hell; a distinction between 
the sacred and the profane and between ritual acts and sacred objects; 
a view that explains the world as a whole and a person’s role in it; 
behaviour and a prescribed moral conduct in line with that worldview; 
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and a group  of people bound to one another on the basis of these 
elements.105
The definitions of religion listed here move beyond the restricted and politicized conception of 
religion as a set of individual doctrines, that we saw above, but they are problematic in other ways. 
Firstly, Horowitz and Shah, Stephan & Toft’s reference to “a set  of beliefs” or “a belief”, even if 
accompanied by  other facets, implies, as Horowitz himself points out, a bias towards the Abrahamic 
religions, leaving out or, worse, making inadequate assumptions about religions in which “beliefs” 
do not feature. An example that is often brought up in this context is Buddhism which, as is well- 
known in disciplines like Religious Studies and Theology, is not  centered around beliefs, if the 
latter feature at all. As Batchelor (1997) explains, Buddhism is focused on action rather than belief. 
At Buddhism’s core are the Four Noble Truths, which all relate to Dukkha (anguish) and how to 
overcome it. Respectively, the Four Noble Truths hold that Dukkha is an inevitable part of life; that 
it originates from man’s desire; that man can overcome it by detaching himself from desire; and, 
that true enlightenment occurs when man has detached himself from such desires. These Truths, 
Batchelor notes, are to be lived out in a particular way: anguish is to be understood, its origins be let 
go of, its cessation be realized and the path of life to be cultivated. Crucially, living out the Four 
Noble Truths is different from believing them to be propositions of fact.106  This is perhaps nowhere 
better clarified in Gautama Buddha’s celebrated utterance: “I teach suffering, its origin, cessation 
and path. That’s all I teach”.107 Related, Armstrong (2001) explains that the notion of a supernatural 
God was refused by the Buddha who insisted that even the Fourth Truth of Nirvana was not 
exclusive to him or any Supreme Being, but rather natural to humanity108 Armstrong’s analysis thus 
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alerts us to another strain between Buddhism and the definitions put forward by  Horowitz and Shah, 
Stephan & Toft, both of which link “belief(s)” to the “supernatural”.
What is more, the terminology used by Haynes, Horowitz and, especially, Shah, Stephan & Toft  is 
so general that it could, unwittingly, define phenomena partly or entirely separate from religion. 
Various scholars have shown how political ideology can take a “religious-like” form. Lausten & 
Wæver (2000), for example, show with reference to Nazism in the Third Reich, how Hitler’s 
socialist nationalism was presented as a religion through the use of religious semantics and 
signifiers.  Drawing on Christian roots of the Germanic tradition, they show that reference points 
were used whereby Mein Kampf (My Fight) became the Biblical Scriptures; Der Fuhrer (Der 
Master), God’s messenger; Swastika, the cross of Jesus; Reichpareigelande (Nazi Party Day area),109 
the Church; holy days of Christianity, holy dats of Nazism; and, preachers of the Reich (regime), 
preachers of the Church. Importantly, for socialist nationalism’s success, a parallel to the Biblical 
narrative was constructed around these reference points: like Adam and Eve had no choice but to 
leave Paradise, Germany was forced to watch the Aryan kingdom disappear; like God’s law was 
revealed to Moses and Jews elected the chosen people, so Hitler was the prophet to proliferate the 
law of race; like Christians struggled against their fallen nature, so the Aryans fought against other 
races; like Christians’ conduct on Earth determined whether they  go to heave or hell on Judgement 
Day, so the Aryans’ survival or extinction depended on whether they fulfill their mission of ensuring 
an unmixed race.110 
Another phenomenon that arguably fits abovementioned definitions of religion, is liberalism of the 
twenty-first century. Drawing on the work of Charles Taylor and Craig Calhoun, Barnett (2011) 
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makes the compelling argument that humanitarian institutions, documents and, more broadly, the 
liberal order which today are referenced as “secular” can be understood as “religious”, partly due to 
their Christian origins; but more importantly, due to the meaning granted to them by adherents.
This is certainly  the case where religious adherents, be they  policy-makers or constituents, adopt  the 
view that a liberal foreign policy, for example, is “right” because it  has been bestowed on the US by 
God. But it is also the case where non-religious adherents support actions on the basis that they  are 
“right” or done for the greater good. This is so, Barnet highlights, because such principles, although 
typically explicitly secular, are situated within a broader moral universe and, as such, have a 
transcendental dimension.111    Theologians have taken issue with the suggestion that international 
ethics, though their origins may have been inspired by  Christianity, are Christian if the persons who 
perform ethical acts do not do so based on a decidedly  Christian persuasion.  Bishop Robert Barron, 
for example, argues that  while ethical principles are indeed contained in Jesus’ message, they  are 
but  a  secondary  concern  of  Christianity. The  primary  concern  of  Christianity  rather  lies  with 
“go[ing] beyond the mind you have” (in Biblical Greek, metanoiate) and accepting the resurrection 
of Christ to mean the creation of a new world in which humanity is saved and the human mind 
geared toward building the Kingdom of God on Earth. Ethical principles of behaviour (as the 
“secular” understanding of them holds) will surely follow from such acceptance, but are only 
Christian if they occur as a consequence of thereof. As such, Barron argues, non-believers are 
perfectly  capable of espousing ethical principles, as indeed was the case with the founders of virtue 
theory  - Plato, Aristotle, Cicero - and their “neo-pagan successors.”112  In this sense, ethical acts and 
rationales are not Christian; but if we understand religion as a phenomenon that has a 
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“transcendental” dimension, acts performed by persons, or states, based on them “being right” 
would indeed, as Barnett argues, qualify as a form of religion.
Judging from a plentitude of literatures, the transcendental dimension of human thought is one that 
persists as a result of humanity’s meaning-seeking condition. Scholar of Religion, Karen Armstrong
(2001), for example, observes that man, since recognizably human, has sought for the meaning of 
our existence, albeit through different theologies; looking forward, she argues that  “God isn’t going 
anywhere”.113   Even Stephen Hawking, world-renowned theoretical Physicist and self-proclaimed 
atheist,114 writes that “[since] the dawn of civilization, people have not been content to see events as 
unconnected and inexplicable. They  have craved an understanding of the underlying order in the 
world”.115   For Hawking, this quest has fueled his search for a “theory of everything” - an all- 
encompassing theory to explain all of the universe's physical dimensions - which, if devised, he 
ironically argues “would be the ultimate triumph of human reason - for then we would know the 
mind of God.”111  For most others, the quest has prompted questions related to the transcendental 
dimension of the human existence, and their version of “religion” would thus fit  into the definitions 
by Haynes (2014), Horowitz (2009) and Shah, Stephan & Toft (2012), which brings us back to 
where we started, and nowhere nearer understanding what  religion is and how to study it. To be 
sure, Shah, Stephan & Toft preface their definition by saying that religion need only include one or 
more of the elements that they list. In doing so, they may  be exempt from the critique that their 
definition, by including “beliefs”, is biased against Buddhism; but they, in turn, offer a definition
that is arguably so loosely structured that it fails to yield any valuable insight. 
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2.2. Surveying the essentialist-functionalist definitional spectrum 
      Substantive understandings of religious doctrines
It seems a near impossible task to produce a definition of religion general enough in its terminology 
to encompass characteristics pertaining to all religions; and sufficiently limited in scope so as to not 
provide a definitional “home” for wide-ranging phenomena. A tempting solution to this problem 
would arguably be to adopt an approach whereby separate definitions are developed for separate 
religions, derived at on the basis of their respective substantive and functional characteristics. For 
example, Christianity may be identified as a monotheistic religion whose adherents believe in one 
supernatural God, embodied in the notion of the Holy Trinity, perform certain prayers to 
communicate with that God, and shape their worldview according to the Ten Commandments. Or 
Islam, as a monotheistic religion, whose adherents believe that the Prophet Muhammad delivered 
God’s word to Muslims (-to-be), and whose lives are shaped by the Five Pillars of Islam. But one 
need only  look to cases where such attempts have led to over-simplification and unduly  ascribed 
essentialist  features  to  a  religion,  to  understand  the  thin  line  between  such  efforts  and 
essentialization of religions that post-secular and other scholars have rightfully warned against.116
The most well-known example of this is perhaps Huntington, who in his quest to depict a range of 
civilizations, some of which - like the “Islamic” civilization - he described with religious 
terminology,  was vehemently accused of essentialism and ignorance. These accusations came not 
from people who disagreed with his basic argument (i.e. Realists who disagreed on the basis that 
the nation-state is still the main player in conflict); but from experts of the very civilizations/
religions that he ventured to define.
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In his article titled The Clash of Ignorance, Edward Said argues from a characteristically post- 
colonial perspective that  Huntington’s thesis is based, as suggested by his article’s provocatively 
worded title, on the latter’s ignorance, particularly with regards to his categorization of “Islam” and 
“the West”. Here, Said argues, Huntington is ignorant of the “internal dynamic” and “plurality” that 
exists within “Islam” and “the West” and the historical ties and encounters between them. Not only 
are such categorisations misrepresentative of reality; they are harmful in that they can serve as self- 
fulfilling  prophesies:  indeed,  discourse  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  terror  attacks  of 
September 11, 2001, was framed in “West versus the rest” terms, largely serving as proof of 
Huntington’s thesis. Said’s verdict is that,
Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make “civilizations” and 
“identities” into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have 
been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human 
history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not 
only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of 
exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing.117
If unpersuaded by Said’s passionate defence of Islam’s particularities, one need only look to 
empirical cases of conflicts within religious doctrines to understand that the latter are far from 
monolithic entities. Wars of religion between Catholics and Protestants in Medieval Europe, the 
conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  between  Catholic  and  Protestant  nationalists  in  the  late  twentieth 
century, and contemporary fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East, are but a 
few examples of how monolithic depictions of a religious doctrines can only  go so far in 
understanding them. In the cases of Catholicism and Protestantism, and Sunnism and Shi’ism, the
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Christian and Islamic doctrines have developed into distinct denominations; but changes occur 
even within those denominations. The concept of jihad (struggle) as holy  war, as opposed to striving 
for  self-betterment,  for  example,  was  introduced  by  Pakistani  ideologue  and  Imam Abu Ala 
Maududi (1903-79) and reiterated by Egyptian Islamic thinker Sayyid Qutb, both of whom were 
convinced that Western imperialism and, in the case of Qutb, the secularizing policies of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, merited their controversial re-interpretation of Sunni doctrine.118   In a similar vein, 
within Judaism, members of the Ultra-Orthodox interpretive community refrained for the better half 
on the twentieth century from supporting the Zionist project on the grounds that the latter should 
follow the Messiah’s arrival, only to support the Israeli state and especially  its expansionist  policies 
vis-a-vis Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel) following Israel’s remarkable military  success in the 1967 
war.119
To comprehend why religions are difficult to understand substantively  by  way of a general 
definition, it is useful to draw on Durkheim’s widely celebrated Elementary Forms of Religious Life 
(1912). In this work, Durkheim argues that while religious thought and practice have existed since 
time immemorial and will continue to do so, as a result of the perennial religious nature of man, 
only “primitive religions” can tell us something about the constituent elements of religious thought 
and practice common to all religions. By “primitive religion”, Durkheim refers to religion in its 
simplest form; as it existed prior to any interference of interpretations, theologies and mythologies. 
This primitive religion is to be found only in small groups in which differences between individuals 
are minimal, and which espouse intellectual and moral uniformity as well as conformity of conduct. 
In such contexts, he argues, there is overlap between the individual type and the general type, unlike 
in larger, more complex groups where one encounters “[...] clash of theologies, the variations of
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ritual, the multiplicity of groupings, the diversity of individuals.”120   The primitive religion thus 
captures religion as it  is closest to its “original” state. In Durkheim’s reading, this precludes even 
the notion of God, as the idea of divinity, which most modern understandings of religion regard as a 
fundamental part of religion - indeed, the definitions outlined earlier in the chapter confirm this - is 
in fact a product of modern religions; rites of the primitive religions are not necessarily  addressed to 
the divine121   Durkheim’s observation that outside the realm of primitive religion, there is no such 
things as a set of uniform constituent elements of religion, like that of Said, suggests that 
interpretations of a non-primitive, to borrow Durkheim’s terminology, religion are many just as they 
are inevitable.
Functionalist understandings of religion
On the opposite end to essentialism, is functionalism, by which any substantive definition of 
religion  is  refrained  from  altogether. As  Sheikh  (2012)  notes,  “religion”,  in  the  functionalist 
approach, “is as religion does to society, to human beings, and so on”,122 and it is thus potentially no 
different  to  other  phenomena  that  produce  similar  functions,  like  nationalism  and  political 
ideologies. The  focus  in the  functionalist  approach  is  to  study  the  effects,  be  they  economic, 
sociological or psychological, that  religion has in a given context.123  Scholars in the functionalist 
camp who are often mentioned in this vein are, rather surprisingly, from the discipline of Religious 
Studies and include the likes of Smith (1982) and McCutcheon (1998) Fitzgerald (1997) who have
respectively argued that “religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study”, that “the category
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‘religion‘ has no analytic value whatsoever.” and that “‘religion pics out nothing distinctive and
[clarifies] nothing”.124
The functionalist understanding of religion is useful to us because, as IR scholars, we are indeed 
interested in the effects that religion has on the social world, and much more so than in developing 
an understanding of elements of religious doctrine, their intellectual coherency, etc. in and of itself, 
fascinating though such a task may be. Moreover, the functionalist approach accommodates the 
various  features  of  religion  highlighted  throughout  this  chapter,  such  as  contingency   of 
interpretation and fluidity  of meaning. But, as Sheikh (2012) rightly points out, by disdaining 
substantive aspects of religion, as the functionalist approach per definition does, we overlook the 
distinctive characteristic of religion that may be all-important for understanding the larger IR- 
relevant phenomena that we are studying. Therefore, conceiving of religion as a sui generis 
phenomenon  is  imperative  to  fully   understanding  and  explaining  such  phenomena.  Crucially, 
Sheikh argues that it is possible to employ  a substantive approach to understanding religion’s role 
without falling into the essentialist camp. She proposes that we can reach a necessary “middle way” 
between functionalism and essentialism, by conceiving of religion as community of believers. By 
assuming a link between the behavior of a belief community and the latter’s particular interpretive 
prism, she proposes that  scholars can understand and explain behaviors by looking at what religion 
means to belief communities through, e.g. deciphering their particular understanding of what 
constitutes justice and pious behaviour.125
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This is not without its challenges, of course, especially  not if we simultaneously take account of the 
changing meaning that religious doctrine has for, even within, a given community, as the examples 
of Maududi’s reformation of the jihad concept above shows. This is a valid consideration, but not 
one that should cause us to discredit Sheikh’s insistence that navigating between essentialist and 
functionalist approaches to religion in IR will ultimately result  in a more useful understanding of 
religion’s role in international relations than would positions on any of the two extremes. It also 
responds to the encouragement of post-secular IR scholars like Petito & Hatzopoulos (2003) and 
Thomas (2000) to take religion seriously. It nonetheless begs the question of how to address the 
possibility that interpretative communities themselves develop (away) from their origin, to become 
something else. Here, we may benefit from engaging with the work of scholars of religion who, as 
will be discussed below, show that it is possible for specific interpretive strands within religions to 
uphold specific reference points which remain tied to the origin whilst other aspects develop.  John 
Henry Cardinal Newman’s seminal essay On the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845)126   is 
particularly relevant in this context. In it, Newman addresses the apparent contradictions in Catholic 
doctrine during its 1800 year long history, specifically  those contradictions between Catholic 
doctrine  of  the Apostolic  fathers  and  that  of  modern  doctrine,  arguing  that  they,  rather  than 
contradictions, represent a clarification of doctrine that, crucially, did not abandon the substance of 
Christian  teachings  but  developed  them  according  to  the  materials  and  conditions  of  its 
surroundings, in order that they  come to fruition. This growing process, which Newman 
characterizes as “development”, was not only natural, but  necessary in order for Christian teachings 
be fully understood: “[...] whatever be the risk of corruption from intercourse with the world
around, such a risk must be encountered if a great idea is duly to be understood, and much more if 
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is to be fully exhibited.127   Development of doctrine is, Newman is careful to highlight, distinct 
from corruption or undermining of doctrine which occurs upon departure from the initial idea or 
principle. Newman’s thesis is arguably supported by various ecumenical councils of the Catholic 
Church  including  the  Council  of  Trent  (1545-1563),  Vatican  I  (1969-1970)  and  Vatican  II 
(1962-1968), which have respectively addressed how to respond to contemporary issues of the 
Protestant Reformation, rationalism, and modernity, in a manner consistent with the Apostolic 
traditions and teachings.
William Graham, though not a believer like Newman but a scholar of Islamic religious history and 
textual traditions, makes a somewhat similar argument in relation to Islam. While recognizing that 
the manifestations of Islam in an enormously varied geographical, historical and cultural context 
make it  difficult to speak of a singular Islam, Graham shows that, even so, a continuity across 
contexts and historical periods can be identified within different strands of Islam. Such continuity, 
he argues, exists due to a need, emphasized over the centuries in Muslim thought and institutions, 
for ittisaliyah; that  is, the need for a sense of connectedness with the Prophet and the first Islamic 
community. The need for ittisaliyah is met through isnād; a “guarantee”, in the form of a report,128 
that any interpretation of the life of the Prophet or his community has been transmitted, 
uninterruptedly, through a chain of individuals, that is traceable from the present-day interpreter to 
the Prophet himself or to one of his companions. Isnād is of crucial importance because the “truth” 
is not thought to be found by  simply looking at ancient documents; rather, it is thought to be 
conveyed through teachings done by people who are both knowledgeable and righteous. It  is 
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necessary, furthermore, in order to interpret issues that are not addressed by the Qu’ran, the latter - 
although considered the ultimate authority for Muslims - not being a substantive a book of laws 
practical guidance. As Graham notes, there must  exist a “golden chain of sincere Muslims”129  which 
ensures the “faithful copying, memorizing, reciting, and understanding of texts”.130  Graham shows 
that Muslim traditionalism lies in maintaining ittisaliyah. Crucially, this does not mean a rejection 
of change amongst Muslims, but rather that present interpretations must  be authorized through 
isnad which, in turn, due to its human element, has been elaborated upon in a multitude of ways, 
serving both modernists and reactionaries. Amongst these strands, however, continuities can be 
found.131
2.3. Conclusion
Based  on  the  cumulative analysis  above,  religion  is  to  be  understood  as  a  phenomenon  that, 
although malleable, can nonetheless be studied substantively with reference to a community of 
believers, or “belief-community.” Importantly, such a community  should not be conceived of in 
terms of a religious doctrine, which I take to mean e.g. Christianity, Islam or Judaism, due to the 
analytical flaws and dangers of Orientalism inherent to doctrinal essentialism that have been 
rendered throughout this chapter. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a bounded belief- 
community  within a specific interpretive tradition such as Twelver Shi’ism or Wahhabi Sunnism, 
within the broader religious doctrine of, in this case, Islam, or Catholicism, in the case of 
Christianity. When reading The Development of Christian Doctrine, one is not in doubt that to 
Newman, who wrote the seminal work as a Catholic and as a Cardinal, the Catholic interpretive 
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tradition was the “true” Christianity. Though the world’s Catholics would likely agree with him, and 
while  the  case  for  Catholicism  as  the  Christian  “truth”  is  arguably  particularly  strong  given
Catholicism’s uninterrupted line of Papal authority and highly centralized interpretive body (the
Magisterium) since its foundation some 2000 years ago, there is no one “true” version of any 
religion, but many.
For peace-loving Muslims, it will be a hard pill to swallow that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) represents Islam in any way, shape or form. But, as shown by  an emerging (albeit limited) 
body  of  literature,  to  which  my  own  postdoctoral  work  aims  to  contribute,  ISIS,  by  its  own 
standards has just as much claim to Islam as does other interpretive communities within Islam. Far 
from revealing an incoherent message whereby extreme violence is justified with randomly 
assembled religious references, these sources collectively reveal a sophisticated narrative whose 
content builds on a set of concepts from the Qu’ran and Hadiths, interpreted according to 
historically-grounded interpretive methods (isnad). Wood (2015) notes how ISIS operates 
significantly, if entirely, according to the “takfiri” doctrine of Islam, which prescribes killing of 
infidels in accordance with a specific set of legal precautions; principles of “offensive jihad”, which 
dictate aggressive expansive into non-Muslim lands although temporary peace treaties are allowed; 
and, Prophetic teachings of the apocalypse, which is expected to manifest in Jerusalem, Istanbul and 
Dabiq. These messages fit logically  into the broader narrative which frames ISIS’ military successes 
and territorial conquests as proof of God’s approval that, moreover, hastens the apocalypse as well 
as  the  rewards  the  latter  brings  to  al-Baghdadi  and  the  subjects  Caliphate;  a  message  that  is 
explicitly different than that of competitive self-identified Islamic forces like Al Qaeda and the 
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Taliban.132  More to it, interviews with some of its most ardent supporters suggest that ISIS subjects 
are ostensibly convinced in the Islamic essence of the ISIS doctrine.133 As Wood (2015) notes about
UK-based spiritual leader and frequent guest on British television shows, Anjem Choudary, “he and
his disciples sincerely believe in the Islamic State and, on matters of doctrine, speak in its voice.134
Many Muslims will disagree with ISIS’ claim to Islam, as have the senior clerical leadership in 
Saudi Arabia, which issued a fatwa (religious legal ruling) declaring ISIS‘ violence “a heinous 
crime” under Islamic law.135  However, such disagreements but confirm the proposition that there is 
no one authentic Islam, but many. As Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, 
Bernard Haykel, bluntly  observes: “As if there is such a thing as Islam!”.136    While God might 
rectify this understanding on Judgement Day, scholars would, until then, benefit from approaching 
all religions according to the understanding they exist in many different “authentic” versions.
Capturing these authentic versions of religions can be done, as I have argued, through conceiving of 
them in terms of bounded community-religions. But, even in their bounded form, the community- 
religions should not be conceived of as static; as Newman (1845) and Graham (1993) show, 
interpretive traditions develop  according to the circumstances they, or specifically their interpreters, 
encounter. Crucially, this development does not necessarily “corrupt”, to borrow Newman’s 
terminology, interpretive traditions in the eyes of the interpreters, but rather signifies their natural 
development whereby their meaning becomes fully crystalized. The community-religions to which 
Khomeini, Fahd and Begin belonged are respectively  Twelver Shi’ism, Wahhabi Sunnism and neo- 
Revisionism (the latter is not strictly a community-religion, as will be elaborated in chapter 4). As 
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must be assumed for all members of a community-religion, Khomeini, Fahd and Begin’s personal 
experiences and relationship  with God - their “faith” - were brought to bear on their interpretation 
of the “authentic” religion of their respective communities-religions. Their “faith” cannot be 
understood, however, without reference to the community-religion to which they belonged, just as
the latter cannot be understood without reference to the “faith” that the leaders share with other 
individuals; I term the conjunction between community religion and faith, the “religious beliefs” of 
the interpreter. The case study  chapters (4, 5 and 6) will discuss neo-revisionism, Twelver Shi’ism 
and Wahhabi Sunnism as community-religions in the context of the individual world-view of Begin, 
Khomeini and Fahd, respectively. Before embarking upon those analyses, the following chapter (3) 
will discuss the socio-political regional and domestic environments within which the foreign policy 
leaders were operating. This is done, in part, to set the scene for the reader, but also to understand 
the context which, in line with what this chapter has argued, must be assumed to affect have 
affected the leaders’ religious beliefs.
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CHAPTER 3
SETTING THE SCENE:
THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF BEGIN, KHOMEINI AND FAHD
3.0 Introduction
The Middle East, stretching from the Maghreb in the West to the Arabian Peninsula in the East, is 
generally  understood to be a region characterized by turmoil and instability, in which ideologies of 
different  kinds are fiercely at play. The late 1970s through to the early 1990s, the period that this 
thesis is concerned with, is far from an exception to such a characterization. The Arab states’ dismal 
defeat in their six-day war with Israel in 1967, which resulted in Israel’s capture of Arab territories 
in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, marked the 
decline of the pan-Arab nationalist ideology that had flourished in the region since the withdrawal 
of British and French colonial powers following World War II. Islamism, whose intellectual seeds 
were planted already in the late nineteenth century by scholars like Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and 
furthered by Imam and teacher Hassan al-Banna in the early  twentieth century, quickly gained 
appeal with Muslim movements and societies across the region, setting off a number of significant 
socio-political trends and events.
The Islamic ideology manifested most conspicuously in Iran’s landmark Islamic Revolution of
1979, the effects of which were felt far beyond Iranian borders into the Levant where the Shi’ite, 
Iran-backed Hizbollah (Party of God) movement formed in opposition to Israel; and into Saudi 
Arabia’s Eastern province, where Shi’ite minorities galvanized around the Islamic populism and 
fierce   anti-Western   discourse   emanating   from   the   newly    formed   Islamic   Republic.   Most 
dramatically, the Islamic Revolution prompted Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, out of fear that it 
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might spread to his Shi’ite-majority Iraq, and with that he initiated an eight-year long conflict that 
would turn out to be the deadliest of the twentieth century. In Israel, too, the ideological landscape 
changed following the 1967 war. The remarkable military  victory of a small, young state over a 
swath of hostile Arab armies not only  made Israel emerge as strong military power, but also fostered 
a religious and nationalist sentiment in the Jewish state that would manifest in a forceful settler 
movement bent  on consolidating Israeli presence on Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel). Moreover, to the 
outrage of some Orthodox Jewish domestic movements, Israel signed the US-mediated Camp David 
Accords with Egypt, agreeing to relinquish Israeli control of Sinai and work towards an autonomy 
agreement with Palestinians in the West Bank.
Not coincidentally, the latter never materialized, intensifying the already intense anger of Arab 
leaders and populations towards the entrenched Arab-Israeli conflict, with Arab leaders gathering at 
the Baghdad Summit in 1979 where they agreed to expel Egypt from the Arab League and call for 
Israeli withdrawal of Palestinian territories. As Israel made peace with its Egyptian neighbor to the 
West as a result of the Accords, Begin launched a military invasion against its Northern one, 
following  rockets  attacks  from  Lebanon-based  PLO  militants;  a  conflict  that  would  continue 
beyond Begin’s resignation in 1984. Saudi Arabia would soon experience its own major conflict 
when Hussein, only two years after the Iran-Iraq war’s end in 1988, invaded Kuwait. Fearing an 
imminent attack, Fahd instantly invited US troops to defend Saudi Arabia; a mission that, while 
successful in defeating Hussein, would consolidate a religious fundamentalist ideology, fiercely 
opposed to the West and the monarchies supporting it, that had clandestinely  been growing 
throughout the Kingdom since the 1970s.
As this chapter will show, Begin, Khomeini and Fahd operated within relatively  unconstrained 
decision making structures with regards to their foreign policies; none of the leaders were, however, 
immune or irresponsive to domestic social and political developments that were shaped, in no small
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part, by the regional landscape. The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, the 
chapter seeks to depict the socio-political landscape in Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia as they existed 
during the leaderships of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd, paying special attention to trends and events 
which occurred in relation to the foreign policy  outcomes studied for each of the case studies. It 
does so because religious beliefs of the leaders in question, as outlined in the previous chapter, are 
understood to be shaped, to a greater or lesser extent, by  their operating environment. On the other 
hand, the chapter seeks to detail the foreign policy decision making structures of Begin, Khomeini 
and Fahd, with a view to show that all three leaders could operate with relative autonomy (how they 
did so is the subject matter of the following case study chapters). This dimension is important to 
capture, especially  for the Israeli and Iranian case studies, because it allows us to understand, in the 
case study chapters that follow this one, a stronger link between leaders’ religious beliefs and their 
foreign policy, than had the leaders exercised little autonomy over the latter.
The chapter proceeds in three main parts focused on Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively, 
each showing, first, the domestic social and political landscape in those countries and second, the 
decision making structures within which Begin, Khomeini and Fahd operated. Specifically, the 
chapter’s first section shows that in Israel, following that country’s decisive military victory of
1967, a settler movement determined to retain territories of Eretz Yisrael emerged alongside an 
increasing religiosity and right-wing nationalist sentiment amongst, especially, the nation’s young. 
This changing ideological landscape culminated in an electoral victory  for Menachem Begin and his 
Likud party in 1977, and again in 1981, whose two major foreign policy outcomes included the 
Camp David Accords and the launch of Operation Peace for Galilee into Lebanon. While the former 
gained support from a majority of the Israeli public, a small but vocal religious segment opposed 
the Accords‘ requirement that Israel withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and, they feared, Judea and 
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Samaria. While the public as a whole was supportive of Operation Peace for Galilee, that support 
decreased in line with Israel’s increasing presence in Lebanon along with the deaths of Israeli 
soldiers and Lebanese civilians, that it implied. With regards to the foreign policy decision making 
structures that Begin worked within, the chapter shows that despite complex bureaucratic structure, 
Israeli foreign policy was, by many accounts, a result of Begin’s forceful personality. Although the 
Knesset could restrict him, it did not do so in matters related to the Camp David Accords and 
Operation Peace for Galilee.
The chapter’s second section shows that, around the time of the Camp David Accords, Iran’s 
unfolding revolution culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with Ayatollah 
Khomeini as its ultimate legal and political authority. The ideological fervour that drove the Islamic 
revolution and sustained the new Republic in the early years of its war with Iraq, started to wane in 
line with Iran’s economy and military which, to the outrage of conservative clerics in the 
government, forced Khomeini to terminate the war in 1988. Only  following his fatwa (religious 
legal ruling) against the British-born novelist Salman Rushdie whose book The Satanic Verses 
(1988) he deemed blasphemous against  Islam, did the ideological fervour from the revolution 
reinvigorate within - and beyond - Iran. In terms of Khomeini’s decision making context, Khomeini 
was, by  constitutional agreement and by practice, the undisputed leader and decision maker of the 
Islamic Republic. While he worked alongside clashing and competing Conservative and Radical 
government  forces,  and  would  interchangeably  support  both  of  them,  he  remained  the  final 
authority on all matters of domestic and foreign policy until his death in 1989.
The chapter’s third and final section shows that in Saudi Arabia, despite its religiously conservative 
system of governance, extremists and regular conservative citizens pressed, albeit in different ways, 
for further religious conservatism in the Kingdom’s domestic and foreign affairs. This reflected in a 
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consciously  hostile Saudi Arabian foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict (the latter had 
been rendered an Islamic, rather than an Arab issue as a result of Khomeini’s efforts and thus 
necessitated a response from the Kingdom as the self-identified leader of the Muslim world). 
Ideological  trends  within  and  beyond  Saudi Arabia  became  relegated  to  secondary   important, 
however, following Iraq invasion of Kuwait, after which Fahd overlooked religious and cultural 
sensitivities by  inviting US troops to defend his Kingdom. Whilst successful in doing that, as well 
as expelling Iraq from Kuwait, this foreign policy  move triggered an extremist backlash that would 
oppose the regime far beyond Fahd’s reign. As far as Fahd’s foreign policy decision making context 
is concerned, the chapter shows that Fahd, both as Crown Prince under King Khalid’s rule, and as 
King from 1982, was officially the ultimate authority on foreign policy  matters though he, as per 
Saudi tradition, operated within a context  where he necessitated, if unofficially, the support of 
important princes as well as the Kingdom’s religious establishment.
3.1 The Jewish State of Israel
3.1.1 The socio-political landscape of Israel (ca. 1967-84)
Israel’s decisive military success in the six-day war of 1967 had a significant impact upon the 
country’s social and political landscape, particularly  amongst its younger members of society. A 
“Young Guard” faction emerged within the National Religious Party (NRP), Israel’s hitherto biggest 
and strongest religious party which had formed part of Labour coalitions since the establishment of 
Israel in 1948 and, prior to that, in the World Zionist Organization.137  The emerging Young Guard, 
drawing its inspiration from Rabbi Avraham Y. H. Kook, held that Israel’s capture of Jerusalem, the 
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West Bank and Gaza during the 1967 war was a sign of God’s support for Jews’ restoration of its 
biblical land and, as such, they viewed retention of this land as a religious duty. Some of its 
members furthermore thought that retention of the territories occupied during the 1967 war, and 
building Jewish settlements upon them, would increase the spirituality of Israeli society  and 
ultimately  speed up the coming of the Messiah.138   Though the older segments of NRP did not 
necessarily advocate the militant view of the Young Guard, the latter would eventually become the 
dominant element determining NRP policy, to the weakening of the traditional leadership  of NRP 
which had historically been more pragmatic and concerned primarily with lobbying for religious 
interests in what they  considered a secular society. Due to the pressure from the Young Guards, the 
NRP, while still a member of the Labour coalition, refrained from endorsing Labour’s “land for 
peace” stance vis-a-vis the Occupied Territories; a significant shift from the NRP’s hitherto 
agreement with Labour to concern itself primarily  with religious education and not with issues 
related to foreign affairs and security.139
From the NRP’s Young Guard movement emerged, in 1974, Gush Emunim, a movement whose 
members were “totally  religious, messianic and fundamentalist  in their beliefs.”140   Their religiously 
derived concerns were, as per their own declaration, “the Torah and territories”; that is, to increase 
religiosity  of Israel and retention of the territories captured during the 1967 war.141   Weissbrod 
(1981) offers the following comprehensive summary of their ideology:
a religious revolutionary ideology, formulated by highly  orthodox students 
of Talmudic colleges. It reinterprets all components of original Labour 
Zionism, implied in the renewed use of the term “Zionism”, but in a Jewish
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religious  vein.  National  redemption  applies  to  the  entire  Holy  Land, 
including the territories on the West Bank occupied in the Six Day War, 
since these were given by  God to the People of Israel. Settlement of these 
territories thus becomes a holy  duty and commandment. Social and 
individual salvation are to be effected in these settlements in the Holy Land, 
to consist of a new form of communality  based on Judaic principles of 
mutual aid and mutual responsibility. The establishment of settlements in 
the Holy Land, and specifically  on the West Bank, is focal to New Zionism, 
as they are the means of implementing this ideology. The religious character 
of New Zionism justifies the occupation and settlement of conquered areas 
of the Holy Land and resolves the crisis of identity: the rift  between 
Israeliness and Jewishness is bridged by a return to Jewish religious values 
which incorporate the Jewish heritage.142
A militant and disproportionately vocal movement, Gush Emunim proactively set out to establish 
and occupy settlements as well as to conduct seminars and other social events designed to spread its 
message, and gain sympathizers. It was successful in doing so insofar as “[Gush Emunim’s] new 
spirit soon lit the hearts of many Israelis”, just as the movement “gain[ed] first the support of the 
young, and subsequently of a large part of the general Israeli public”.143  Gush Emunim would form 
an  important  part  of  the  broader  Land  of  Israel  Movement,  an  ultra-nationalist  umbrella 
organization which counted a diverse set of elements including religious fundamentalists, military 
hardliners and labor settlement fanatics, amongst its supporters.140 Collectively, and vehemently, the 
Land of Israel movement advocated for Israeli retention of, and settlement on, territories captured
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during the Six Day War, especially the West Bank and Gaza but, for Gush Emunim, also Sinai. The 
ideological changes within Israel reflected in the increasing popularity  - particularly amongst the 
young - of religious and nationalist groups and, related, in the public opinion polls conducted 
around the same period. In 1973, 36% of people aged 17-20 and 25% of those aged 20+ “identified 
with rightist parties”, just as 12% of people in the 17-20 category and 8% in the 20+ category 
“identified with religious parties”.144
As it would turn out, the changing ideological landscape within Israel following the six day  war led 
to a shift in the country’s political landscape in 1977, when, for the first time in its relatively short 
history, Israel would have a right-wing government, led by Menachem Begin’s Likud 
(Consolidation) party. Tessler (1986) describes the 1977 election as “the earthquake” that “shook 
[Israel’s] political landscape”, an indication of the significant political change that it represented.145
Although due in part  to growing discontent  with Labour’s economic policies and scandals within 
the party, an important part of this change can, as the opinion poll results above suggest, be 
attributed to a genuine identification by the public since the early 70s with the religious and 
nationalist parties, which made up  Begin’s coalition. Moreover, Begin and his nationalist-religious 
coalition would succeed in the national elections of 1981, as well, and continue as the governing 
Israeli leadership until Begin’s resignation in 1984. The parties of Begin’s coalition jointly  called 
for territorial maximalism throughout Eretz Yisrael and a generally militant stance vis-a-vis Arabs 
within and beyond Israel.143
To be sure, there were nuances between the parties concerning what exactly constituted Eretz
Yisrael, and why Israel should strive to settle that land. The NRP, under increasing influence of its
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Young Guard faction which, in turn, was increasingly supportive of Gush Emunim, advocated for 
territorial maximalism on the basis of explicitly  religious claims to the land. To this end, its 
members, as we saw above, pursued settlement-building and educational projects. Agudat, an Ultra- 
Orthodox political party, was concerned primarily  with Israel’s domestic religious affairs, such as 
promotion of Orthodox Jewish law and education, and not at all with matters of foreign policy, 
including the Occupied Territories.146   Its Ultra-Orthodox members held the strong belief that, only 
upon arrival of the Messiah, would the Jewish people be reestablished on Biblical Land.147  It joined 
the Likud coalition, following twenty five years of non-participation in Israel’s government; its 
concern as a political party to promote Jewish law and education was, however, less an implicit 
endorsement of the Zionist project, as it was a sense of duty to ensure the wellbeing of Jews through 
promoting Orthodox Jewish law and education. In return for Likud’s concession in these areas, 
Agudat lent its support for maximalist and militarist policies though its doing so, from its Ultra 
Orthodox  members’ perspective,  neither  helped  nor  hindered  the  redemption  of  the  Jews.148
Throughout  both  of  Begin’s  governments, Agudat,  though  not  holding  any  cabinet  positions, 
pressed hard for increased government legislation in the area of religious law, threatening to quit the 
coalition if not enacted; possibly due to these efforts, did the frequency of conversion to religiosity 
in Israeli society increase.149
Likud, a merger of various parties including the dominant Herut party, advocated the position of 
territorial  maximalism  and  a  general  militant  preparedness.  Though  grounded  in  Revisionist
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Zionism and, as that movement, considered secular-nationalist rather than religious-nationalist - 
certainly next to the Orthodox Young Guard and Ultra-Orthodox Agudat - the lines between secular 
and religious nationalism were blurred amongst parties of Israel’s right during this period. Herut, 
for example, rejected the secular notions of a Jewish state held by Labour, and, to that end, counted 
amongst its priorities to serve the needs of Judaism inside Israel.150 The case study in chapter 4 will 
detail the significance of this with reference to Begin’s foreign policy.
In the early aftermath of the 1977 election, the unity  between the coalition parties was notably 
strong. This was largely  due to Menachem Begin, who united parties and constituencies of the right 
with his renowned oratory skills and ability  to navigate the nationalist-religious spectrum in ways 
that would resonate across the board. The right-wing unity  would be severely  strained, however, by 
Begin’s signing of the Camp David Accords, alongside Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat, in
1978. The Accords agreed to a peace treaty with Egypt, in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the 
Sinai Peninsula, as well as the initiation of an autonomy plan to solve the “Palestinian problem” in 
the Occupied West Bank or, as Begin referred incessantly to it, Judea and Samaria. A vast majority 
of Israeli public, and indeed Likud, applauded this achievement. Begin’s recognized this sentiment 
of approval, as his speech before the Knesset on 20 November 1977, during Anwar al-Sadat’s first 
visit to Jerusalem, shows:
Today, Jerusalem is bedecked with two flags - the Egyptian and the Israeli. 
Together, Mr. President, we have seen our little children waving both flags. 
Let us sign a peace treaty and establish such a situation forever both in 
Jerusalem and in Cairo. I hope the day will come when Egyptian children
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will wave Israeli and Egyptian flags together, just as the Israeli children are 
waving both of these flags together in Jerusalem [...]151
A smaller, though very vocal, minority vehemently opposed the Accords on the grounds that 
withdrawal from Sinai and, worse, compromising Judea and Samaria (Biblical land of highest 
stature) would unnecessarily delay national redemption. To Gush Emunim and its supporters, Camp 
David’s signified a “religious affront of the first  degree”, and Begin’s signing of the accords was 
symbolically associated with the shameful peace signed with Hitler in 1939 by  Britain’s Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain. The “betrayal”, as was his accord signing characterised, prompted 
establishment of “The Covenant of Eretz Yisrael Loyalists”; a large-scale coalition composed of 
student groups, political movements and settler supporters of the maximalist  cause, which sought to 
“alert the public about the grave error committed by Begin” as well as lobby Likud for a reversal of 
policy.152  Most radical, was what would later become known as the “Jewish Underground”; a secret 
establishment with close ties to Gush Emunim which planned terrorist attacks against the Muslim 
Dome of the Rock, based on the conviction that “infidel” presence on what was also a holy Jewish 
site (Temple Mount) was what led to to the national offense of Camp David in the first place. 
Liberating Temple Mount, the holiest site of Judaism, was thought to hasten national redemption.153
As would become evident throughout the Camp David proceedings and their aftermath, Begin 
never intended to relinquish Israeli presence on Judea and Samaria, and as a result he never did so. 
Moreover, he continued to support the NRP and Gush Emunim in their settlement drive on those 
territories  and in Gaza. This reflected in the number of settlements in those territories, which rose
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from 27 in 1977 to 77 1981.154  The latter’s objection to removal of settlements from Sinai, was, 
however, not accommodated, prompting the establishment of the Movement to Halt the Retreat in 
Sinai, comprised mostly of Gush Emunim adherents. This movement brought settler families and 
communities, including Jewish seminaries, to Sinai and proactively set up and lived a “normal life” 
until they were evacuated by Israeli soldiers in 1981.155
Following the successful or disastrous, depending on who is asked, Camp  David Accords, Begin’s 
attention was forced to shift from Israel’s Western neighbour, to its Northern one. Increasingly 
hostile developments in Lebanon, including PLO’s firing of artillery shells into Israel’s Galilee 
region, and increased anti-Israel Syrian military presence in that country, prompted Begin’s launch 
of Operation Peace for Galilee or, what is otherwise known as, the First  Lebanon War. The latter 
officially  sought to push PLO factions 40 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border in order to 
protect Israeli civilians in the Galilee region, though its aims would come to include destruction of 
PLO infrastructure in Lebanon, installment of a Christian Lebanese, pro-Israel government, and 
expulsion of the Syrian army from Lebanon. The Israeli public was overwhelmingly supportive of 
Begin’s foreign policy decision to launch a military operation in Lebanon; so much so, in fact, that 
former Israeli deputy national security adviser Charles Freilich (2012) describes Begin as being 
“bound to action” by “his public commitments” during the operation’s early  stages.156    As the 
operation went awry in its later stages, particularly following an attack on the IDF headquarters in 
Lebanon which killed 36 Israeli soldiers, public opinion became heavily divided.157  Begin resigned 
shortly after, due partly to his sense of responsibility for lives of soldiers lost.158
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3.1.2 Menachem Begin’s decision making environment
Foreign policy decision making in Israel is, despite an enormously  complex bureaucratic structure, 
informal, improvisational, highly  personalized and subjective to policy  preferences of the leadership 
in question. This has been the case throughout Israel’s relatively short history, but perhaps no more 
so than during the Prime Ministership of Menachem Begin, from 1977 to 1984. Begin’s foreign 
policy was, by  all accounts, largely a one-man show which, as the case study in chapter 4 will 
detail, meant a stubborn and ardent insistence on Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael, and secure 
borders with neighboring states. Though the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was largely 
planned and carried out under the command of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon - and dubbed “Arik’s 
war” by some for that reason,159  - that war was made possible only by Begin’s acquiescence. 
Begin’s centralized decision making approach was reinforced by his total disregard of 
international opinion. In areas where Begin’s decision making was contingent upon external 
approval, such as parliamentary approval for signing the Camp David Accords and launching 
Operation Peace for Galilee, he was largely  unrestrained though, in the latter case, as we will see, 
this had less to do with genuine parliamentary approval than with Sharon’s deceptive behaviour vis-
a-vis the Knesset.
The government
As Prime Minister, Begin “[acted] on the basis of his free will, dictating to others his political 
preferences, and determining the timing of his own initiatives” just as he “did not accommodate 
pressure but resisted and often overcame it”.160   In his discussion about Israeli national security
policy, Freilich (2012) outlines the characteristics of decision making structures and processes in
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Israel, that make such centralized decision making possible. One essential reason is the lacking 
capacity of key offices, including the Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Foreign Ministry 
and Ministry of Defence, to conduct systematic policy formulation, coordination and assessment. 
The cabinet, too, is weak with many members being inadequately equipped for the ministerial roles 
in which they  serve, leading to Prime Ministers relying on a few selected confidantes for 
consultation.161 In the case where ministers disagree vehemently with the Prime Minister, the latter 
is not bound to change course. Thus, the vehement opposition to Begin’s settlement policies in the 
West Bank by Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, and Defense Minister, Ezer Weizmann, led to their 
respective resignations rather than Begin’s policy reformulation.162   Similarly, in the context of 
Operation Peace for Galilee, Begin would silence anyone who attempted to challenge Sharon, as a 
result of which “few ministers [were] likely  to defy Begin and risk incurring his wrath.”163 Only  the 
IDF (Israeli Defence Forces), through its Planning Branch established following the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, have such capacity and uses it to offer advice on foreign policy and defence matters. It 
typically does so through its highest  authority, the Chief of Staff who, nonetheless is subordinate to 
the Minister of Defence. Its influence not withstanding, the IDF’s approach to national security is 
highly  pragmatic, and focused on analysing “military ramifications” of a given policy, rather than 
imposing its own policy.164 Indeed, as Peleg (1987) writes, Begin “enjoy[ed] control over the IDF”.165
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Such features foster an environment where decisions are made on a short-term and tactical, rather 
than strategic, ad hoc basis. This is reinforced by  a pervading self-confidence of Prime Ministers 
and senior officials, most of whom hold extensive political and military experience, in their 
respective understandings of Israel’s national security  concerns. Moreover, a general and conscious 
avoidance, by those same officials, of staff work like preparatory  notes produced by the various 
national security bureaucracies, underlines this. More implicitly, it is fostered by Israeli tradition 
which celebrates leaders who advance unconstrained in their decision making. As Freilich points 
out, these tendencies are reflected in Begin’s approach to the Camp David negotiations, to which he 
went without  preparatory documents and having rejected a major IDF study, just as he adopted his 
position on the peace process “solely, or almost solely, on [his] own cognizance.”166   Similarly, in 
the context of Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, Begin and, then Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon 
kept extensive staff work which had been produced prior to the invasion, from the cabinet.167 
For all of its informality, the Israeli decision making structure calls for consultation with, and 
approval  from,  the  Knesset  in  cases  of  “supreme  importance”  and  “fundamental  partisan 
discord.”168    This is far from a straightforward process, given the low electoral threshold (1%)169 for 
parties, which in turn renders Israeli politics fragile and possibly very fractioned. It is, nonetheless, 
a process that Begin held in high regard. On one occasion, he stated that “Ours is a parliamentary, 
not a presidential, regime, and our task is to implement the policy that the Knesset has decided to 
undertake.”170 Similarly, he pronounced before the Knesset that, as far as the Israeli-Palestinian 
Peace Treaty was concerned,
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[...] “It is a clear cut decision that we are making today. We will not delude
anyone. If the Knesset  so decides, the decision will be implemented [...] I 
beseech each and every one, for God’s sake, vote as you wish but let  a clear- 
cut decision be made by the majority  in the Knesset so that tomorrow we 
can begin the work of preparing the negotiations and, God willing, sign a 
peace treaty.171
The  foreign  policy  outcomes  examined  in  the  following  chapter  -  Camp  David Accords  and 
Operation Peace for Galilee - are both considered cases of “supreme importance” whose fruition in 
turn necessitated parliamentary  approval. In neither case, however, did the Knesset majority  go 
against Begin’s preferred policy. The ninth Knesset (1977-1981) approved the Camp David 
Framework. This is reflected in the final votes on that matter where 84 Knesset members voted in 
favour, 19 Knesset members voted against and 17 Knesset members abstained from voting.172
Similarly, the tenth Knesset (1981-84) supported (along with Begin and his cabinet) the launch of 
Operation Peace for Galilee. This was not as much due to the genuine approval by the Knesset and 
cabinet of the invasion, as it was to the efforts of Ariel Sharon who, as has since been widely 
documented, engaged in deceptive efforts to secure the backing of both the Knesset and cabinet.. 
These efforts included Sharon evading the Knesset’s supervisory role through exploiting cracks in 
the political system and, crucially, either manipulating or withholding vital intelligence by blocking 
the flow of vital information to the cabinet and, as such, essentially  “circumvent[ing] democratic 
procedures.”173 Sharon’s deceptive efforts may possibly  also have implicated Begin, as the Defence 
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Minister has been described as “untiringly [procuring] Begin’s backing [by  kindling] the Prime 
Minister’s personal zeal to penetrate right down to “Arafat’s bunker”174   - a reference Begin made 
prior to the war to express his eagerness to eliminate the  PLO’s leader. As mentioned earlier, who 
though he necessitated Begin’s acquiescence to carry out the invasion of Lebanon, Sharon is 
considered the primary architect and driving force behind it. Indeed, the Kahane report of 1983 - a 
Commission of Inquiry supervised by two Israeli Supreme Court Judges and a Major General to 
examine the atrocities carried out during the Shatila and Sabra refugee camps in Western Beirut175 - 
found Sharon to be indirectly  responsible for those atrocities, following which he was compelled to 
resign as Defense Minister.176  To be sure, Sharon was a decidedly secular Minister but, though of a 
different worldview than Begin, their respective convictions for the appropriate course of action vis-
a-vis Lebanon - be it based on a plan to re-constitute the Middle East along new lines in the interest 
of national security177  as was the case with Sharon, or to do so to especially establish conditions 
conducive to securing Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, as in Begin’s case (detailed 
further in chapter 4) - did not therefore necessarily clash.   Following the Operation’s initial stage, 
the Knesset mounted increasing opposition to Israel’s invasion, which is likely to have prompted 
Begin’s early resignation from the post of Prime Minister.
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3.2 Islamic Republic of Iran
3.2.1 The socio-political landscape of Iran (ca. 1978-89)
Around the time of the Camp David Accords, and about a thousand miles further East, a revolution 
was unfolding across Iran, culminating in the forced departure of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in early 
January 1979, which ended fifty-four years of Pahlavi dynastic rule. Public dissent in Iran had been 
long underway, galvanized as it was by  Marxist, leftist  and, most dominant, Islamic forces, all of 
which shared intense anti-foreign, especially anti-American, sentiment.178    This was expressed in 
popular battle-cries such as Khod kafa-ye179 (self-sufficiency), which referred to protesters’ desire to 
reduce Iran’s dependency on Western powers; a desire built up during a history of foreign 
domination and one that arguably resulted in a protruding paranoia amongst the Iranian public.180
As observed by Roger Cooper, a British businessman, following his five-year imprisonment during 
the mid-1980s in the Iranian Evin prison on the suspicion that he was a British spy:
I think [the anti-foreign sentiment] goes back to the actually historical fact. 
There’s  no  doubt  that  in  the  nineteenth  century and up to the first couple 
of decades of the 20th century, the British on one side and Russians on the 
other did really  control everything important in Iran. It’s nothing really new 
that   the   Iranians   have   a   dislike [...] they  think that everything that 
happens has a British influence.
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Anti-Westernism, possibly enforced by  the paranoia identified by Cooper, strengthened in the 
aftermath of Pahlavi’s modernization and secularization efforts in the 1960s. Vehement opposition 
to  those  efforts  was  spearheaded  by  the  hitherto  quietist  Shi’ite  clergy,  above  all  Ruhollah 
Khomeini, who opposed them on the grounds that they encouraged moral corruption of society  and 
furthered Iranian dependence on Western powers and Israel. Khomeini was then “but” a respected 
member of the clergy, but his voice resonated widely across all sectors of Iranian society helped 
along by his charisma and importantly  also the clergy’s highly  organized network of mosques and 
other  platforms  of  social  outreach,  as  well  as  its  strong  links  to  the  bazaaris  (merchants). 
Khomeini’s vocal opposition and, presumably, its appeal across the country, prompted in his exile to 
Najaf in Iraq, and later Neauphle-le-Château in France, but that neither silenced him nor reduced his 
following. Quite to the contrary, Khomeini developed and lectured on Islamic Government while in 
Najaf, and continued reaching and galvanizing dissenting masses in Iran through his publications as 
well  as  audio  messages  on  clandestinely  smuggled  cassette  tapes.  The  Islamic  ideology, 
undoubtedly the dominant and ultimately  victorious of the revolutionary  ideologies, was reflected in 
another popular battle cry of the revolution Esteqlal, Azadi: Jomhouri Eslami(Independence, 
Freedom: Islamic Republic), which not only  called for freedom and independence, but equated this 
with Islamic Government.181
By the time of Khomeini’s return to Tehran from his exile on 1 February 1979, he was received by 
millions of Iranians who embraced him as leader of the revolution, as well as of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran that was to replace the Shah’s monarchical rule. This sentiment was reflected in the 
outcome of Iran’s referendum of 30-31 March, 1979 in which 99.3% of voters said ‘yes’ to the 
creation of an Islamic Republic and, similarly, in the referendum of 2-3 December, 1979 which
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ratified Iran’s new Islam-based constitution, to which 99.5% of voters agreed.182  These figures are 
to be taken with caution, as they  do not represent the voice of all Iranian constituents: some left- 
leaning political parties such as the National Democratic Front and the Fadaiyan Khalgh 
(Organization of Iranian People's Fadaian) boycotted the March referendum on the grounds that  it 
was not an open one,183 while another source suggests that the December 1979 referendum had only 
a 65% voter turn-out as a result, in large part, of the Kurdistani, Baluchistani and Azerbaijani 
minority regions’ boycott thereof.184  That said, pictures and video footage of Khomeini’s return to 
Iran and the time that followed makes it hard to deny that  he and the vision he promoted yielded 
widespread support.
This  support,  underpinned  by   a  fiercely  anti-Western  and  Islamic  populist  sentiment,  would 
continue throughout the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war; a conflict  initiated by Saddam Hussein’s 
offensive military  invasion of Iran in September 1980. However, as the war carried on, taking its 
toll on Iran’s increasingly  weak military, economy and morale, the regime’s domestic support 
declined, as became evident in a drop of army volunteers as well as in anti-war and anti-government 
demonstrations. Moreover, it coincided with increasing disunity within the government, particularly 
amongst the conservative clerics who wanted to continue the war at all costs, and the pragmatic 
ones who pushed for an end to it. The latter’s wish ultimately came true in August of 1988 when 
Khomeini accepted UN resolution 598 and, with it, agreed to withdraw to the international border 
between Iraq and Iran. These dire conditions were underpinned by Iran’s regional and international 
alienation, as Arab Gulf nations which had formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in defence of the
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spread of the Islamic Revolution, aided Iraq financially, materially and diplomatically during the 
war, just as major international powers did.
In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, pragmatists in the Iranian government were eager to re- 
establish relations with international allies, though much to the dismay of hardliners who vocally 
opposed any such moves. Various events indicate that  the their efforts were working, or starting to 
work. For example, diplomatic relations between Iran and the UK were restored in December 1978 
when a new Chargé d’Affaires, Nicholas Browne, took up a diplomatic post in Tehran; and 
negotiation talks concerning the release of British hostages held in Lebanon by Iranian-funded 
Hizbollah were moving forward. In a BBC interview one of these hostages, Terry Waite, recalls that
[the   capturers]   moved   me   to   [...]   very   nice   quarters, to a private 
house, and they  said  “you’ll  be  going  home  soon”. They brought  me 
good food, even wheeled in  for  the  first  time  a  video  machine,  and  said 
“you  can  watch  videos  if  you  would  like”’.185
Similarly, Roger Cooper, introduced above as the British business man held hostage in Iran on 
spying charges, recalls that his interrogators showed friendly signs and even said that they  were 
working towards releasing him.186  This rapprochement was reversed, however, following what 
would become known, alongside the Iran-Iraq war, as one of Khomeini’s main foreign policy 
moves: his fatwa (religious legal ruling) ordering the killing of British- and Muslim-born (but non- 
believing) novelist Salman Rushdie in response to the latter’s book The Satanic Verses (1988); a 
publication interpreted by many Muslim communities worldwide to be blasphemous against Islam. 
In the fatwa’s aftermath, the UK and other countries in the European Community withdrew their
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ambassadors from Iran; Hizbollah-held British hostages were re-placed into hostile conditions; and
Roger Cooper was sentenced to death plus ten years.
The effect of Khomeini’s fatwa on Muslims was immense: it  instigated condemnation and massive 
protests domestically, regionally and internationally. In Iran, 3000 demonstrators assembled by the 
British embassy  in Tehran to hear politicians call the UK “the enemy of the  Qur’an and Islam and 
the manifestation of all things evil”,187   and, in a separate incident, the head of an Iranian charity 
organisation, 15th Khordad  Relief  Agency, offered a financial reward to anyone, Iranian or non- 
Iranian,  for  the  murder  of  Rushdie.  Regionally,  Hizbollah  leaders  “promised  to  do  ‘all  that’s 
possible to have the honour’ of carrying out Khomeini’s death sentence.”188    Various Lebanese 
groups   also   supported   Khomeini’s   sentence   including   the   largest   Shi’i   groups,   Amal, 
and  the  Sunni  organisation,  Islamic  Unification  Movement  (the  latter  indicates  support  for 
Khomeini from an Islamic, not only a Shi’ite, base). A number of Palestinian groups, such as 
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 
joined these efforts as well. Even those who did not agree with Khomeini’s verdict, supported it, as 
one British Muslim explained: “many    Muslims didn’t   agree   with   the   fatwa   [but]   if   you 
disagreed  with  the  fatwa  it  was  as  if you disagreed with  the  Prophet  himself  and  your  faith 
would   be   lacking”.189  Khomeini died in early  June of 1989; long before the aggression against 
Rushdie would ease and even longer before the fatwa against  Rushdie would become withdrawn by 
the reformist Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, in 1998.
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3.2.2 Ayatollah Khomeini’s decision making environment
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s political system is notoriously complex. At no point has this held 
more  true  than  in  the  decade  following  the  Islamic  Revolution,  a  period  characterised  by 
factionalism between and within liberal and clerical parties. While a myriad of voices, belonging 
primarily  to conservative clerics, found expression through their dominant role in the Council of 
Guardians, Ayatollah Khomeini, throughout this time, remained the undisputed authority on all 
matters domestic and foreign. This authority  was vested in him by the Islamic Republic’s 
constitution of 1979, awarding him the role of faqih (leading jurist) and, more generally, 
implemented as system of governance velayat-e faqih (governance of the jurist), a form of Islamic 
government conceptualized by Khomeini himself during his exile in the decades leading up  to the 
revolution. As the case study in chapter 5 will detail, this manifested in a foreign policy concerned, 
above all, with fierce anti-Westernism, consolidation of the Islamic Republic and, spreading of the 
Islamic Revolution.
Islamic Government
As  “supreme  decision  maker”,190       of  the  Islamic  Republic,  Khomeini  “wielded  undisputed 
power”,191  counting the authority to determine “general policies” and exercise “supreme command” 
of the armed forces, amongst his prerogatives.184   Khomeini’s authority did not follow naturally 
from his role as leader of the Islamic Revolution. It was derived following intense debate between
liberal  and  clerical  forces  about  the  nature  of  Iran’s  post-Pahlavian  government;  specifically,
whether the latter was to be shaped according to republican or Islamic principles which respectively 
upheld a supreme and supervisory  role of the faqih.192   Ramazani (1989) and others distinguishes 
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these blocs as “Iran firsters” and “Islam firsters”.193  The former were generally at a disadvantage in 
this period, due to the overwhelming anti-Western sentiment that was present throughout Iran, 
fostering, as it did, a to dislike (and distrust) of institutions from the old regime and, more generally, 
delegitimized attempts run the country in “an organized, controlled manner.”194  Despite their lack of 
a clear idea about the details of their rule, “Islam firsters” found themselves in an environment 
conducive to their general conservative preferences and the constitution, ratified in December 1979, 
institutionalized velayat-e faqih (guardianship  of the jurist). The latter, a type of Islamic government 
conceptualized by Khomeini in the decades leading up to the revolution, entrusted the faqih with 
veto power over all government laws and decisions for the duration of the twelfth imam’s 
occultation, and laid Shari’a law as the basis for the country’s legal system. A number of bodies 
were created to uphold the regime’s “Islamicity” both politically and publicly. Most powerful 
amongst them was the Showra-ye Negahba (Council of Guardians), a non-elected body comprised 
of six theologians and six civilian jurists, whose significant privileges included authority to veto 
interpretations of the constitution and supervise elections to the presidency and Majlis (parliament) 
as well as approving legislation passed by the latter to ensure its “Islamicity”.195
Factionalism
Following the victory of “Islam firsters” and the subsequent institutionalization of clerical power,
factional rivalry between the liberal and clerical camp voices changed into rivalry within the clerical
camp,   played   out   between   what   Moslem   (2002)   characterizes   as   the   “conservative 
right” (henceforth, Conservatives) and “radical left” (henceforth, Radicals). The former argued for 
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private property, containment the Islamic Revolution within Iran and, importantly, promoted a strict 
interpretation of Shari’a law, to be based only  on primary  ordinances in the form of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (verbally transmitted records of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings), from which jurists 
could deviate only in exceptional circumstances. This clashed with the Radicals’ support  for state- 
sponsored egalitarian policies, export of the Revolution and, more fundamentally, their dynamic 
interpretation of Shari’a which allowed for secondary ordinances developed according to social and 
political issues of the day. The rivalry  between these camps was fought out between the 
Conservative-dominated Council of Guardians and parliament which comprised both Conservatives 
and Radicals. Given the power inequalities between those two bodies, the Council would seek to 
manifest its power through, e.g., principled rejections of laws that it deemed un-Islamic.196
However, as the constitution would have it, Khomeini was tasked with settling disputes and giving 
ultimate verdicts; a task which he, by  all accounts, approached with a dual containment policy 
whereby he would alternate between his endorsement of both camps, for the sake of consolidating 
the Islamic Republic. As early  as 1981, however, it  was suggested that the Ayatollah’s approach to 
policy-making lay in line with the Radical camp’s dynamic interpretation of Shari’a. In August of 
that year, the Majlis (parliament) passed a land reform law to redistribute land amongst peasant 
citizens, a move that was rejected by the Conservative-dominated Guardian Council on the grounds 
that it contradicted the Qur’anic verse “Muslims have mandate over their possession”. Following 
Khomeini’s intervention, and his first secondary  ordinance, the land reform law was approved by 
the Council of Guardians. Towards the end of the Islamic Republic first decade, and Khomeini’s 
life, the Ayatollah’s adoption of preference for maslahat (expediency), had been confirmed on
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numerous occasions, most prominently with his decision to terminate the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 in 
the face of fierce opposition from Conservatives in the Guardian Council and beyond.197
Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war, with domestic discontent and economic woes at their peak, 
Khomeini’s support of the Radicals and their dynamic interpretive methods manifested nowhere 
more clearly  than in his commission of a 13-member Review Council to oversee decisions of the 
Guardian Council ‘in the interest of the Islamic Country’, effectively undermining the power of 
Conservatives.198    Following Khomeini’s death in June of 1989, a new constitution diluted the 
extreme  centralization  of  authority  in  the  hands  of  the  faqih,  awarding  more  powers  to  the 
President. In the words of Mozafari (1993), the constitution instigated a change from “paternalism” 
to “presidentialism”.199 The political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the late twentieth and 
beyond thus looked and looks significantly different, although the overall form of governance, 
velayat-e faqih, remains intact forming what Maloney (2002) describes as “a modern theocracy”.200
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3.3 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
3.3.1 The socio-political landscape of Saudi Arabia (ca. 1982-92)
Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia was not immune to the effects of regional ideological trends 
and  events.  Iran’s  Islamic  Revolution  galvanized  Shi’ite  elements  in  the  Kingdom’s  Eastern
province, near the oil fields, prompting Saudi police to arrest and interrogate those who they
identified as pro-Khomeini activists.201  Also from within Saudi Arabia’s native, Sunni population 
did religious fervour increase; a development that many might consider surprising, given the 
Kingdom’s Shari’a-based legal system and the religiously  conservative society that it fosters. Most 
conspicuously, this manifested in the insurgency of a group of religious extremists who, on 20
November, 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in opposition to the Ulema’s relationship  with 
a corrupt and Westernized monarchy. Though most of the Saudi populace opposed this action on the 
basis that it  was “doctrinally illegitimate”, it  did not oppose the extremists’ demand for a more 
puritanical society; this was evident, for example, in male students’ appearance which increasingly 
incorporated short hair and long beards, both symbols of piety for Muslim men.202   Following 
permission from the Kingdom’s Ulema (Islamic clergy) to use violence in a Holy  territory, the 
extremists were killed by  Saudi security forces on 4 December 1979, and the Grand Mosque seizure 
terminated. But, as Saudi Arabian Columnist, Dr. Sulaiman Al Hattlan, observes, their wish was 
granted posthumously:
We killed the extremists of 1979, but later on - a few months after we killed 
them - we adopted their ideology. We gave them what they wanted when 
they  were alive. So, in every level of the society  - I am talking about the 
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educational system; I am talking about the media discourse; I am talking 
about the relationship between the government and the people; I am talking 
about even the relationship between the people and the people. We started 
competing  on  how  to  appear  more  conservative,  just  to  protect  our
reputation and to protect sometimes our safety. We had to pretend we were 
something that we actually were not.203
Indeed, the growing trend of religiosity in the Kingdom was responded to by the government 
through stricter laws of society, including forbidding female singers on television and (further) 
censoring of TV shows. Moreover, and despite a declining Saudi economy due to decreased oil 
revenue, vast amounts of government money was invested in religious education, including 
theological schools with the purpose of training future clerics. Internationally, too, the Kingdom 
increased its donations to Islamic causes: in 1981, for example, Saudi Arabia contributed $35 
million above its membership due, to the various institutions of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation.204   Upon becoming King in 1982, Crown Prince Fahd even assumed the official title 
“Custodian of the Two Holy  Mosques” (referring to guardianship  of Al Masjid al Haram (the Grand 
Mosque) in Mecca and Al Masjid an-Nabawi (the Prophet’s Mosque), the two holiest mosques in 
Islam).
In terms of foreign policy, Fahd joined, albeit reluctantly, other Arab leaders in expelling Egypt 
from the Arab League, following the Camp David Accords that occurred around this time, which 
were a source of enragement for Arabs and Muslims in the region. The Arab-Israeli conflict  was no 
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longer an Arab issue; if it had not been so before, it  became an Islamic issue following Khomeini’s 
public assurance to Arafat that “Iran’s revolution would not be complete until the Palestinians won 
theirs”, as well as his invitation for the PLO to install its mission in the former Israeli embassy in 
Tehran.205 Such rallying cries from Khomeini did more than challenge Fahd’s leadership role of the
Islamic world, which he and his predecessors had bestowed upon them due to their guardianship of 
Islam’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina; it galvanized Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia. Although 
the Kingdom’s Palestinian population numbered only  around 110,000 people206   of the Kingdom’s 
roughly ten million citizens, it comprised a significant 60-65% of the ARAMCO compound’s 
workforce in the late 1970s. Despite their integration into the local economy, those Palestinians 
were strongly attached to the idea of a Palestinian homeland. Cooley (1978-79) shows, with 
reference to his interview with the former Saudi Petroleum Minister, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, 
how the Saudis’ perceived security implications for Saudi Arabia, of a regional war incited by 
escalation of hostilities in the Israeli-Palestinian conference. In his interview with Yamani, Cooley 
was told “[...] You know about the Palestinians and the other foreigners we have around us. Even if 
we deployed the entire Saudi army and national guard around the oil fields, we could not prevent 
sabotage by “[...] trained and determined professional saboteurs.”207   As though to consolidate this 
existing fear, Faruq al-Qaddumi of the PLO is rumored to have “warned [Saudi Arabia’s Foreign 
Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal] of the vulnerability  of the Saudi oil fields, and also of the Islamic 
holy places, in case of general hostilities on the Middle East.”201
Domestic and regional ideological trends were relegated to a concern of secondary  stature in early 
August of 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s army invaded neighbouring Kuwait; an offense that 
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instantly prompted Fahd to invite US troops to defend his Kingdom. “Operation Desert Shield”, as 
this move was codenamed, was successful in doing so; as was the combat phase, “Operation Desert 
Storm” which succeeded resulted in Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Both operations were 
devastating for the Saudi regime’s legitimacy at  home, however. Whereas Saudi-Western relations 
had hitherto been framed as a necessary co-operation that facilitated import of technology and
expertise, the regime’s lacking defence capabilities in the face of Iraqi threats, now highlighted its 
dependency on the West. This severely undermined a regime whose legitimacy had rested on the 
ideology that it was the rightful defendant of the land of Islam. The kingdom’s dependency on the 
West for external security furthermore highlighted its mismanagement of funds spent on military 
equipment that, as it happened, did not serve its purpose. Altogether, this delegitimization of the 
regime  gave  rise  to  two  strands  of  opposition:  a  secular-liberal  opposition  which  pushed  for 
political process through a petition of December 1990, signed by public figures, businessmen, 
writers and journalists; and, a religious opposition emanating from a segment of the Ulema who 
called for greater adherence to Sharia law  through their own petition of February 1991, signed by 
the head of the Ulema, the spokesman of official Islam in the country, various judges, professors 
and teachers.208   Moreover, the latter was decidedly opposed, not only to the regime’s hosting of 
foreign troops, which they  referred to as “an alignment of the Kingdom and the enemies of God”209  
and an ‘illegitimate [alliance]”;210   but to part  of the Ulema which had accepted and legitimized, in 
the form of a fatwa, the regime’s decision to invite US troops into the Kingdom. Indeed, it was 
arguably  Fahd’s decision to facilitate Operation Desert Shield that mobilized a lingering Islamist 
trend which led to the terrorist attacks on American targets in Riyadh and Khobar in November
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1995 and June 1996, respectively. Osama bin Laden, who led both of those terrorist acts, wrote in 
“An Open Letter to King Fahd” that the attacks were a response to Fahd’s foreign policy, and 
criticized both the Saudi Arabian government’s foreign policy  as well as the Ulema for issuing 
fatwas that legitimized it. Bin Laden concluded the letter with his verdict that Fahd’s regime was 
un-Islamic and called for the King’s resignation.211
3.3.2. Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s decision making environment
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, in which neither elections nor political parties are allowed.212
Unlike Begin’s Israel and Khomeini’s Iran, however, its foreign policy  decision making structure 
and processes are, in the absence of a strong King, relatively  diffused in that the latter necessitates 
approval from senior members of the royal family to implement foreign policy decisions. Due to the 
weak leadership of King Khalid (1975-82), Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was the 
Kingdom’s highest de-facto authority under Khalid’s reign until his accession to the throne in 1982, 
after which he became so officially. Characteristic of Saudi foreign policy decision making is that, 
in times of crises, the decision making circle is brought together around the King’s policy, which, as 
chapter 6 will detail, meant unanimous support for Fahd’s decision to invite US troops to the 
Kingdom in the context of the 1990-91 Gulf War. While Saudi Arabia’s ulema (religious 
establishment)  does  not  have  any  direct  influence  on  the  Kingdom’s  foreign  policy  decision 
making, its preferences, particularly those related to Arab and Islamic affairs at home and abroad, 
must necessarily be accommodated. The ulema’s leverage derives from the crucial role that it has 
played historically in legitimizing Al Saud’s dynastic rule, in exchange for the latter’s 
implementation of Islamic governance in its Wahhabi variant. In this sense, King Fahd and his inner 
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circle,  and  indeed  the  Saudi  leadership  across  time,  was  confined,  however  informally,  by  a 
relatively rigid Saudi identity intricately tied to Islam. 
The King and Senior Princes
Under the reign of King Khalid (1957-82), whose non-political persona and poor health rendered 
him a weak leader, Crown Prince Fahd was, by all accounts, the de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.213
He has been described as the “most important single figure in shaping Saudi foreign policy” and 
“the kingdom’s strongman” of this period, before becoming the official ruler - or, King - following 
Khalid’s death in 1982.214    Although dominating the decision making process, Fahd shared his 
mandate with a group of senior princes, as is customary in the Kingdom due to the leader’s need to 
maintain legitimacy  around his person in the eyes of the royal family.215  Prominent in Fahd’s circle 
was Prince, later Crown Prince, and Head of the National Guard, Abdullah, Prince and Foreign 
Minister Saud Al-Faisal, and Prince and Defence Minister Sultan. Although their primary concern 
laid with Syria and Yemen, respectively, both Abdullah and Saud Al-Faisal were concerned with the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.216    Abdullah was vehemently critical of US-foreign policy vis-a-vis the 
Palestinian  question,  and Al-Faisal  emphasized  centrality   of  Palestinian  issues  in Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This differed from Fahd’s own view, which has generally been characterized as “pro- 
American” and “centrist” in an inter-Arab context  which, as the case study in chapter 6 will show, 
meant that he was less anti-Egyptian than most Saudis and indeed influential senior princes.
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Decision making amongst the highest authorities of the Saudi royal family is “shrouded in 
secrecy”217    and depends largely  on intra-family dynamics and politics. As such it is difficult to 
ascertain precisely how policy on the Israeli-Palestinian question came to be. However, as will be 
discussed in chapter 6, it is likely that the pro-Palestinian sentiment amongst his aides, coupled with
that of the Ulema as well as public opinion more broadly, shaped Fahd’s foreign policy vis-a-vis 
this issue218    This would furthermore be in line with the trend for the royal family to reach a 
consensus on policy matters, on the grounds that such a position minimizes risks of delegitimization 
that come from revealing disunity or disagreements within the family. This is especially so in the 
times of crisis, when princes tend to band together and abandon their differences, as was the case 
during Fahd’s decision to invite US troops to the Kingdom during Operations Desert Shield and 
Storm.219  Upon Fahd’s announcement of this decision in August 1990, five (and probably more) of 
the people in the room were ruling family members.220     Had there been major disagreements 
between them, this would have been reflected in the Kingdom’s foreign policy; a scenario that has 
only been seen during King Saud’s vehement disagreement with Crown Prince Faisal over the 
adequate policy  vis-a-vis Nasserist Egypt, which resulted in a contradictory  foreign policy  of 
confrontation and appeasement, and eventually leading to King Saud’s deposition.221
The  roles  of  government  officials  like  technocrats  as  well  as  government  bodies  like  the 
Consultative Council and Council of Ministers, in foreign policy decision making is limited to 
advisory ones, at best, except where members are royal and/or amongst the senior Princes, as was 
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the case with Abdullah, al-Faisal and Sultan.222    Despite what has become a complex and large 
bureaucracy, decision making is centralized amongst a handful of royals who, as the section below 
details, nonetheless operate within the important context of a religio-political symbiosis between the 
Al Saud family, on the one hand, and the religious establishment, on the other.
The Ulema
By all accounts, the ulema does not, despite its representation in government, have a decisive voice 
in the Kingdom’s foreign policy  decision making process.223 Such a role is largely  confined to the 
domestic sphere where it  staunchly  ensures that social and legal codes are in line with Shari’a law, 
and controls the content  of Friday sermons and public fora.224  Indeed, as Gause III (2003) notes, a 
foreign policy decision has never been repealed due to opposition from the Ulema.225   Rather than 
having a decisive role, the Ulema is thought to “influence [foreign policy] to various degrees”226  by, 
for example, holding regular Thursday meetings with the King to “exchange views and coordinate 
policy”227  and, importantly, by its ability to give or withhold support for a given foreign policy  and 
thereby legitimize, or not, the King and his fellow decision makers. Legitimization in the form of 
the Ulema’s approval is of critical importance for the royal family as the latter’s survival as a ruling 
body is largely dependent upon it. The Ulema, in turn, depends on the royal family’s institutional 
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protection and financial support  for its own subsistence. This religio-politico symbiosis dates back 
to the mid-seventeenth century, when the dynasty’s founding father, Muhammad Ibn al-Saud, and 
and the founder of the Wahhabi movement, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab, struck an “legitimacy- 
for-protection” agreement.228  Upon meeting, Al Saud, then ruler of the town of Diriyah, is said to
have told Al Wahhab, who was at odds with local rulers of the Nejd region,229   that “this oasis is 
yours, do not fear your enemies. By the name of God, if all Nejd was summoned to throw you out, 
we will never agree to expel you,”230  to which Al Wahhab replied that “[...] I want you to grant me 
an oath that you will perform jihad against the unbelievers. In return you will be Imam, leader of the 
Muslim community and I will be leader in religious matters.”231
As such, the two leaders effectively put  in place a power-sharing agreement by which Al Wahhab 
and his followers were promised both protection and a society  led according to Islamic values, 
while Al Saud was granted the religious legitimacy necessary for his recognition as the effective 
ruler of the Saudi state.232   Specifically, the legitimacy allowed Al Saud to unify, in the name of 
religion, his sources of support that were otherwise separated according to tribal loyalties and 
traditional leaderships.233    The Saudi state founded by Al Saud fell twice; during the Ottoman- 
Wahhabi war of 1811-1818, and again during the civil war between quarreling tribes of the Asir and 
Riyadh regions in 1880. When re-established by  Ibn Saud in 1932, the success of the new state was 
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determined, as had been the case centuries prior, by  the Wahhabi-Saud alliance. The politico-religio 
symbiosis has been essential to the consolidation of the Saudi nation ever since.
For a crisis situation like that  faced by  Fahd when inviting U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia to fight 
against Iraq, this symbiosis meant that the regime turned to the Ulema, albeit post-facto, to justify 
its decision, so that a fatwa may be released in support of the latter.234   For non-crisis situations, 
especially those with a decidedly Islamic dimension, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
King and his advisors, are generally seen to deviate less, at least conspicuously, from the Ulema’s 
well-known anti-Israeli line.
3.4 Conclusion
As the chapter has shown, Begin, Khomeini and Fahd led their respective countries during a period 
when religious ideologies and sentiment were rife within their borders and across the Middle East 
region. Moreover, it has shown that all three leaders could operate with disproportionate autonomy 
over matters of foreign policy, either by way of constitutional design as in the case of Khomeini and 
Fahd, or a forceful personality, in the case of Begin. The latter does not imply that the leaders were 
above the influence of government dynamics, public opinion or, the Ulema, in the case of Saudi 
Arabia; as the methodology section of the thesis’ introductory chapter pointed out, these factors are 
therefore accounted for, where relevant, in the case study analysis. The following three chapters 
comprise the case study analysis of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia, each of them discussing first the 
worldview of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd, respectively, with reference to those leaders‘ “faith”and 
“belief-communities” before they  proceed to looking at how the “religious beliefs” reflect in their 
foreign policy outcomes and, especially, the leaders’ discourse surrounding those outcomes. For 
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Begin’s Israel, the foreign policies include the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for 
Galilee; for Iran, Khomeini’s policy vis-a-vis the Iran-Iraq War and his fatwa against Salman 
Rushdie; and for Saudi Arabia, Fahd’s policy vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and Operation 
Desert Shield and Storm.
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CHAPTER 4
RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ISRAEL 
UNDER MENACHEM BEGIN (1977-84)
The Bible is a living document – eternally living document. We live on this 
Book, with this Book – forever. And my predecessor of blessed memory, the 
late Mr. Ben-Gurion, aptly expressed himself when he said, ‘Some people 
say that the British Mandate is our Bible. It is untrue’ he said. ‘The Bible is 
our mandate!’ Yes, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip are integral parts of 
Eretz Yisrael [...]
- Menachem Begin’s address to Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20, 1978.235
4.0 Introduction
Menachem Begin was never one to shy away from speaking candidly in public and the quote above 
is but one of many examples in which he speaks his mind on the matter that was, by his own 
account and the accounts of many others, nearest and dearest to his heart: Eretz Yisrael (Land of 
Israel). More specifically, Begin was concerned with the return to Eretz Yisrael of the Jewish people 
and the latter’s expected redemption which, he held, would occur as a result thereof.  In this chapter, 
I argue, and show, that Begin’s religious beliefs - that is, the combination of his individual “faith” 
and the shared faith of his neo-revisionist “belief-community” (discussed further on pp. 113-14) 
shaped his worldview, which apart from comprising an ardent insistence on the Jewish return (or 
continued presence, depending on the time period discussed) on the Land of Israel in its entirety, 
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also comprised a pervasive perception of an inherent anti-Semitism on the part of Arabs and, 
especially, the PLO. In the same context, I furthermore argue that, by  way of forming part of his 
worldview, and by extension also his foreign policy doctrine, Begin’s religious beliefs shaped two of 
his most important foreign policy outcomes: the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for 
Galilee.236 To be sure, I do not identify religion as an independent variable, but acknowledge, and 
account for it as one which interplays with other important factors, above all, historical ones. That 
interplay  notwithstanding, I show that the relationship  between Begin’s religious beliefs and his 
policy vis-a-vis Judea, Samaria and Gaza, in the context of Framework I of the Camp David 
Accords was particularly strong; explicit, in fact. The relationship between Begin’s religious 
beliefs and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and Operation Peace for Galilee was notably  an indirect 
one, but an important one nonetheless as Begin’s intention to establish full, contractual peace with 
both Egypt and Lebanon can only be understood in the context of his insistence of the Jewish 
people’s sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael.
With reference to various excerpts of Begin’s discourse, I furthermore argue that a second role of 
religion in Begin’s foreign policy, is one of legitimization. Specifically, I show how Begin invokes 
religious references at times when he is faced with mounting public opposition, whether from a 
minority movement like Gush Emunim or broader public opposition as during Operation Peace for 
Galilee. Given Begin’s candid personality, and the malleability  of religious beliefs, I do not 
necessarily discard his religious references as disingenuous and, but rather suggest that they may be 
a means to legitimize his foreign policy  to the public as well as to himself; this discussion and that 
of religion’s role as one which shapes Begin’s worldview, foreign policy doctrine and foreign policy 
outcomes, is taken up in the chapter’s conclusion. It follows a section on the religious dimension of 
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Begin’s worldview (4.1),  the latter’s reflection in his foreign policy doctrine (4.2) and two sections 
on the Camp David Accords (4.3) and Operation Peace for Galilee (4.4), respectively.
4.1 Begin’s world-view
Begin’s “faith”
In the words of Begin’s longtime friend and advisor, Harry  Hurwitz, Menachem was “above all, [...] 
a man of immense and supreme faith”,237  whose constant prayer was “Be’ezrat Haskem - with the 
help of the Almighty.”238 His biographer Avi Shilon makes a similar observation, writing that,
When [Begin] came to power, it became apparent that expressions such as 
“Be’ezrat  Hashem”,  [which]  riddled  his  speech,  were  not  merely  an 
affection, but a genuine part of his world outlook [...] His faith in God was 
evident in everything he did.239
His colleague during the Camp David Accords, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, writes along the same 
lines that Begin’s “deep  and unswerving religious commitments [had] always been a guiding factor 
in his consciousness and in his pursuit of unswerving goals.”240   Scholars dedicated to studying the 
life and political behaviour of Begin have reached similar conclusions. Amongst them, Dr. Arnon 
Lammfrom from the Israeli State Archives, who, when I asked him about Begin’s faith during my 
visit to the archives, replied that, “although Begin was not religious in an explicit way [as] he was 
not a Rabbi; his soul was religious.”241  Begin’s personal reflections on his relationship with God tell 
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a similar story. In his autobiographical memoir, White Nights: the Story of a Prisoner in Russia, for 
example, Begin included references such as “[I] said a silent prayer of thanksgiving”,242  “I prayed
to God to help me in my hour of need”243    and “We chatted, studied, played, thought, prayed.”244
Most telling of all, perhaps, Begin recalls the following conversation between himself and an 
interrogator during his imprisonment in a Russian labour camp in the 1940s:
Begin:             “With the help of God [...] I will perhaps still work for my people.” 
Interrogator:   “God? Do you believe in God?”
Begin:             “Yes, of course I believe in God”.
Interrogator:   “I see that in this sphere too you will need re-education. But I must say I didn’t 
expect to hear such nonsense from you, Menachem Wolfowitz. After all you 
are an educated man. How can you believe in God?”
Begin:             “I have seen university professors who believe in God. There have been great 
scientists who believed in God.”
Interrogator:   “Nonsense! A scientist can’t believe in God. Those that you are referring to 
only said they believe. They were in the pay of the bourgeoisie. Incidentally, 
can you tell me why you believe in God?”
Begin:             “It’s very  hard to explain, Citizen-Judge. Faith is not a thing that one can 
explain rationally.”
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Interrogator:   “Are there things that the mind cannot grasp? There are no such things! An 
answer can be found to everything in science.”
Begin:       “Faith does not  stand in contradiction to human intelligence; but man, in his 
intelligence, understands that there are things he cannot fathom by rationality, 
and so he believes in a Higher Power.”245
Begin’s faith did not so much exist in isolation as it did as an important constitutive part  of what 
Peleg (1987) refers to as the “neo-revisionist” ideology, where it intricately interplayed with 
nationalist and historical elements.246    The neo-revisionist ideology  - what I argue in this chapter 
comprises Begin’s “belief-community” - was spearheaded by Begin himself but comprising a 
broad political leadership and, as we saw in chapter 3, even broader public support amongst 
especially religious constituents in Israel since the early 1970s. It developed from Ze’ev 
Jabotinsky’s Revisionist  Zionism of the 1920s and 1930s, and shared with the latter the position that 
Jews should establish a powerful state in their national home on Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), 
through the use of force as this was deemed the only viable way of tackling hatred against Jews.247 
Begin’s neo-revisionism, while comprising the same goals and preferred militant tactics as 
Jabotinsky’s Revisionism, was an emotionalized variant thereof. It was developed around the notion 
that a return to Eretz Yisrael would ultimately bring about the Jewish people’s redemption which 
had diminished through millennia in exile.248  For Begin, there was a direct relationship  between the 
weakening of the Jewish people on the one hand, and its time in exile which had allowed for 
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atrocities like the Holocaust, on the other; once the Jewish people would return to Eretz Yisrael, its 
heroism and grandeur of ancient times would manifest again.249  Moreover, neo-revisionism based
its claim to Eretz Yisrael more staunchly on its ancient  historical and spiritual ties to the land, than 
did its Labour predecessors or and political Zionism in general.250
In a private letter to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on 4 August, 1980, Begin expresses this view 
clearly, when he writes that “To the Jewish people Jerusalem is not only  holy; it is their history for 
three millennia, their heart, their dream, the visible symbol of their national redemption.”251   In this 
short excerpt, Begin emphasizes that the claim of the Jewish people to Jerusalem is upheld by its 
religious (“holy”) as well as historical (“history for three millennia”) relationship  with that city. In 
discussing how Begin viewed the Jewish people’s claim to Eretz Yisrael it is indeed implausible to 
separate historical and religious aspects from one another; that said, it is possible to get a sense of 
just how important the religious dimension was to Begin, by looking at his public and private 
discourse across a range of contexts. In a public prayer at the Wailing Wall following Israel’s 
(re)capture of Jerusalem in 1967, for example, Begin spoke the following words:
We shall yet come to Hebron, the city of the Four Couples, and there 
we shall prostrate ourselves at the graves of the Patriarchs of our 
people. We shall yet be on the way to Euphrath as thou comest to 
Bethlehem of Judah. We shall pray at the Tomb of Rachel and we shall 
bring to mind the prayer of the prophet: “A voice is heard in Raman, 
weiling and bitter lamentation, Rachel weeping for her children, she 
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refuseth to be comforted for her children, for they  are not. Refrain thy 
voice from weeping and thine eyes from tears for there is a reward for 
thy labour, saith the Lord, and they shall return from the land of the
enemy. And there is hope for thy latter end and thy children shall 
return to their borders.252
Begin’s reference to the Palestinian city of Hebron as “the city of the Four Couples” invokes a 
testimony in the Talmud in which Hebron (or Kiriath-Arba, as it  was formerly known) is described 
as the home of four Biblical Couples: Adam and Eve; Abraham and Sarah; Isaac and Rebeccah; 
and, Jacob and Leah.253    Similarly, his reference to the “graves of the Patriarchs of our people” 
invokes the founders - Abraham, Isaac and Jacob - of Judaism, just  as the “Tomb of Rachel”  does 
the Biblical matriarch, Rachel, and her tomb in Bethlehem of Judah whose location is described in 
the Bible to be in Ephath (as Bethlehem was formerly known).254    When invoking Biblical 
references, as Begin does, alongside statements like “we shall pray” and “we shall bring to mind 
the prayer of the prophet,” their meaning becomes more than merely historical. The following 
reference from Begin’s speech in a less “religiously charged” environment than the Wailing Wall255  
sends a similar message. It shows Begin’s response to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s speech 
delivered to the Knesset on November 20, 1977, in which Sadat referred to the West Bank and Gaza 
as “the Occupied Territories,”256    and called for Israel’s presumed understanding of the need to 
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create a Palestinian state, given the Jews “moral and legal justification to set up a national home on 
a land that did not all belong to [them].”257 To this, Begin responded:
[...] it is my duty to tell our guest and the peoples watching us and 
listening to our words about the link between our people and this land.
[...] No sir, we did not take over any  strange land. We returned to our 
homeland. The link between our people and this land is eternal. It was 
created at the dawn of human history. It was never severed. In this 
land we established our civilization. Here our prophets spoke those 
holy words you cited this very  day; there the Kings of Judah and Israel 
prostrated themselves; here we became a nation; here we established 
our Kingdom and, when we were exiled from our country  by the force 
that was exercised against us, even when we were far away  we did not 
forget this Land, not even for a single day; we prayed for it; we longed 
for it; we have believed in our return to it.258
Here, Begin speaks of the Jews’ “eternal” link to Eretz Yisrael, an adjective that implies more than 
merely a historical connection between Jews and the Land of israel. Similarly, he refers to 
“prophets” who spoke “holy” words on the Land of Israel, a land that Jews for millennia 
subsequently,  “prayed”  that  they   would  return  to.  In  his  address  to  the  Egyptian  people  in 
November 1977, Begin moreover implied that the bond between Jews and the Land of Israel is 
Divinely sanctioned through Moses, a common prophet of Jews and Muslims:
It is in the Holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to this land was 
stated and sanctified. May I read to you this eternal Surah. “Recall 
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when Moses said to his people, O my people, remember the goodness 
of Allah towards you when He appointed prophets among you. O my 
people,  enter  the  Holy  Land  which  Allah  hath  written  down  as 
yours.259
In addition to its staunch advocacy of the Jewish people’s return to Eretz Yisrael, the neo-revisionist 
ideology was characterized by its ever-present perception of extreme anti-Semitism. Unlike political 
Zionism of the late twentieth century onwards, which thought anti-Semitism to be a result of social, 
political and economic conditions, Begin and his contemporary neo-revisionists, many of whom 
had a lived memory  of the atrocities committed against European Jews during World War II, viewed 
anti-Semitism in “theological terms”, as “an almost cosmic reality, a metaphysical condition” and 
often “religiously inspired”.260  The neo-revisionist perception of anti-Semitism applied above all to 
Arabs, who were referred to as “Amalek;” the Biblical enemy nation which, upon fighting the 
Hebrews, the latter were commanded by God to annihilate. The Amalek-reference was invoked by 
political and popular voices, and reinforced by  religious leadership. In his article, The Genocide 
Commandment in the Torah, for example, Rabbi Israel Hess likened Arabs to Amalekites and 
concluded that “the day will come when we all be summoned for the commandment of Milchemet 
Mitzvah [an obligatory war] for the annihilation of Amalek”261   and, according to Armstron (2001) 
argued in this essay that Palestinians deserved a similar fate to the Amalekites because “Palestinians 
were to Jews what darkness was to light.”262  Similarly, albeit in a less radical manner, Rabbi Eliezer 
Waldenberg announced that non-Jews should not make up  a majority  in any  Israeli city and, in 
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Jerusalem, not be allowed to live at all.263    Not everyone in the neo-revisionist camp espoused 
equally radical views to Eliezer and, especially, Hess; however, the Amalek reference was used by it
to “give religious sanction” to the neo-revisionist position of unlimited war against the Arabs.264
For Begin, perceived anti-Semitism on the part of Arabs was espoused nowhere more vehemently 
than within the ranks of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),265    as he expressed 
unequivocally in his statement to the Zionist General Council on 23 June 1977, a few days after 
taking office:
And with regard to the Palestinian State, we have to realize that we are 
faced with the most cruel enemy of the Jewish people since the days of the 
Nazis. They have made up their minds to try, and can now but try to destroy 
us, man, woman and child. We don't really need the Palestinian Charter to 
know this. It is written there, in Paragraph 19, that the establishment of the 
State of Israel is null and void as though it had never been. They met 
together in Cairo, and there was hope in certain countries for a toning down 
of their position and hope was expressed that this paragraph would be 
retracted. But they didn't even consider it. It didn't cross their minds. They 
confirmed it explicitly -for this is the line of their thought. [...] And it is they 
who, inevitably, would be in control of this state. No agreement will be 
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made, unless it is with some other body, that would transfer Judea and 
Samaria and Gaza to these murderers.266
It can convincingly be argued that  Begin’s depiction of an inherently anti-Semitic PLO, especially, 
but also broader Arab region and world at large, made the victories of a minuscule (in relative 
terms) Jewish people and state seem almost miraculous and as ones aided by a higher power. The 
best example of this is the decisive military victory of Israel in the 1967 war when the, still young,
Jewish state defeated the long-standing armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in a matter of just six 
days. This event was interpreted by many as one facilitated by Divine intervention,267    and, as 
chapter 3 showed, marked a turning point in Israel’s socio-political landscape followed by increased 
religious  conversions.  By  the  same  token,  Begin’s  perception,  and  that   of  neo-revisionists  in 
general, of an inherently  anti-Semitic world legitimized the militant stance vis-a-vis Arab state and 
non-state actors in particular, that characterized the neo-revisionist ideology. In line with this, Peleg 
(1987) characterizes neo-revisionism as a combination of “secular realism” and “religious 
messianism.”268    This multi-faceted nature of the neo-revisionist ideology, which simultaneously 
appealed to parties and constituents belonging to the religious and nationalist right, is likely the 
reason why Begin obtained the wide-ranging support that made possible his electoral victories of
1977 and 1982. Importantly, this does not necessarily imply that Begin employed his celebrated 
oratory  skills in a manipulative way merely  to secure support from across the board. As will become 
clear throughout this chapter, Begin’s was, by  nature, exceptionally candid and never one to employ 
obscure terminology to cover his beliefs and rationalization, even if they  appeared contradictory; as 
Sofer (1998) observes, for Begin, “reality” genuinely existed on two levels - “one ideological, and 
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another resting on the “rationality  of political realism,”269     to which she adds that in Begin’s 
“profound  inner  contradiction,  the  romantic  element  has  frequently  undermined  the  realistic 
political assumptions [...]”270
4.2 Begin’s Foreign Policy doctrine
Begin’s world-view, characterized by “secular realism” and “religious messianism” - to borrow
Peleg’s  terminology  -  and  underpinned  by  a  deep-rooted  perception  of  pervasive  anti-Semitic
hostility from Arabs in particular, and above all the PLO, reflected in a foreign policy doctrine 
characterised by two main tenets. First, liberation of Eretz Yisrael, which for Begin meant the 
territory comprising Jerusalem (including East Jerusalem), Judea, Samaria (roughly, modern day 
West Bank) and the Gaza Strip, in addition to Israel’s international borders which marked said 
territories as Palestinian. Begin expressed this position incessantly before and during his time in 
power as Prime Minister of Israel, for example in his joint press conference with Sadat in Jerusalem 
on 21 November, 1977:
Since the book of Samuel, and President Sadat knows the Bible perfectly 
well, no less than the Koran - so he knows the book of Samuel as well - 
where it is written for the first time: “And no locksmith shall be found 
throughout Eretz-Yisrael.” The translation of Eretz-Yisrael is Palestine.271
In other discourse, Begin was more explicit about the areas which he considered to comprise Eretz 
Yisrael: in his speech to Jewish leaders in New York on 20 September 1978, for example, he stated 
that “Yes, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip  are integral parts of Eretz Yisrael.”272   Similarly, with 
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regards to Jerusalem, Begin stated in his letter of 4 August, 1980 to Sadat that  “Jerusalem is and 
will be one, under Israel’s sovereignty, its indivisible capital.”273     The second tenet of Begin’s 
foreign policy doctrine was full, contractual peace with all of Israel’s neighboring Arab states, 
which he held would enhance Israel’s security  in the region. As with his stance vis-a-vis Eretz 
Yisrael, Begin expressed his commitment to this position many times over, most notably, perhaps, 
in his speech to the Knesset during Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, in which he stated that “We want
peace with all our neighbors - with Egypt and with Jordan, with Syria and with Lebanon.”274  A
militant stance underpinned both of those tenets, as Begin expressed on another occasion:
This ought to be the rule for us: every nation should try  to achieve its national 
goal by diplomatic means, as far as is possible. The use of force, if right is on 
your side, is not forbidden. At times it is even obligatory.275
Begin’s foreign policy doctrine would reflect in the two major foreign policy decisions that marked 
his  Prime  Ministership:  the  Camp  David Accords  and  Operation  Peace  for  Galilee;  both  are 
discussed below in the context of religion’s role in them.
4.3 Menachem Begin and the Camp David Accords
This is, Ladies and Gentlemen, the third greatest day in my  life. The 
first was May 14, 1948, when our flag was hoisted [...] The second 
day was when Jerusalem became one city and our [...] soldiers [...] 
kissed the ancient stones of the remnants of the Western Wall, destined 
to protect the chosen place of God’s glory. [...] This is the third 
118
273 Ibid. p. 203.
274 Ibid. p. 31.
275 Begin cited in Sofer, S. (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. 139.
[greatest] day in my life. I have signed a treaty of peace with our 
neighbor, with Egypt. The heart is full and overflowing.276
These words were spoken by Begin, following his signing of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt 
and Israel, on the lawn of the White House in Washington on March 26, 1979, alongside signatory 
Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat and, witness, US President Jimmy Carter. The peace treaty was
a result of negotiations preceding and following the Camp David Accords, signed and witnessed by 
the same three parties some six months prior. A two-framework agreement, the accords comprised 
of plans for “Peace in the Middle East” and “the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and 
Israel”. The former framework addressed the need to “solve the Palestinian problem in all its 
aspects”277  by allowing for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza, 
while providing for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during a transitional period of five 
years. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to be determined through future negotiations. 
The latter agreement called for full withdrawal of Israeli military  forces from the Sinai Peninsula, 
granting full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty  over that territory, and leading to the establishment of 
a binding peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, including diplomatic relations.278  As the opening 
excerpt from Begin’s speech indicates, the latter was achieved in March of 1979; the “Palestinian 
Problem,” however, remains to be solved. The following two sub-sections respectively  look at  the 
Israel-Peace  Treaty  and  Framework  II  of  the  Accords  in  the  context  of  Begin’s  “religious 
beliefs” (defined in chapter 2 as the interaction between a leaders “faith” and the interpretive 
tradition of his “belief-community.”)
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Begin’s religious beliefs and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty
Begin’s agreement to sign the Camp David Accords was in line with his foreign policy  doctrine 
which, as we saw above, committed him to liberating Eretz Yisrael on the one hand, and obtaining 
full contractual peace with neighbouring states, on the other. This is most obvious in the case 
Framework II of the Accords, which called for an Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty  on the condition of 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  Peninsula.  It  is  true  that  Begin,  when  he  was  part  of  the
opposition,279  disapproved of then ruling Labour party’s interim talks with Egypt and the United
States concerning the potential withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula, but he did so because 
such talks did not request a final peace treaty between Israel and Egypt; not because they  were at 
odds with his position regarding withdrawal from the Sinai or relations with Egypt.280   Moreover, 
Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula did not go against his commitment to liberate Eretz 
Yisrael; to Begin, the Sinai Peninsula did not constitute the Land of Israel and certainly  not land of 
the same Biblical stature as Judea and Samaria. The Peace Treaty with Egypt was thus a welcome 
move for Begin, and all the more so given the increasingly  insecure environment in which Israel 
found itself, with the Islamic Revolution unfolding in Iran - Israel’s sole regional ally - and Islamist 
discourse intensifying regionally, alongside anti-Israel sentiment solidified by  four Arab-Israeli 
wars and Saudi Arabia-led oil embargo imposed in protest of Western nations’ aid to Israel during 
the Yom Kippur War in 1974. Under such conditions, a populous and military strong Egypt that, 
given its prominent role in the unfolding Islamist  ideology held significant mobilizing potential, 
would seem to Begin, a peace treaty  signatory  of high calibre that could serve to increase Israel’s 
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security standing in the region.281   Begin enjoyed the support of the majority  in the Knesset for his 
signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty - the ninth Knesset’s (1977-81) approval of the Peace 
Treaty was reflected in 84 “in favour” votes as opposed to only 19 votes “against” and 17 abstained 
from voting.282   Israeli public opinion, too, was largely in favour and Begin was proud to state to 
Sadat upon his visit to Jerusalem on 20 November, 1977 that,
Today, Jerusalem is bedecked with two flags - the Egyptian and the Israeli. 
Together, Mr. President, we have seen our little children waving both flags. 
Let us sign a peace treaty and establish such a situation forever both in
Jerusalem and in Cairo. I hope the day will come when Egyptian children 
will wave Israeli and Egyptian flags together, just as the Israeli children are 
waving both of these flags together in Jerusalem [...]283
The support of the Knesset and public notwithstanding, Begin met vehement opposition from a 
small, but vocal minority of the Gush Emunim movement who dismissed the Israeli withdrawal 
from Sinai on explicitly  religious grounds. As detailed in chapter 3, the “totally religious, messianic 
and fundamentalist” Gush Emunim movement, which saw the Sinai Peninsula as part of Eretz 
Yisrael and moreover feared that Begin’s weak stance on Sinai would compromise Judea and 
Samaria, set up  “The Movement to Halt the Sinai Retreat”, which proactively  established Jewish 
communities, including settler families and Jewish seminaries, in the Sinai.284   Its efforts were not 
successful and Gush Emunim settlers were forcefully  removed by Israeli soldiers in 1981 when the 
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Sinai was to be returned to Egypt.285 Although Gush Emunim’s was the loudest “religious” voice, it 
was not the only one. Begin would at times, though not consistently, use religion to frame the 
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty as an effort which was sanctioned by  God. This is evident, for example, 
in his speech at  the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, where he spoke the following 
words:
[...] The ancient Jewish people gave the world the vision of eternal peace, of 
universal disarmament, of abolishing the teaching and learning of war. Two 
prophets, Yeshayahu ben Amotz and Micha Hamorashti, having foreseen the 
spiritual unity of man under God – with His word coming forth from 
Jerusalem – gave the nations of the world the following vision expressed in 
identical terms: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their
spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not  lift up  sword against  nation; 
neither shall they learn war anymore.” Despite the tragedies and 
disappointments of the past, we must never forsake that vision, that  human 
dream, that unshakable faith. Peace is the beauty of life. It  is sunshine. It is 
the  smile  of  a  child,  the  love  of  a  mother,  the  joy  of  a  father,  the 
togetherness of a family.286
In this passage, Begin draws a connection between the teachings of two Prophets of Israel, who 
foresaw the spiritual unity  of man under God, and eternal peace between nations. Given the context 
in which he relayed this speech, Begin seems to suggest that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty 
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fulfills religious teachings, or is at least in accordance with them. Begin employed a similar rhetoric 
during his joint press conference with Sadat following the latter’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977:
[...] as we both believe, the President [Sadat] and I, in Divine Providence, 
before the departure of the President  and his party, we pray  to the Almighty 
that he give all of us the wisdom to continue in our efforts to bring peace to 
our nations – real peace [...]287
Although less explicitly than in the previous excerpt, Begin frames the immanent Egyptian-Israeli 
peace as one that is somehow in line with God’s will. His rhetoric can be understood in various 
ways: first, as a means of bestowing legitimacy  upon himself and his decision to sign the Israel- 
Egypt Peace Treaty. As we saw in chapter 3, the social and political milieu in Israel had become 
increasingly   religious  since  the  early   1970s,  with  religious  conversions  taking  place  more 
frequently, possibly organically or as a result of proselytizing efforts by religious parties like
Agudat and the National Religious Party (NRP). With Gush Emunim’s vociferous, religiously- 
grounded opposition to the Peace Treaty, Begin may have perceived a need to ensure his religious 
constituents, moderate and radical alike, of the Peace Treaty’s religious legitimacy. Second, it  is 
possible that Begin’s public discourse was a true reflection of his religious beliefs. This becomes 
increasingly  plausible when reviewing accounts of his personality. William Quandt, who was a staff 
member on the National Security  Council in the Carter administration and actively involved in the 
negotiations preceeding both the Camp David Accords and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, writes 
that Begin had a “large capacity for self-persuasion” as well as “an unmatched skill” of taking an 
idea and building it into a pattern for the purpose of granting legitimacy to an existing idea.288
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Moreover, as indicated earlier, Sofer (1988) notes that in Begin’s “[...] profound inner contradiction 
[between ideology and political realism], the romantic element has frequently  undermined the 
realistic political assumptions [...]289   In this light, it  would not be farfetched to suggest that Begin 
saw the signing of a peace treaty with Egypt not exclusively  in terms enhancing the material 
security of the Israeli state, but rather in the context of his broader world-view, as a necessary 
means to ensure redemption of the Jewish people; a view that, as we have seen in section 4.1 above 
had, for Begin, a religious dimension. Perhaps, Begin even saw Israel’s peace with the region’s 
most militarily powerful actor, one that had been a major aggressor during all four Arab-Israeli 
wars, as a sign that the Jewish people had reclaimed its grandeur and strength as a result of its 
presence on Eretz Yisrael. Begin had previously, in the context of the 1967-war expressed that it 
was  “With the help  of God Almighty, [that Israel] overcame the forces of aggression, and we have 
guaranteed  existence  for  our  nation;”290      a  sentiment  that   was  shared  by  many  in  the  settler 
movement who saw God’s help as the only full explanation for Israel’s unlikely military victory
against three aggressive Arab armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Even some Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 
who had previously refrained from supporting Zionism on the grounds that a Jewish state should 
only follow the Messiah’s arrival, became Zionists in the wake of the 1967 war. Seen in this light, 
Begin’s religious framing of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty tells a story that goes beyond “mere” 
instrumental legitimization and rather fits logically within his broader world-view. Importantly, the 
fact that Begin’s understanding of Eretz Yisrael’s borders is different than that of fundamentalist 
religious groups does, by  no means, imply that it is “religiously” less legitimate. As Shindler (2001) 
notes, there are various passages in the Bible, which delineate different borders of Eretz Yisrael. The 
passage in Genesis, for example, in which God promises to the Patriarchs “To your seed I give this 
land from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates,” has meant to the much of the 
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Orthodox Jewry that Eretz Yisrael comprises parts of modern-day Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq.291  Yet, another definition in Numbers delineates the Land of Israel to be on the territory  of 
Canaan - roughly, from Mount Hor in the north to “the Brook of Egypt” in the South, and in this 
definition the territory East of the River Jordan (Bashan and Gilead) is excluded. In general, the 
term Eretz Yisrael has taken on different meanings for different groups of Zionists, including 
secular ones as it did for Revisionism’s founding father Ze’ev Jabotinsky, for example.285   For 
Begin, though certainly  not as one-dimensional as that of the Orthodox Jewry, his attachment to 
Eretz Yisrael was neither entirely secular, as this chapter has shown thus far.
Begin’s religious beliefs and Framework II of the Camp David Accords
The settler movement’s religious fundamentalists saw Begin’s signing of the Camp David Accords 
as “a religious front of the first degree” and symbolically associated it with the shameful peace 
signed with Hitler in 1939 by Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. The “betrayal”, as was 
his accord signing characterised, even prompted establishment of The Covenant of Eretz Yisrael
Loyalists; a large-scale coalition composed of student groups, political movements and settler 
supporters of the maximalist cause, which sought to “alert the public about the grave error 
committed by Begin.”292   Despite what religious fundamentalists may have initially feared, 
Begin, unlike his Camp David negotiation partners, never intended for the Accord’s efforts to 
“solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects,”293  to mean that Israel relinquish “sovereignty” 
over the West Bank or, what he incessantly referred to as Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza 
Strip. This becomes clear when appraising the Camp David Agreement in light of the 
negotiations that preceded it, the (lack of) actions that followed it and indeed the minute 
details which comprised it: through Begin’s meticulous and tenacious approach to the 
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negotiations, he ensured that the final agreement to which he gave his signature at Camp 
David, was phrased in such a way that he could be neither expected nor forced to make any 
compromise that would require Israeli settlement or military withdrawal from Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza. Quandt (2005) who, as noted previously, took part in the Camp David negotiations, 
details the type of assiduousness and concessional requests exposed by Begin, who he 
described as having “a feel for the strategic use of time, taking the negotiations to the brink of 
collapse over secondary issues to avoid being pressed on key problems.”294   By “key problems” 
Quandt refers specifically  to the Palestinian issue, where Begin demonstrated an 
“unwillingness to accept that the principle of withdrawal from occupied territory, as called for 
in Resolution 242, should apply  to the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a transitional 
period,”295 and insisted that “any agreement [...] concerning Egyptian-Israeli relations should in 
no way be dependent on resolving the Palestinian question.”290 Egypt’s Foreign Minister, 
Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, makes a similar observation in his first-hand account of the Camp 
David negotiations:
Every   hour  brought  reports  of  further  concessions.  Begin  insisted  on 
deletion of all reference to “the non-admissibility  of acquiring territory by 
force”, telling Carter that “if he had to sign or cut  off his two hands he still 
would not sign it.” This resulted in the deletion of the reference to this 
cardinal principle of Resolution 242. [...] In return for the word “full” that 
Carter had added to the phrase “autonomy”, Begin insisted on inserting the 
phrase “administrative council” between brackets before the phrase “the 
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self-governing authority” so as to minimize its jurisdiction to administrative 
questions to the exclusion of the legislative and judicial.296
Begin made his intensions vis-a-vis Framework I of the Camp David Accords clear across various 
contexts, and his justification of this position with reference to the “religious strand” of his world- 
view can be detected across all of them. In a letter to Sadat on May 1980, for example, upon 
pressure from the latter to alter his position on the Palestinian question, Begin answered that “Our 
position on settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District is certainly well-known to you, as is 
that on Jerusalem: it is the exercise of our inherent right [...];”297 an “inherent right” that  came from 
the Jewish people’s unique relationship with Eretz Yisrael. As he stressed to an Egyptian journalist 
during a joint press conference with Sadat, “we were given our right to exist by the God of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. We have paid a price for that right, higher perhaps than any  other nation. 
It is inherent; it required no recognition.”298    Like in previous examples, Begin’s choice of words 
denote more than merely a historical relationship between the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael: it 
explicitly bases the Jewish people’s right on something beyond the Jewish patriarchs, on God. This 
is further expressed in his speech to Jewish leaders in New York, on 20 September 1978 where he 
stated that,
The Bible is a living document – eternally living document. We live on this 
Book, with this Book – forever. And my predecessor of blessed memory, the 
late Mr. Ben-Gurion, aptly expressed himself when he said, ‘Some people 
say that the British Mandate is our Bible. It is untrue’ he said. ‘The Bible is 
our mandate!’ Yes, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip  are integral parts of 
Eretz Yisrael – the land of our forefathers, which we have never forgotten 
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during exile, when we were a persecuted minority, humiliated, killed, our 
blood shed, burned alive. We always remembered Zion, and Zion means 
Eretz Yisrael. It is our land as of right.294
Here too, Begin frames Jewish ties to Eretz Yisrael with references to the Bible as an “eternally 
living” document and land “as of right” which, taken in context of Begin’s world-view, seem to 
denote more than merely a historical relationship. What is more, Begin would never depart from 
using the Biblical terms when referring to what his negotiation partners, Carter and Sadat, termed 
“the West Bank”. This is evident in Begin’s personal correspondence with Sadat, for example, in 
which the latter, voicing specific points of disagreement between him and Begin, wrote:
Sadat:                          It goes without saying, also, that these actions contradict the provision of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the annexation of occupied 
territories.
Begin:                         The Egyptian delegate votes for a resolution demanding that by November
15, Israel withdraw from Judea, Samaria (my language), the Gaza District, 
the Golan Height and Jerusalem.295
Begin’s insistence on referring to the West Bank by its Biblical name, despite the non-ideological 
context in which the area is discussed in his correspondence with Sadat implies, if nothing else, the 
importance of those territories to Begin. As with Framework II, Begin’s use of religious discourse in 
the context of Framework II can be understood in various ways. As above, it can be seen to 
legitimize to his audience, be it Sadat, Carter or the Israeli public, his position vis-a-vis Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza. His need for legitimacy in the eyes of the public, in particular, may be explained 
with reference to the vocal opposition from the likes of Gush Emunim and the general religiosity of 
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the Israeli public at this time. This need notwithstanding, Begin’s use of such discourse across 
public and private contexts, in addition to his assiduousness that Quandt and Kamel record in this 
regard, suggests that it  rather speaks to a attachment to his ideals which, as noted in the section 
about Begin’s world-view, derived in important part from his faith. It is noteworthy that if Biblical 
teachings “prescribed” Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, as Begin’s discourse in the context of the 
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty suggest, their prescription for Judea and Samaria was quite the opposite. 
In the latter context, Begin suggested, ever ardently, that it was Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria 
and the Gaza Strip  - territories of the highest Biblical stature - which was condoned, if not 
commanded, by God; not peace as in the Egyptian case. This can of course be explained by the 
different Biblical status of those areas in Begin’s view; but, if nothing else, that only serves to 
reinforce the notion that Begin’s foreign policy was in line with his world-view.
4.4 Menachem Begin and Operation Peace for Galilee
On 6 June, 1982 Israel launched a military  invasion, Operation Peace for Galilee, into Southern 
Lebanon; officially a defensive, limited invasion seeking to push the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) factions 40 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border in order to protect 
civilians in the Galilee region in Northern Israel from artillery and rocket attacks by the Lebanon- 
based PLO. Though unbeknownst to the Israeli public and most of the government at the time, the 
Operation’s objectives were much more extensive and included destroying PLO infrastructure 
throughout Lebanon, along with the Syria forces militarily aiding it (albeit with its own geopolitical 
interests in mind), and installing a Christian Lebanese, pro-Israel government. Amongst many other 
sources that  reveal these intentions is a private letter from Begin to U.S. Ambassador to Robert 
McFarlane on 11 August, 1982, in which the Prime Minister noted that “Israel’s principal goals” in 
the context  of Operation Peace for Galilee were “[...] a) to strengthen the government of President 
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Amin Jemayel, and b) to get  Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon.”299  Ultimately, such measures 
were thought to foster conditions for a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon; an objective in line 
with Begin’s foreign policy  doctrine which sought peace with all of Israel’s neighbors through 
force, if diplomacy fell short of achieving the desired results.297 The launch of Operation Peace for 
Galilee initially enjoyed overwhelming backing from the Israeli public which, as chapter 3 detailed, 
supported the neo-revisionist militant stance on foreign policy and a general suspicion vis-a-vis 
Arabs and especially  Palestinians. As it became clear that Begin, in conjunction with his Defence 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, intended for Operation Peace for Galilee to be a much more elaborate 
invasion than it had initially been presented as, public opinion and that of the Knesset became
increasingly  divided.  Following  the  Sabra  and  Shatila  massacre  of  September  1982,  where
around one thousand of Palestinian civilians in West Beirut refugee camps were killed by 
Phalange300   militia with the suspected complicity of the IDF, constituents in Israel turned 
decidedly  against the war. 400,000 people, then 10% of the Israeli population, called for Sharon’s 
resignation and an official enquiry into the massacre. Sharon stepped down as a result  of the 
report findings, and Begin resigned out of his own initiative the following year.
Unlike  in  the  Camp  David Accords,  especially  Framework  I,  where  Begin’s  religious  beliefs 
featured explicitly across private and public contexts, the former appeared only sporadically, if at 
all, in discourse surrounding Operation Peace for Galilee. It is still possible, however, to discern its 
important role in this context. The sections below will show that by placing Operation Peace for 
Galilee in the context of Begin’s world-view, we cannot hope to understand the invasion without 
reference to the world-view’s religious dimension. Additionally, they will show religion as a means 
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with which Begin legitimizes the invasion to an increasing critical Knesset and public, and possibly 
also to himself.
Begin’s religious beliefs and the rationale for Operation Peace for Galilee
The decision to launch Operation Peace for Galilee was instigated by an assassination attempt in 
London on 3 June, 1982 against the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov, by 
three  members  of  the  militant,  Palestinian  splinter  group,  the Abu  Nidal  Organisation.  Begin 
responded to the shooting by stating that Argov had been shot “because he was a Jew, because he 
was an Israeli, because he was a symbol of the State of Israel.”299   To Begin, the assassination 
attempt was clearly an act symbolic of something much bigger than Argov; it was a manifestation 
of the Arab anti-semitism that, as we have seen, occupied a protruding role in his world-view and
made justifiable a militant response. Indeed, the attack on Argov was, as Begin’s Defense Minister,
Ariel Sharon, has since described in his memoirs, “merely the spark that lit the fuse.”301   It 
followed a year of tension between Israel and the PLO along the Israel-Lebanon border; tension 
that had, nonetheless, hitherto been tempered by the U.S.-brokered Israel-PLO ceasefire of 25 
July 1981 and unjustifiably so, as this statement from Begin’s government shows:
We must point out that the ceasefire of July 1981 has been interpreted in 
many quarters as prohibiting any and all Israeli measures against the hostile 
bases. While leaving the forces entrenched in these bases free to attack 
Israel and its citizens everywhere except  one specific border. In reality  this 
interpretation amounts to a one-sided cease-fire permitting the attacker to 
attack while binding the hands of the attacked party.302
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Abu Nidal’s attack gave Israel a justification to invade Lebanon, a long welcome move in the eyes 
of Begin and Sharon. Already on 30 May, 1982, in a private correspondence with U.S. Secretary 
Alexander Haig, did the latter express concern about future Israeli military actions in Lebanon and 
encouraged Israel to exercise military restraint. Begin found Haig’s suggestion inappropriate as he 
thought  that  there  “[was]  in  Lebanon  a  neo-nazi  terrorist  organization  which  constantly 
proclaim[ed] its design to kill [Israeli] people in Israel and abroad - men, women and children 
[...],”303    and he took Haig’s suggestion to mean that  Israel “should let [the PLO] kill [Israeli] 
citizens and brethren - and do nothing.”304   Begin ensured Haig that Israel’s reconnaissance flights 
would continue to fly  over Lebanon, as “he would never expose the Jews to such danger, because of 
what had happened to [them] in the Past.”305   In a private correspondence with U.S. President
Reagan on 6 June, 1982, when Israel had just initiated its invasion, Begin responded in a similar 
fashion when Reagan encouraged Begin to still exercise military restraint. Specifically, Begin 
responded:
For the last seventy-two hours, twenty-three of our towns, townships and 
villages in Galilee have been under the constant shelling of Soviet-supplied 
heavy   artillery  and  Katyusha  rockets  by  the  "P.L.O."  terrorists. Tens  of 
thousands of men, women and children remain day and night in shelters. We 
have suffered casualties. The terrorists are aiming their guns exclusively  at 
the civilian population. There are many military targets in the area; these are 
completely "immune". The purpose of the enemy is to kill - to kill Jews; 
men, women and children. Is there a nation in the world that would tolerate 
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such, a situation which, after the cessation of hostilities agreement, has 
repeated itself time and again?
The question is clearly answered in the most recent action of the United 
Kingdom which is now waging a full-fledged war eight thousand miles from 
its shores in the name of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Mr. 
President, the bloodthirsty  aggressor against us is on our doorstep. Do we 
not have "the inherent right to self-defense?" Does not Article 51 of the 
Charter  apply  to  us?  Is  the  Jewish  State  an  exception  to  all  the  rules 
applying to all other nations? The answer to these questions is enshrined in 
the questions themselves.
Begin concluded the letter with the words: “We shall do our sacred duty. So 
help  us God.”306   Like in his reaction to Argov’s shooting, Begin’s world-
view shines through in his letters to both Haig and Reagan: the PLO is not 
merely regarded as a terrorist threat on Israel’s northern border; it is viewed 
as an existential threat unique to the Jews, posed by terrorists aiming their 
guns exclusively at the civilian population with the purpose to kill Jews; 
men, women and children. Begin sees this threat is inherently anti-Semitic, 
similar in character to that exposed by Nazi Germany. Moreover, the 
Jewish state’s defensive military  action against the PLO is, unlike the United 
Kingdom’s defensive invasion of the Falkland Islands, not being judged 
according to the international standards which grant  states the inherent right 
to self-defense; yet another aspect in which the Jews state are being 
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discriminated against. These examples fit logically in Begin’s broader 
world-view and this is only reinforced by his signing off with saying so help 
us God. Begin’s decision to invade Lebanon must necessarily be viewed in 
the context of his world-view; and, when we do so, it is possible to conceive 
of a role of Begin’s religious beliefs in the invasion. As far as the 
statements above are concerned, such a role is not an explicit one; but, 
insofar as Begin’s faith is an all-important, constitutive part of his world-
view, it cannot be separated from this action which is, by all accounts, an 
extension of Begin’s world-view and one that fits logically  into his foreign 
policy doctrine.
It is possible to discern a more tangible role of religion in Operation Peace for Galilee if we look at 
the invasion, as many scholars have,307  more specifically as an attempt to maintain Israeli presence 
on Judea and Samaria by  destroying the increasingly powerful and legitimate PLO leadership and, 
with it, a growing capacity for establishing a Palestinian state. In 1970, the PLO, under the 
leadership of Yassir Arafat, was expelled from Jordan and set up its new base in Southern Lebanon, 
an area that, as Lebanon in general, had seen an influx of Palestinian refugees dislocated by the
1967 war. This move was preceded by  the Cairo Accord of November 1969, an Egyptian-brokered 
agreement by which Arafat and Lebanese General, Emile Bustani, agreed to PLO presence in 
Southern Lebanon. These developments empowered the PLO in Lebanon, making the latter a a an 
even  more  powerful  centre  for  resistance  to  West  Bank  annexation. An  Israeli  invasion  into 
Lebanon would not only destroy  the PLO’s ability  to attack Jews living in the Galilee region from 
its stronghold in Southern Lebanon; it would also decentralize the PLO. Removing leadership 
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abilities of the PLO would depoliticize the Palestinian community, breaking it  into “controllable 
minorities” reducing the Palestinian question to a refugee one, rather than a viable political one.308
It is likely that Begin saw the latter - the PLO as an viable political option - as an increasingly 
threatening development, given the PLO’s growing international recognition and its perceived 
growing moderation due, in part, to its keeping of the 1981 cease fire; factors that, altogether could 
make the PLO a legitimate claimant of Judea and Samaria.309    This is especially likely  when 
appraised in light of media excerpts from around the time leading up to the invasion: for example, 
on 12 October, 1981 a Chicago Tribune article entitled Carter, Ford urge recognition of PLO to 
attain Mideast peace, stated that “Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford believe there can be no real 
diplomatic advances in the Middle East until the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization is 
accepted” and that “both [former Presidents] went further in calling for recognition of the PLO than 
they  ever did when they  were in the White House.”310  Carter furthermore entertained the idea of the 
PLO as an moderate force and the only viable leadership of the Palestinian people, stating that 
"Many of the PLO leaders are very moderate in abhorring terrorism and violence. I don't see any
possibility of the Palestinian world, and the Arab world, of acknowledging any other leadership for
the Palestinians other than the PLO."311  Moreover, Carter partly blamed the Israelis and “their 
policy of installing new settlements in the occupied West Bank” for the stalemate in Middle East 
negotiations.312  In the midst of such discourse coming from none other that the U.S., Begin would 
be right to fear the increasingly realistic emergence of the PLO as a legitimate actor and with it, a 
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growing threat to Judea and Samaria specifically. Viewing the invasion from this perspective, the 
religious beliefs of Begin become more discernible.
Begin’s religious beliefs and public discourse
Operation Peace for Galilee’s official objective to push PLO factions in Southern Lebanon, or “the 
terrorists,” 40 kilometers beyond the Israel-Lebanon border was achieved within a few days of its 
launch. According to at least one first-hand account, it did so at the expense of an Israeli-operated 
jet, which was shot down during an air raid in Nabatiyeh on 8 June, 1982 as well as numerous 
Palestinian civilian casualties and wounded in the areas of Sidon, Tyre, Damour and the areas 
inland from those cities.313 On the same day, Begin delivered the following address to the Knesset:
[...] from time to time our nation has an encounter with history. And 
so, our soldiers are now in Tyre. We recall Ezekiel, chapter 27, verse
8: “Thy wise me, O Tyre, were in thee, they were thy pilots.” We are 
standing today  in Sidon and we recall Isaiah, chapter 23, verse 12: 
“Thou shalt no more rejoice, O thou oppressed virgin daughter of 
Sidon.” We also recall the two chapters in the Book of Kings on the 
friendship  between Hiram, King of Tyre, and our King David, and on 
the alliance our King Solomon formed with the King of Tyre at the
time of the construction of the First Temple. We will not  be able to 
give Tyre what Solomon gave it, but we can give it  security, peace and 
tranquility. And only on condition that  there be peace and tranquility 
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in Nahariya, which was shelled from Tyre for many  years, with 
Katyusha shells. No longer. All will be tranquil – both we and they.314
In this passage, Begin invokes Biblical events during which the nation of Israel had a friendship or 
alliance with the cities of Tyre and Sidon in modern-day Lebanon. By invoking these events as they 
were relayed by the Prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah, Begin’s references have a religious rather than 
purely  historical connotation, and serve to emphasize the invasion as one of aimed at peace, 
security and tranquility. It is unclear, though not entirely unlikely, that Begin’s reference to “pilots” 
is invoked specifically to somehow justify, in the broader context of Biblical history, the Israeli jet 
that was shot down on the same day in Nabatiyeh; what is explicit, however, is that Begin’s passage 
as a whole is an effort to legitimize the Israeli invasion that was, on the day of this speech, 
unfolding violently in Southern Lebanon. Begin made a similar effort on a separate occasion, 
specifically in his address to the Knesset on June 29, 1982, at which point Israeli troops had moved 
far beyond the 40 kilometer lines and into Beirut. Speaking to the Knesset which had, at no point, 
knowingly agreed to this military advance, Begin stated that,
We don’t  want even a square millimeter of Lebanese soil. Lebanon 
isn’t  the Land of Israel. From ancient time until the end of all 
generations, it hasn’t been the Land of Israel. We want to renew the 
alliance with Lebanon, as it  was in ancient time between Israel and 
Judah and Lebanon. We will renew it. But first  of all we must get rid 
of this scourge that isn’t written in the Torah, these terrorists whom I
don’t  even want to describe by their correct name [...] the Jewish 
people can exist, with God’s help, only by the readiness to sacrifice on 
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the part of our finest sons, only  through willingness and self- 
sacrifice’.315
As, or perhaps more than, in the previous passage, Begin makes explicitly religious references like 
the Torah and God’s help; in this passage, too, his efforts seem to be aimed at legitimizing Israeli 
presence in Lebanon through such references. Additionally, by  depicting it as absent from the 
Torah, his discourse simultaneously “religiously” delegitimizes the scourge (PLO). Moreover, one 
can sense Begin’s broader world-view of the Jewish people as one whose redemption depends on its 
ties with the Land of Israel, implicitly  at work in this passage: through peace with neighboring 
Lebanon, as that which existed between ancient Israel and Judah and Lebanon, the Jewish people 
will be able to live, as God intends for them, on the Land of Israel. Like in the previous example, 
Begin gave this statement as disapproval amongst both Knesset members as well as public opinion 
was increasingly  divided regarding Operation Peace for Galilee, which, in part, was a result of Arab 
propaganda proliferating harsh images from Beirut.316    Public discontent culminated, a few days 
after Begin’s address to the Knesset, with an anti-government demonstration organized by the 
Peace Now movement, which rallied approximately  100,000 anti-government protesters demanding 
an end to the Lebanon war on the ground that it had gone beyond the 40 kilometer line initially 
agreed to by Knesset.317
In the context of Begin’s public discourse vis-a-vis Operation Peace for Galilee, it  is possible to 
discuss two roles of religion, both of them linked to legitimization and both, likely, at play 
simultaneously. First, religion can be understood as a discursive instrument with which Begin
legitimizes the invasion into Lebanon and, especially, the violence suffered by both Israelis and 
Palestinians. It is notable that the excerpts above are from discourse employed around the time of 
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heightened violence, as this suggests that Begin might have sought to pre-empt or respond to public 
disapproval  that  (would)  occurred  as  a  result.  Shilon  (2012)  explains  that  Begin  expressed 
“bitterness at public criticism” of IDF during Operation Peace for Galilee, an indication that  he was 
indeed aware of the invasion’s repercussions for public opinion.318  It makes sense that Begin would 
tend to religious references for legitimization purposes because, as we saw in chapter two, the 
Israeli public was at  this time on the same ideological trajectory that had been developing since the 
early 1970s, something which had been confirmed to Begin shortly  before when he formed his 
second nationalist-religious government on 5 August, 1981. Second, Begin’s religious references 
can be understood as an accurate reflection of his religious beliefs at the time; an understanding that 
becomes all the more plausible when appraised in light of his candid personality. This view would 
suggest that religion legitimized Operation Peace for Galilee to Begin himself by  way of rendering 
the invasion an effort carried out for an end that was in line with God’s will.
4.5 Conclusion
Against the backdrop of material presented and analyzed throughout this chapter, we can discern 
two primary  roles of religion in the context of Israeli foreign policy under Menachem Begin. First, 
Begin’s faith along with the shared faith of his belief-community - the two together forming Begin’s 
religious  beliefs  -  shaped  his  world-view. Though interplaying with other variables (discussed 
further in thesis’ conclusion in chapter 7), this meant a worldview characterized by an ardent 
insistence on Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in the context of the 
Camp David Accords and also, albeit indirectly, in his militant insistence to destroy the PLO in 
the context of Operation Peace for Galilee. By  extension, Begin’s faith and belief-community also 
shaped  his  foreign  policy doctrine, which rested on the tenets of liberating Eretz Yisrael and 
establishing full, contractual peace  with  neighbouring  states.  Equally,  his  worldview  by 
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extension  shaped  his  two  most significant foreign policy  outcomes: the Camp David Accords 
and Operation Peace for Galilee. As the chapter has demonstrated, the relationship between 
Begin’s religious beliefs and the foreign policy tenet of liberating Eretz Yisrael is more directly 
discernible than the tenet of establishing full, contractual peace with all of Israel’s neighboring Arab 
states. As a result, a relationship between Begin’s religious beliefs and his policy vis-a-vis Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza (Framework I of the Camp David Accords) is also more easily  discerned, as 
the material presented in section 4.3 has shown. Whilst  not obvious, the relationship  between 
Begin’ religious beliefs on the one hand, and his Peace Treaty  with Egypt  as well as his Operation 
Peace for Galilee, on the other, is not necessarily absent. In line with his foreign policy doctrine, 
Begin signed the Peace Treaty with Egypt in order to secure the Jewish people on Eretz Yisrael. 
His invasion into Lebanon was carried out for the same reason; to establish a secure neighbour on 
Israel’s Northern border. Based on the material presented in section 4.4, the invasion was moreover 
intensified due to the direct threat that the PLO, as an increasingly moderate force, presented to 
Israeli sovereignty over key  Biblical territories of Eretz Yisrael, Judea and Samaria. In this vein, it 
can convincingly  be argued that, insofar as the “end goal” of Begin’s foreign policy vis-a-vis both 
Egypt and the PLO in Lebanon was to secure the Jewish people on Eretz Yisrael, we can talk about 
an indirect relationship between Begin’s religious beliefs and these foreign policy  outcomes, in 
addition to the direct relationship between his religious beliefs and Framework I of the Camp David 
Accords. To be sure, it is entirely possible, indeed likely, that a decidedly secular leader employ a 
similar foreign policy  to Begin (although that is arguably less true in the context of territorial 
maximalist policies vis-a-vis Judea and Samaria, which Labour leaders before and after distanced 
themselves from.) But, as section 4.1 detailed, Begin was not a secular leader and, given the role of 
religious beliefs in his worldview, his foreign policy  outcomes - even those in which the relationship 
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to his religious beliefs are not clear - can, I argue, not be understood fully outside the context of 
religion.
The second role of religion is one of legitimization. While it does not feature equally intensely 
across the board, Begin employs religious discourse in the context of all of the foreign policy 
outcomes discussed in the chapter. It  each context, religion seems to take on a different, often rather 
specific, meaning for Begin. In the context of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, it prescribes peace 
between nations - and implicitly  acceptance of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, - whilst 
in that of Framework I of the Camp David Accords, it prescribes Jewish presence on Judea and 
Samaria. To be sure, these meanings should not be viewed as contradictory to one another as the 
land upon which Begin’s religious beliefs prescribe presence, is distinct from that with which he 
agrees to withdrawal; the different meanings of religion are nonetheless worthy  of mention as they 
highlight the multi-faceted nature of captured by  a single religious doctrine. More interestingly, 
perhaps is that Begin employs religious discourse at times, and in contexts, where dissenting public 
opinion, whether from a minority movement like Gush Emunim, or the broader public following the 
early  stages  of  Operation  Peace  for  Galilee,  were  particularly   vocal.  The  timing  of  Begin’s 
discourse would suggest that Begin employs religious discourse in order to legitimize the foreign 
policy at hand. This could plausibly be seen as an instrumental use of religion on Begin’s part. In 
the event  that such is the case, it nonetheless reflects the importance of religion, if not for Begin, 
then for segments of his audience in Israeli society. Given the candid manner in which Begin spoke 
and  behaved,  however,  it  is  not  entirely  unlikely  that  his  religious  discourse  was  a  genuine 
reflection of his religious beliefs and served not just to legitimize his foreign policy to the public, 
but also to himself.
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CHAPTER 5
RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN IRAN UNDER 
AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI (1979-1989)
God Almighty has granted us His favor and destroyed the regime of 
arrogance by His powerful hand, which has shown itself as the power 
of the oppressed. [On] this blessed day, the day the Islamic community 
assumes leadership, the day of the victory and triumph of our people, 
I declare the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  - Ayatollah Khomeini on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s establishment on 1 April, 1979.
5.0 Introduction
While the religious beliefs of Menachem Begin may have been somewhat obscure given their 
interplay  with historical and nationalist  ones, Khomeini’s life-works and discourse left room for 
little doubt as to his faith and dedication to Islam. Schooled in religious seminaries from an early 
age, Khomeini’s dedication to Islam only deepened throughout his early career as a teacher of 
Islamic law, his position as Marja’ (source of emulation) within the ranks of Iran’s Shi’ite 
Islamic clergy and, in 1979, as founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the opening quote of 
this  chapter  suggests,  the  latter  occasion  marked  a  dramatic  shift  from  Iran’s  previous 
government and with that change came an equally dramatic shift in Iran’s foreign policy. From 
the   moment   of   the   Islamic   Republic’s   establishment,   Iran’s   foreign   policy   would   be 
characterized   by    non-alignment,   tied   to   a   vehement   anti-Westernism   and   a   focus   on 
consolidating the Islamic Republic, and export of the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran’s borders. In 
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this chapter, I argue - and show - that Khomeini’s foreign policy doctrine was grounded 
solidly  in his religious beliefs which were shaped by his own unswerving Islamic faith as well a the 
Twelver Shi’ite belief-community to which he belonged (explained in detail on p. . Khomeini’s 
doctrine moreover reflected in his foreign policy vis-a-vis the Iran-Iraq war - particularly, his 
continuation of that war following Iran’s nominal victory in 1982 - in that the latter sought to both 
consolidate the Islamic Republic and spread the Islamic Revolution; as well as in his fatwa against 
the British novelist Salman Rushdie, for the same reasons.319
Similarly  to the previous chapter, I furthermore argue that  Khomeini invoked religious public 
discourse  to legitimize  himself  and  his  foreign  policy.    As  was  the  case  with  Begin,  that 
discourse seems to reflect the domestic socio-political trends and conditions and, as a result, appears 
to be somewhat contradictory. With reference to concepts of ijtihad (the right to interpretation)  and 
maslahat  (expediency),  both  pertaining  to  the  Usuli  branch  of  Twelver Shi’ism  to  which 
Khomeini  adhered,  I  argue  that  any  contradictions  in  both  Khomeini’s discourse and behaviour 
should not be regarded as a deviation from his religious beliefs, but rather a logical development 
thereof.
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319  In  addition to the Iran-Iraq war and his fatwa vis-a-vis Salman Rushdie, Khomeini’s foreign policy was also charaterized by his 
prolonging of the hostage crisis  from 4 November, 1979 - 20 January, 1981, in which 52 Americans were held hostage in the US 
Embassy of Tehran for 444 days by a group of Iranian students. Though Khomeini did not instigate the hostage crisis, he later threw his 
support behind it  before he decided to release the hostages just seconds after Jimmy Carter finished his term as US President. Though 
including this foreign policy decision would yield relevant and interesting findings, it is not discussed in the chapter, primarily due to 
issues related to time and resource constraints, and as the author evaluates  that Khomeini’s other two foreign policy decisions - the Iran-
Iraq war and Salman Rushdie fatwa - suffice to substantiate the case study analysis.  
5.1 Khomeini’s worldview
Unlike Menachem Begin, Ruhollah Khomeini was, for the majority of his life, not a politician or a 
layman, but a cleric adhering to the Usuli branch of Shi’a Islam (what I refer to as his “belief-
community). Born into a religious family, he began to study  the Qu’ran already at the age of six, 
and, as a young adult, moved to the holy city  of Qom to study Sharia (Islamic law) and fiqh 
(jurisprudence) at  the Islamic seminary. He became a Marja’ (source of emulation)320  in 1963, after 
having taught and written prolifically on Islamic philosophy, law and ethics and, with book titles 
such as The Disciplines of Prayer and Islamic Governments (1942) and Islamic Government 
(1979), his lifeworks have left no-one in doubt of his devotion to Islam. Western observers have 
described him as “the embodiment of an Islamic religious leader,”321    but this statement hardly does 
justice to the extraordinary appeal that he had amongst  many  Muslims in Iran and beyond. As scenes 
from his return to Iran from exile on 1 February, 1979 and his funeral on 6 June ten years later - both 
of which gathered people by the millions - bear witness to, Iranians had an intense and emotional 
devotion to Khomeini, some viewing him as almost superhuman;322   a sentiment that is moreover 
reflected in the people’s reference to him as Imam which is a title traditionally  reserved in Shi’a 
Islam for the rightful, blood-related successors of the Prophet Muhammad.323   In his biography of 
Khomeini, Moin (1999) furthermore writes that “housewives and high officials alike would often 
burst into tears as soon as Khomeini opened his mouth, or into laughter when he told an 
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decisions pertaining to Sharia, serving, moreover, as a source that  is to be emulated by lay people as well as  clerics with less 
authority.
321 AL JAZEERA (2014) Ayatollah Khomeini: A rare encounter with a true revolutionary. [Online] Available from: http://
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/02/ayatollah-khomeini-rare-encounte-20142354756879470.html [Accessed: 3 February
2014].
322 Kurzman, C. (2004) The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge, MA. and London, UK: Harvard University Press. p. 67.
323 OXFORD ISLAMIC STUDIES ONLINE (2015) Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi. [Online] Available from: http://
www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0457 [Accessed: September 10, 2014].
entertaining story,"324   which equally speaks of an emotional relationship between Khomeini and 
his followers in Iran.
Though ardent in much of his public discourse in his insistence that Muslims ought to unite 
across Islam’s denominations, the belief-community  to which Khomeini belonged was of a specific 
interpretive strand, namely Twelver Shi’ism; a branch of Shi’a Islam which developed following 
Islam’s Sunni-Shi’a split soon after the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632. Like Shi’ism in general, 
it holds that the Prophet’s rightful successor, and thus leader of the Islamic community, must be of 
the Ahl al-Bayt (People of the House); that is, of the Prophet’s blood-line. Shi’ism therefore 
considers Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin, as the first Imam following the 
Prophet.325    It furthermore holds the third Imam, Hussayn, in particularly  high regard given his 
courageous confrontation with Yazid I, the ruling Caliph of Ummayad caliphate,326  in 680 AD, on 
the grounds that the latter’s rule was un-Islamic. Their confrontation at Karbala327    culminated in 
Imam Hussayn’s beheading and the death of his seventy-two followers; in spite of this defeat, 
the Battle of Karbala is upheld as an example of Imam Hussayn’s integrity and, to this day, 
commemorated yearly  in Shi’a communities in Iran and beyond. Specific to Twelver Shi’ism is a 
belief that twelve Imams, from Ali onwards, rightfully  succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader 
of the Islamic community. Of highest importance, the twelfth Imam is believed to be the Mahdi (the 
divinely guided Savior Imam) who went into occultation and will return at  an unknown point in the 
future, alongside Isa (Jesus) to fulfill their joint mission of bringing justice on Earth.328  Until then, 
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324 Moin, B. (1999) Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 253.
325  This is distinct  from Islam’s Sunni branch, whose followers  consider Abu Bakr the first rightful leader of the early Islamic 
community, following the Prophet Muhammad, based on his relation to the Prophet as his most senior companion as well  as his 
father-in-law.
326 The Ummayad caliphate was one of four major Islamic caliphates  which were established  following the Prophet Muhammad’s  death 
in 632 AD.
327 Karbala is a city southwest of Baghdad in present-day Iraq.
328  This overview of Shi’ism and Twelver Shi’ism is based largely  on Abdulaziz, A. S. (1981) Islamic Messianism: The Idea of 
Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism. Albany: State University of New York Press. p. 53.
the question of who should be entrusted with authority  over the Islamic community has been 
debated in the Twelver Shi’a tradition. To Khomeini, that authority belonged to an Islamic jurist of 
the highest stature, a position he developed during his sixteen year long forced exile in Najaf,329  and 
one that would comprise the constitutional basis of Iran following the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Khomeini’s position on the leadership  question is captured in the concept of Veleyat-e Faqih (Rule 
of the Islamic jurist), as is his worldview more broadly. Velayat-e Faqih, which Khomeini presented 
over a series of lectures on Islamic government, developed around Khomeini’s belief that Sharia, as 
it contains instruction for all human affairs, should form the juridical basis of society, and the 
faqih (Islamic jurist), unsurpassed in knowledge of Islamic justice, should be the ultimate authority 
of the system.330 As Khomeini suggests in the following excerpts from one of his lectures on Islamic 
Government, this system was desirable as it emulated that led by Prophet Muhammad, in the 
seventh century:
God made the prophet the ruler of all the faithful and his rule included 
even the individual who was to succeed him. After the prophet, the imam 
became the ruler. The significance of their rule is that their legal order 
applied to all and that the appointment of, control over and, when 
necessary, dismissal of judges and provincial rulers was in their hands. 
[...] The jurisprudents have been appointed by God to rule and the 
jurisprudent must act as much as possible in accordance with his 
assignment.331
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330  Algar, H. (trans. and ed.) (1981) Islam and revolution: writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
Mizan Press. p. 28-40.
331 Khomeini, A. R. (1979) Islamic government, Joint Publications Research Service translation. New York: Manor Books, Inc. p. 41
Equally desirable was a society without  injustice, corruption and oppression by the powerful, as 
well  as  one  above  the  influence  of  foreign  and  anti-Islamic  powers,  which  only  a  society 
governed by Velayat-e faqih, could facilitate:
The Moslems will never at any tie attain justice, security and stability 
until they acquire full faith and virtuous ethics under the canopy of a just 
government that  follows the laws of Islam and dispenses with everything 
else.330
It is notable that Khomeini’s conceptualization of Velayat-e faqih was a dramatic a re-thinking of 
the concept in its traditional form, by which clerical jurisdiction pertained only to orphans, 
widows and the mentally  weak.332  Similarly, Khomeini’s Velayat-e faqih was markedly  different 
than his previous ideas about government which as per his book The Revealing of Secrets (1944), 
included a limited monarchical government under the Iranian constitution of 1906.333  Generally, 
Khomeini’s writings and seminary  teaching throughout the 1940s and 1950s refrained from 
interfering with politics; a behaviour in line with the political quietism advocated by  the, then, 
leading Marja’, Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi. When Khomeini succeeded Boroujerdi, shortly  after 
the latter’s death in 1961, his political involvement increased, especially  in the form of staunch 
critique of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s modernization programme.334  Also during his “political” 
period, which lasted until his death in 1989,  did Khomeini show inconsistent interpretations of 
Sharia. His stance on women’s suffrage, for example, changed from condemnation in 1963, 
when he issued a fatwa contradicting Muhammad Reza Shah’s granting of women’s right to 
vote; to support thereof following the 1979 revolution, when he announced that women had a 
147
332 Moin, B. (1999) Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 157-8.
333 Martin, V. (2000) Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 129-31.
334 Khomeini’s critique of the Shah led to his exile in Iraq and later France.
duty to participate in all elections.335  The same was the case with his stance vis-a-vis state tax 
and mandatory military service - state laws which he condemned prior to assuming his role as 
Faqih, shortly after he issued a fatwa instructing all citizens to do the opposite.336  Similarly, he 
once considered the consumption of sturgeon haram (sinful), only to subsequently issue a fatwa 
declaring it  halal (permissible).337   Khomeini’s seemingly inconsistent interpretations of Sharia 
continued throughout his rule as Faqih of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its first  decade. Indeed, 
one of the most respected authorities on Khomeini’s domestic and foreign policy, Rouhallah 
Ramazani, has argued that Khomeini’s “career” as Faqih reveals “complex mixture of idealism 
and realism” whereby “Khomeini himself [kept] changing the Khomeini line.”338    Ramazani 
further explains that, “under one set of circumstances, [Khomeini] contributed to Iran’s 
international isolation and under another has led the campaign to break that isolation down.”339
Far from being unaware of, or denying, inconsistencies in his rulings and behaviour, Khomeini 
explicitly acknowledged them, as in his speech below to the Council of Guardians.340  Addressing 
his initial promise that  religious personalities would be a temporary, rather than permanent, 
presence in the Islamic government, he said:
[The fact that] I had said something does not mean that I should be bound 
by my word. I am saying that for as long as we have not implemented all 
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336 Ibid.
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338 Ramazani, R. K. (1989) Iran’s Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations, Middle East Journal, 43  (2). p. 211.
339 Ibid. 
340  The Council of Guardians is a non-elected body comprised of six theologians and six civilian jurists, whose significant privileges, 
during Khomeini’s leadership, included authority to veto interpretations  of the constitution and supervise elections to the presidency and 
Majlis (parliament) as well as approving legislation passed by the latter to ensure its “Islamicity.”
Islamic rules and have no competent people to do the job, the clergy 
should stay in their positions. It is below the dignity of a clergyman to be 
a president or to occupy other posts. He does it because it is a duty. We 
have to implement Islam and should not fear anyone.341
In a speech of July 1981, he communicated a similarly  flexible stance vis-a-vis Sharia, when he 
announced to Khomeini the Revolutionary Guards342 that,
Islamic law exists to serve the interests of the Muslim community and of 
Islam. [Therefore,] to save Muslim lives and for the sake of Islam’s 
survival it is obligatory to lie, it is obligatory to drink wine [if necessary].
Similarly, in his 1987 speech addressed to then President Ali Khamenei, Khomeini expressed 
that,
[...] The government can unilaterally abrogate any religious agreement 
made by  it  with the people if it believes that  the agreement is against the 
interests  of  the  country  and  Islam. The  government  can  prevent   any 
Islamic law - whether related to rituals or not - from being implemented 
if it sees its implementation as harmful to the interests of Islam.343
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342 The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, also known as The Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, is a 
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343 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (2011) Nuclear Fatwa: Religion and Politics in Iran’s Proliferation 
Strategy. Available from: http://www.pewforum.org/2007/05/30/a-six-day-war-its-aftermath-in-american-public- opinion/. [Accessed: 
December 6, 2013].
Observant voices further substantiate Khomeini’s inconsistent proclamations: for example, 
Meisam Koohsari, a 30 year-old engineer who lives and works in his native Tehran, says of 
Khomeini’s inconsistent approach to domestic and foreign politics that “[Khomeini] had good 
intentions, but his plan was unrealistic, so it changed.”344  Along similar lines, Richard Falk who, 
as chair of an American committee opposed to U.S. intervention in Iran was invited to visit 
Khomeini immediately  prior to the latter’s return to Iran in February  1979, recounts in his 
reflections on his meeting with the Ayatollah: “Did Khomeini change the conception of his role 
upon returning to Iran, or did he hide from us either consciously  or unconsciously  his real game 
plan? As far as I know, no one has provided a credible explanation.”345   The answer to Falk’s 
question, and explanation behind the preceding quotes as well as Khomeini’s shift from political 
quietism  in  the  1960s,  lies  neither  in  his  indecisiveness  nor  in  his  disingenuity.  Western 
journalists who have met him describe him as exhibiting “great strength of mind and will” as 
well as an “active mind and sharp intelligence.”346   His family furthermore characterizes him as 
exceedingly conscientious. His daughter, Farida Mustafayi, for example, describes him as “very 
strict in principles”347 and says that “[...] even his passion as a father or husband [...] could never 
convince  him  to  do  something  he  thought  was  wrong.  His  word  never  changed.  [...].”348
Similarly, his son, Hojatol Islam Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, recounts that “[Khomeini’s] best 
characteristic was his honesty. He would never say  something outside and something else at 
home. [His] behaviour outside was the same as his behaviour inside plus some formality”349 and 
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349 Ibid., p. 79.
that although very emotional, “[Khomeini’s] emotion never influenced his decisions”.350  The 
latter is seconded by Hojjatol Islam Imam Jamarani who says that “[the Ayatollah’s] moral never 
changed even up to the last moments [...].”351
Khomeini’s inconsistent interpretations of Islam and Sharia should rather be appraised in the 
context of the Usuli interpretive tradition of Shi’ism and the various concepts that it has given 
rise to. The Usuli interpretive strand of Shi’a Islam emerged “victorious” in the 1600s after a 
centuries-long debate about itjihad (the right to interpretation) between Usuli and Akhbaris.
Adherents of those interpretive strands respectively held that the Mujtahed (highest learned Shi’a 
clergy) ought to base its interpretations of Islamic law on current  social and political 
circumstances; and, conversely, that, following the death of the twelfth imam, the hadiths (the 
tradition of words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad)  were the only authority of  Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence).352     Indeed, it was the Usulis’ victory which paved the way  for the 
creation of the modern Shi’i clergy  that Khomeini studied to join from a young age. That itjihad 
is part and parcel of Khomeini’s interpretive approach is also evident various places in the 
Islamic  Republic’s  constitution  of  1979,  of  which  he  was  the  main  architect. Article  5  of 
Constitution, for example, states that “During the occultation of the Wali al-‘Asr (the twelfth of 
the infallible imams), the leadership of the Ummah (Muslim community) devolve upon the just 
and pious person, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age [...].”30 That a leader should 
be fully aware of the circumstances of his age, is a clear reference to the Usuli tradition, which 
holds that, only the Mujtahed (clergy experts in Islamic jursiprudence), and later, in the mid- 
nineteenth century, the centralized leadership  Marja-e taqlid (the source of imitation), had the 
right to ijtihad, and each believer had to follow their interpretations.
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From the Usuli premise, it follows that interpretations of Islamic law necessarily wax and wane 
as changes in the social and political environment occur, even if such interpretations seem at 
odds with one another. Indeed, as Lincoln (1985) shows, distinct interpretations of Shi’ism have 
promoted sentiments as different as quietism and rebellion that, respectively, have supported and 
protested status quo governments. In times where the clergy has implicitly  and explicitly rallied 
behind temporal powers through political quietism, as Boroujerdi did, they have done so by, for 
example, arguing that a world change cannot be hurried but can come only through the return of 
the Mahdi (the prophesied redeemer of Islam). In times where the clergy  has incited protest 
against temporal powers, as Khomeini did before and during the Islamic revolution, it conversely 
invoked the Mahdi to argue that disorder is a sign that that the redeemer’s return is nearing. In a 
similar vein, Imam Hussein’s martyrdom was, prior to the 1979 revolution, invoked to present 
the latter as an interceder for the people and God, someone who “somehow helped [people] 
overcome their own incomprehensible family losses.”353  This presentation of the Imam Hussein 
is distinct from that during the revolution, when he was held up as a courageous activist “leading 
a battle against odds in order to establish justice.”354
The Usuli tradition has moreover given rise to specific concepts, developed throughout history, 
to safeguard Shi’ism in general and, later, the Islamic Republic. Taqiyya (caution, fear or 
avoidance), for example, developed from the need of Shi’a communities, as historically 
persecuted minorities, to defend themselves against persecutors by deceiving the latter about 
their  faith,  in  order  that  Shi’ism  survive  as  a  Muslim  denomination. Accordingly,  taqiyya 
promotes the engagement of Shi’a Muslim individuals or communities in deception for the sake 
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of self-protection.355    Similarly, maslahat (expediency) allows for governments to reconcile 
traditional Sharia with demands posed by contemporary social and political circumstances, if it 
is deemed that  doing so is in the interest of the state and of its people.356  Unlike in Sunni Islam, 
where Muftis (Muslim legal experts) have employed maslahat for centuries, Shi’ism officially 
opposed the concept until 1988, when Khomeini broke publicly granted permission for the vali 
(Guardian Jurist), to adopt maslahat,357  affirming that “Sharia is not binding for the jurist ruler, 
who has the right to ignore prayer and other rituals (known as the Pillars of Islam) in favour of 
the regime’s needs”,358  and even the vali’s “authority  to destroy a mosque [if] rendered necessary 
by the “expediency” or “interests” of the regime.”358   Moreover, Khomeini revised the Islamic 
Republic’s constitution to include an important role for the newly formed Expediency Council 
whose purpose would be to advise the Supreme Leader on matters of regime expediency, as well 
as serving as a point of mediation between the, often pragmatic-leaning, parliament, and the 
largely traditionalist Guardian Council. This meant that post-1988 legislation of the Islamic 
Republic became grounded in expediency  rather than Islamic law, though, as Khomeini’s speech 
excepts above, as well as his behaviour under the leadership of Boroujerdi show, Khomeini 
operated, rather explicitly, according to maslahat principles long throughout his leadership and, 
before that, within a similar pragmatism advocated by Usuli tradition.
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5.2 Ayatollah Khomeini’s Foreign Policy Doctrine
Khomeini’s worldview, as it had taken form by the time of the Iranian revolution of 1979, 
translated into a foreign policy doctrine that was premised on two main principles of non- 
alignment and spread of the Islamic revolution beyond Iran.
        “Neither East nor West, but the Islamic Republic”
The first  of these, non-alignment, is captured by Khomeini’s slogan “Neither East nor West, but 
the Islamic Republic,” which also reflects his belief, outlined above, in the necessity to prevent 
influence of foreign, un-Islamic powers in order that an Islamic Republic may form and thrive. 
As he put it himself, “We must become isolated in order to become independent.”359    In his 
discourse, Khomeini furthermore draws a clear connection between this foreign policy  tenet and 
Islam. In his announcement of the Iran-Iraq war’s termination, for example, he proclaimed,
O' God! You are aware that we do not collude even for a moment with 
America, the Soviet Union and other global powers, and that we consider 
collusion with superpowers and other powers as turning our back on 
Islamic principles.360
That relations with global powers should equate turning [Iran’s] back on Islamic principles, 
suggests, if directly  states, that the Neither East nor West part of his foreign policy principle was 
grounded in the view that Islam required rejection of un-Islamic powers. This view is also 
discernible in Khomeini’s speech on 8 February, 1981 to a group of air personnel, whom he 
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spoke to about his suspicion that some revolutionaries would attempt to exploit the Islamic 
revolution for their personal gain. He warned air personnel to be aware of
[...] political methods advocated by those who might approach [them], 
who might infiltrate [them], may divert  [them] from the path [they] are 
taking, the path of Islam you adopted after rejecting Satan.361
Here,  Khomeini  implicitly  states  that  rejection  of  Satan  (that  is,  the  U.S.  embodied  in 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) led his air personnel audience, in this case, on to the path of Islam.
Along with the previous statement, this suggests that rejection of foreign influence, particularly 
American, is a religiously righteous action. In the following excerpt from Islamic Government 
(1979), Khomeini furthermore accounts for the part of his Neither East nor West foreign policy 
principle which stresses the Islamic Republic, by  linking the establishment and consolidation of 
the latter, to the  rejection of un-Islamic powers:
We must fight the rule of the false god because God has ordered us to do 
so and has proscribed obedience to false gods or joining their 
bandwagons.  The  unjust  authorities  must  vacate  their  place  for  the 
Islamic public services so that a stable and legitimate Islamic government 
may be established gradually.362
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Khomeini’s reference to the rule of the false god presumably  refers to secularism and the unjust 
authorities to Pahlavi’s constitutional monarchy and, given Khomeini’s ever-present anti- 
American sentiment, likely also to the U.S. In proclaiming that [God] has proscribed obedience 
to [these] false gods, Khomeini explicitly  links rejection of the Shah, and presumably also the 
U.S, to religion and, moreover, legitimizes any such action by stating that it will lead to a stable 
and legitimate Islamic government. Khomeini would further legitimize this message by  drawing 
on references from historical Shi’ism, as in the following passage from Islamic Government 
(1979):
[the tyrannical authorities’] rule was futile and they were aware that 
‘Ali’s descendants would claim the caliphate wherever they happened to 
be and would seek resolutely to form the Islamic government as part of 
their duties in life.363
As above, Khomeini rejects the notion of un-Islamic rule, equating it here with tyranny and 
reinforces the righteousness of Islamic government, by  invoking the most revered figures (apart 
from the Prophet) in Shi’a history: Ali and his descendants. His reference to the establishment of 
an Islamic Government as part of [the] duties in life of Ali’s descendants furthermore confirms 
that Khomeini saw, and encouraged other to see, such a government as a reflection of God’s will.
     
  “Export the Revolution”
The  second  principle  of  Khomeini’s  foreign  policy  doctrine  was  to  export  the  Islamic 
Revolution, which he saw as a means to liberate oppressed people beyond Iran and, ultimately, 
establish an Islamic world order. This principle was based on Khomeini’s view of an Islam that 
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knew no borders; in his words, Islam “is not peculiar to a country [...] even the Muslims.”364 
Rather, “Islam comes for humanity [wishing] to bring all humanity under the umbrella of justice 
[...].”365   As the only  faqih-ruled Islamic Republic, Khomeini held that Iran “should try hard to 
export its revolution to the world”366   and stressed that since “the export of idea by force is not 
export”,367   the Islamic Revolution should rather be exported by setting an example of Islamic 
ethical behaviour. He expressed this rationale on numerous occasions, including the following 
excerpt from his public speech on the eve of the Iranian New Year in 1980:We should try  hard to 
export our revolution to the world. We should set aside the thought that we do not export our 
revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently  and is the 
regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed people of the 
world. If we remain in an enclosed environment, we shall definitely face defeat.368
The foreign policy principle of exporting the revolution also came to be part of the preamble of 
the Islamic Republic’s 1979 constitution, of which Khomeini was the primary architect:
[...] in the development of international relations, the Constitution will 
strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for 
the formation of a single world community (in accordance with the 
Koranic verse “This your community is a single community, and I am 
your Lord, so worship Me” [21:92]), and to assure the continuation of the 
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struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the 
world...).369
Similarly  to the previous references to Khomeini’s discourse, this passage from the Republic’s 
constitution,  specifically  its  reference  the  Koranic  verse  promulgating  a  single  [world] 
community discerns a link between Islam, on the one hand, and the export of the revolution 
principle, on the other. Khomeini-observers have similar takes; Shapour Bakhtier, for example, 
who was the last Prime Minister of Iran under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and attempted to 
contain Khomeini’s ascension to power by making various conciliatory gestures, has said that the 
Ayatollah’s idea of exporting the evolution made the latter appear as “[...] one of those Muslims 
who want[s] to establish a world empire [and who considered] himself the pope of the 
Muslims.”370   Similarly, Mehdi Bazargan, who Khomeini appointed as the head of the Islamic 
Republic’s interim government, has interpreted the Ayatollah’s foreign policy as based on a 
“[belief] in the service of Islam by means of Iran” as distinct from Bazargan’s own belief in “the 
service of Iran by means of Islam”.371
Khomeini’s foreign policy doctrine, underpinned by the Neither East nor West, but the Islamic 
Republic and Export of the Islamic Revolution explained here, reflected in his foreign policy 
throughout the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) which, although initially a defensive war, sought to both 
consolidate the Islamic Republic and to spread the Revolution, particularly after 1982. 
Khomeini’s foreign policy doctrine also reflected in the Salman Rushdie affair, which served the 
similar purpose of strengthening the Islamic Republic amidst public dissent and governmental 
disputes, as well as spreading the Revolution through galvanizing Muslims worldwide. The 
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following sections (5.3 and 5.4) discusses both of these foreign policy  outcomes with in the 
context of Khomeini’s religious beliefs.
5.3 The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
The relationship  between Iraq and Iran had been plagued by border disputes for many years and, 
following Iran’s revolution of 1979, Iraqi Baath leadership, under Saddam Hussein, felt itself 
increasingly  vulnerable to an uprising within its own Shi’a population as well as the emergence 
of Iran as a dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Taking advantage of Iran’s post-revolutionary 
domestic turmoil and declining economic situation, Saddam Hussein sent warplanes to attack 
airfields in Iran on 22 September 1980, and, with that offensive, initiated what would become an 
eight  year  long  conflict  between  the  two  neighboring  states,  and  the  longest-running 
conventional war of the twentieth century. Iran fought a defensive war until June 1982, when 
Iraqi forces had been pushed back from occupied Iranian territories. Rather than ending the war 
following this victory, Khomeini opted to launch a series of offensives38 which took the war into 
Iraq; a move widely interpreted as a means to consolidate both a government and nation which 
were still adapting to the post-revolutionary status quo. In 1988, after having dismissed many 
opportunities to do the same, Khomeini accepted a UN-brokered ceasefire, a decision he 
characterized as “more deadly than taking poison.”372 He did so despite his consistent insistence 
on “War, War, until Victory;”373    a goal which he desired in the first place, largely because it 
would enable Iran to export its revolution to its neighboring, and largely Shi’a inhabited, Iraq. 
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Not surprisingly, Khomeini employed religious discourse throughout the war, which, as the 
following analysis will show, revolved around a number of specific themes, including jihad and 
martyrdom.
From the initial stages of the Iran-Iraq war, and all throughout, Khomeini labelled the latter a 
jihad, through statements such as “Islam has ordered us to defend and wage jihad.”374  Nearing 
the war’s end, in February  1987, Khomeini employed similarly  religiously  charged discourse by 
depicting the war as a “holy crusade” and stating that  Iran was battling for a “divine cause” in 
the war.375 The following excerpt is a good example of such discourse:
Can anyone who believes in the world beyond be afraid? [...] We must 
thank God if He confers on us the honor of dying in the Holy  Battle. Let 
us thrust our way into the ranks of the martyrs in our hordes...if we have 
been afraid, this means that we don’t believe in the world beyond”.376
The effectiveness of such discourse is reflected in, for example, the following account of a 
former child volunteer of the human wave:377
On the television [...] they would show a young boy  dressed as a soldier, 
carrying a gun and wearing the red headband of the Basij.378   He would 
say how wonderful it was to be a soldier for Islam, fighting for freedom 
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against the Iraqis. Then he would curse the Iraqis and all Arabs saying 
they  were not good Muslims. Next he would tell us to join him and come 
to the war.379
That this young boy should boy see himself as a soldier for Islam [who was] fighting for freedom 
against the Iraqis suggests that he experienced the war as a jihad. The boy’s remark that the 
Iraqis and all Arabs [...] were not good Muslims furthermore points at the theme, highlighted by 
scholars time and again, that Khomeini incessantly referred to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi 
soldiers as kuffar (unbelievers), perhaps, as a way to overcome the perception of fight fellow 
Muslims  (including  Sunni  Muslims,  who,  as  discussed  previously,  he  stressed  unity   with.) 
Gieling (1999) argues that  Khomeini employed such discourse which presented Hussein as 
kuffar and the war in general as one between Islam and infidelity, in order to “get around” the 
Islamic Law, which, she holds, forbids Muslims to go to war with one another. While that option 
cannot, of course, be dismissed entirely, I would rather argue that, given Khomeini’s unswerving 
faith and the connection between his religious beliefs and his foreign policy tenets, it is more 
likely that he either genuinely  viewed Saddam Hussein and the broader Iraqi enemy as an infidel 
one; or, that he employed the concept of maslahat by which he could rightfully  reconcile 
traditional Sharia rulings (such as the illegality of fighting a fellow Muslim) with demands posed 
by contemporary social and political circumstances, when doing so - as was the case during the 
war - is in the interest of the state and of its people.380
Going back to his previous statement, Khomeini - apart from sanctifying the war by depicting it 
as a Holy Battle, he, by  stating Let us thrust our way in the ranks of the martyrs, moreover 
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encourages martyrdom; another theme which runs throughout his war discourse and that is, as 
we saw above, especially  familiar to Muslims of the Shi’a Islamic tradition. In the following 
quotes, Khomeini engages at length with this theme:
You are right just like the Imam, Lord of the Martyrs, was in the right and 
became  superior  with  so  few  in  number. Although  he  was  martyred 
together with his sons, he revived Islam and brought disgrace on Yaazid 
and the Umayyad dynasty.381
In this excerpt, Khomeini legitimizes martyrdom by  invoking key reference points of the Shi’a 
tradition: Lord of the Martyrs refers to Imam Hussein, Shi’ism’s most revered figure after the 
Prophet Muhammad; and, the celebrated disgrace that he brought on Yaazid and the Ummayyad 
dynasty implicitly  refers to the Battle of Karbala, the battle in which he was killed and which, 
until this day, is commemorated yearly  on Iranian streets and theaters during Ashura382   to show 
respect of the martyrdom that Imam Hussein endured for the sake of Islam. By invoking the 
Karbala Battle and moreover stressing that fighters of the Iran-Iraq war are right just like the 
Imam, Khomeini uses the righteousness of Imam Hussein, which holds undisputed emotional 
appeal amongst Iranians, to foster support and participation in the war against Iraq. This message 
was reinforced further by street-propaganda in the form of large posters of celebrated martyrs 
hanging on buildings throughout Iran, some of which remain throughout the country  today. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of Khomeini’s encouragement of martyrdom is reflected in material 
in Tehran’s Martyr Museum, a museum established to commemorate martyrs of the war, which 
displays personal memorabilia of the war martyrs, laid out next  to a short  biography of each. In 
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the case of virtually  all martyrs, a small pocket-sized Qu’ran was amongst their limited 
possessions, indicating that they  subscribed to the notion of fighting, and possibly dying, for 
Islam.
Khomeini would continue to sanctify  and legitimize the Iran-Iraq war throughout its course by 
invoking themes like jihad and martyrdom. But, as the war dragged on and socio-economic 
conditions deteriorated, his discourse would become infused with references to modern concepts 
like “nations” and “nationalism” that seem a out of line with the Islamic world order that he had 
hitherto advocated. The excerpt below from Khomeini’s speech to a group of Iranian teachers in 
April 1983, is a good example  of this:
The Iranian nation and the inhabitants of dear Dezful383  continue to resist 
calamity and suffering [...] Those who make false claims to support the 
people are harming the Iranian people. Those who are treating the great 
ulema of Iran, the beloved great  figures of Iran and its great scholars, in 
such a manner, who are resorting to terrorism against all classes and 
maintaining their bond of friendship with the Saddam government, which 
has committed such crimes against Iran, which has committed such a 
great crime against Dezful - these people have already shown their true 
face to the world.384
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Here, Khomeini refers to the Iranian people as opposed to Muslims as well as Iran’s great  ulema 
and  Iran’s great figures and scholars. In the    excerpt  below,  Khomeini  employs  a  similar 
terminology:
Those claiming to support human rights, the elaborate and high-sounding 
organizations set in the world - we do not see them condemning Iraq’s 
acts. These organizations receive their cues from our enemies and then 
issue  statements  against  Iran,  the  dear  Iranian  nation.  They  issue 
warnings to us. They substantiate their claims by stating that this is what 
our enemies have said. The so-called sound reasoning given by 
international  organizations  is:  You  are  killing  small  children  in  the 
streets; you are daily  executing hundreds of people in Evin Prison. As 
proof of this, they quote our enemies. [...] We hope that a situation is 
created by this Islamic center of Iran which will eliminate these corrupt 
values, propagate dear Islam, and bring about a situation in the world 
reviving the Islamic values which have been ignored. To do this we must 
first of all look at ourselves. There are people living in this country  who 
are  sediments  which  have  remained  behind.  These  people  beat  their 
chests in favour of the West or the East. Meanwhile, they claim to be an 
integral part of the nation. These people are aliens in the guise of 
nationalists and Iranians. They are aliens in Iran, and Iran no longer 
recognizes them as Iranian. The individual who sacrifices all his Islamic 
and national values for the USSR or for America is not considered an 
Iranian.385
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Similarly  to above, Khomeini refers to the dear Iranian nation just  as he refers to those enemies 
living within Iran as no longer [recognized] as Iranians, the latter quote being a far cry  from 
labeling enemies as kuffar (infidels) as he did with Saddam and Iraqi soldiers in the excerpts that 
we saw above. Moreover, in this speech, the people who sacrifice, not just their Islamic values 
but also their national ones, seize to be Iranian, to Khomeini. Again, this discourse is markedly 
different from that which we have previously seen, whereby such people might reasonably  be 
thought to have been called out as apostates for going against  Islam. Khomeini also invokes the 
modern concept international organizations and implicitly  also the international world order 
through his reference to elaborate and high-sounding organizations [not] condemning Iraq.
Khomeini’s shift in discourse should be understood as a significant one, especially  given his 
efforts during the Islamic revolution, in which he, as Halliday (2003) notes, decidedly  invoked 
Arabic - the language of the Qu’ran - writings and slogans, in order to distinguish himself from 
nationalist revolutionary  forces.386     In a similar vein, Falk (2014), in his reflections on his 
interview with Khomeini shortly before the latter’s return to Iran from exile, noted the following:
We asked about his hopes for the "Iranian Revolution". His response 
fascinates me to this day. First of all, he immediately corrected us 
forcefully  pointing  out  that  what  had  just  been  completed  was  "an 
Islamic Revolution", that is, asserting as primary an identity associated 
with religious and cultural affinities rather than emphasizing the 
nationalist agenda of regime change that was the common way of 
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interpreting what had happened in Iran. Khomeini went on to say that the 
importance of the unfolding of events in Iran related to the entire region.387
By July 1988, Iran’s severely weakened military as well as the country’s worsening socio- 
economic conditions were such that Khomeini saw himself forced to accept United Nations 
resolution 598, which called for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq as well the 
withdrawal of both sides to internationally  recognized borders. Khomeini was made aware of 
Iran’s strategic disadvantages in the war by the Revolutionary Guards and military commanders 
who informed the Ayatollah that, given Iran’s inferiority in chemical and regular weaponry, “the 
Islamic military [would] not be victorious for some time.”388   In addition, Khomeini had been 
informed by Prime Minister, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, on behalf of the latter’s Minister of Economy, 
that “the financial situation of the country stood at below zero.”
In  a  statement  to  the  Iranian  people,  Khomeini  categorically  stated  that  such  material  and 
strategic disadvantages left him no choice but to accept UN resolution 598, as is made clear in 
the following passage:
You dear ones, more than anyone else, know that this decision is like 
drinking the poisoned chalice and I submit to the Almighty's will and for 
the safeguarding of Islam and the protection of the Islamic republic, I do 
away with my honour.389
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By framing his decision as one that is made in line with the Almighty’s will and in order to 
[safeguard] Islam [and protect] the Islamic Republic, Khomeini legitimizes the ceasefire is a 
choice made because of Islam, not despite of it. Perhaps partly because he is aware that this 
decision  stands  in  clear  contrast  to  his  hitherto  insistence  to  continue  the  war  with  Iraq, 
Khomeini emphasizes, through his likening of the ceasefire to drinking the poisoned chalice, the 
difficulty involved in reaching this decision. Had such difficulty  gone unmentioned, it would 
have been problematic, one must assume, for Khomeini to retrospectively justify his policy of 
the preceding six years to remain at war with Iraq. However, so as to not suggest that Islam 
served only to inform his termination of the war, Khomeini incorporates the following passage in 
his statement, indicating that Islam served as his guiding principle when deciding to continue 
fighting as well as ending the war:
O' God! We rose for the sake of your religion, we fought for your religion 
and we accept the cease-fire for the protection of your religion.390
What is more, Khomeini further legitimizes both such choices (as well as the choice to mount a 
revolution in 1979) by  drawing on key figures in Shi’a history who, in their respective contexts, 
faced difficulties:
O' God! In the entire history, whenever prophets, guardians and ulema 
decided to be the peacemakers of societies and intertwine practice with 
knowledge, and organize societies devoid of corruption and decay, they 
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faced resistance from the Abu Jahls and the Abu Sofyans [opponents of 
Prophet Muhammad] of their time.391
In doing so, Khomeini likens his own situation of having to make the hard choice of accepting a 
UN-brokered ceasefire, to situations in which prophets and guardians of the Shi’a tradition faced 
difficulties in the form of resistance from the opponents of Prophet Muhammad. One must 
assume that such sources of legitimization were drawn upon in order to garner domestic public 
and political support for his acceptance of Resolution 598. By no means does that discount the 
possibility that the decision was grounded in Khomeini’s religious beliefs, which - as above - the 
concept of maslahat helps to explain.
Having rationalized his policy  with reference to Islamic interests, justified and legitimized it 
further through references to Shi’a history, Khomeini finalized his statement with a call for the 
Iranian people to exert wariness against the hard-liners’ message:
I said that a session should be convened and the people ought to be 
informed about the cease-fire. You must be careful because some hard- 
liners with their revolutionary slogans might divert your attention from 
what is best for Islam. I openly say that all your efforts should be directed 
at justifying this [the cease-fire]. Diversionary actions are haram and 
would lead to reactions. You are aware that, the high ranking officials of 
the system have taken this decision with extreme sadness and with their 
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heart filled to the brim with love for Islam and our Islamic country. Be 
aware of God and whatever happens, it is His decision.392
Khomeini’s  discursive  examples  shown  throughout  this  section  highlight   the  Ayatollah’s 
readiness to alternate between distinct rationales in his justification of the Iran-Iraq war’s 
continuation  post-1982  and  its  ending  in  1988.  The  perhaps  most  telling  example  of  this 
tendency as it applies to action, as opposed to discourse, is what has become known as the “Iran- 
Contra Affair.” That is, a clandestine arms deal between Iran and the U.S., in the period August 
1985 to March 1987, through which the U.S. sold arms to Iran, and channelled them through 
Israel,  in  exchange  for  the  release  of American  hostages  held  by  pro-Iranian  Hizbollah  in 
Lebanon.393    Although Khomeini and his cohort denied that the deal took place, various 
declassified documents convincingly suggest otherwise.394    Iran’s motive   for   accepting   the 
arms  deal  is  all  but  clear, given the dire state of its arms arsenal at the time. As Mark Phythian 
relates,
[...]    that the Iranian air force could function at all [after Iraq's 
initial attack and] was able to undertake a number of sorties over 
Baghdad strike at  strategic installations [was] at least partly  due to 
the decision of the Reagan administration to allow Israel to channel 
arms of US origin to Iran to prevent an easy and early  Iraqi 
victory.395
169
392 Ibid.
393 Ramazani,  R.K.    (2004)  Ideology  and  Pragmatism  in  Iran’s  Foreign  Policy The  Middle  East  Journal, Vol. 58 (4), Autumn, pp. 
556.
394  NEW YORK TIMES (1994) Excerpts from the Iran-Contra   Report:  A  Secret    Foreign   Policy’   Accessed:   May   5,   2013. 
Available from http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/06/29/reviews/iran-transcript.html [Accessed: 13 March, 2014].
395 Phythian,  M.  (1997). Arming  Iraq:  How  the  U.S.  and  Britain  Secretly  Built  Saddam’s War  Machine,  Boston:  Northeastern 
University Press. p. 20.
Reluctant though Khomeini surely was to engage with the two “Satans” - that  is, U.S. and Israel 
- in this (and presumably  any) context, his ultimate willingness to do so stands in sharp  contrast 
to his general anti-Western stance as well as specific statements such as “[Iran does] not collude 
even for a moment with America, the Soviet Union and other global powers, and [considers] 
collusion with superpowers and other powers as turning [its] back on Islamic principles.”396  The 
Iran-contra affair thus highlights the extent to which Khomeini was willing to go to preserve the 
Islamic Republic, and by  extension also just  how much the malleability of Shi’a thought, as it is 
made  possible  by  the  Faqih’s  right  to  interpretation  of  doctrine  along  with  concepts  like 
maslahat, can account for the most distinct, if contradictory, rationales and actions.
5.4 The Salman Rushdie Affair
On 14 February 1989, Khomeini issued a religious ruling, a fatwa, against the British- and 
Muslim-born, but non-believing, novelist Salman Rushdie in response to the latter’s book The 
Satanic Verses (1988); a publication interpreted by many Muslim communities worldwide to 
contain elements that are blasphemous against Islam. Khomeini’s fatwa declared the following:
In the name of Him, the Highest. There is only one God, to whom we 
shall all return. I inform all zealous Muslims of the world that the author 
of the book entitled The Satanic Verses - which has been compiled, 
printed, and published in opposition to   Islam,   the   Prophet,   and   the 
Qur’an  - and all those involved in its publication who were aware of its 
content, are sentenced to death. I call on all zealous Muslims to execute 
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them quickly, wherever they may be found, so that no one else will dare 
to insult the Muslim sanctities. God willing, whoever is killed on this 
path is a martyr. In addition, anyone who has access to the author of this 
book, but does not possess the power to execute him, should report him 
to the people so that he may  be punished for his actions. May peace and 
the mercy of God and His blessings be with you.397
The fatwa was preceded by and further instigated a furore of violent, at times deadly, 
demonstrations in the Muslim world and beyond. It directly caused diplomatic relations between 
the United Kingdom (UK) and various other European countries to break; a political crisis that, 
in the case of the UK, would last until at least  1998 when diplomatic relations  between  the  two 
countries  were  restored  as  a  result  of  Iran’s  then  Foreign  Minister, Kamal  Kharrazi’s, 
public  effort  to  divorce  his  government  from  Khomeini’s  fatwa.398   Restored diplomatic 
relations notwithstanding, the fatwa still renders British-Iranian relations strained more than two 
decades after its issuing.399   Amongst the Iranian public, too, the fatwa instigated condemnation 
and massive protests, including a 3000 people strong demonstration assembled by the British 
embassy in Tehran, in which demonstrators accused the  the UK of being  “the   enemy   of   the 
Qur’an   and   Islam,  and   the   manifestation  of  all  things  evil.”400  In another incident, the 
head of an Iranian charity organization, 15th Khordad   Relief   Agency, offered a significant 
financial   award   to   anyone, Iranian or non-Iranian, for the murder of Rushdie; a reward that 
remains standing today  and that, in fact, was increased as recently  as September 2012, when the 
head of 15th Khordad   Relief   Agency increased the financial award to $3.3 million, in the 
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context of the release of the allegedly  Islamophobic film Innocence of Muslims (2012),401  which 
he argued would not have occurred, had Khomeini’s fatwa been carried out.402
Scholars like Pipes (2003) and Piscatori (1990) have speculated about  the “religious legitimacy” 
of Khomeini’s fatwa, given its timing and context. As Pipes (2003) observes, Khomeini 
responded, in the form of his fatwa, to Rushdie’s book on February 14, 1989 – five  months  after 
the  book’s  initial  publication in September 1988 and three months after its review in Iranian 
press, which leads him to question the chanciness behind the fatwa: if it was indeed theologically 
based, why did Khomeini not issue it earlier?403  Piscatori (1990) moreover points out that  many 
works published prior to The Satanic Verses have included material that could be deemed 
blasphemous against Islam, yet they have not been subjected - by Khomeini nor other high 
ranking clerics - to  scrutiny  anywhere  near  the  same  level  as  Rushdie’s  The Satanic Verses. 
Piscatori’s examples   include   H.G. Well’s   A Short History of the World (1922), in which the 
Prophet  Muhammad  “with  his  shifty  character”  and  “unedifying  life”  was  depicted as a 
man of considerable vanity, greed, cunning, self-deception and quite insincere religious 
passion.404 To be sure, the publication of Well’s book prompted protest rallies internationally  just 
as governments throughout Europe were petitioned to ban it. But even so, no fatwa was issued 
from Islamic religious authorities anywhere. A key difference between Well and Rushdie is that 
the latter, being a Muslim by birth and a non-believing Muslim by choice, was, in addition to 
being blasphemous against Islam, also an apostate.405 Apostacy may not have been applicable to 
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Well, but, as Pipes (2003) notes, there are numerous of Khomeini’s contemporaries that it could 
well apply to, including Iranians who celebrate Nawruz (Iranian New year), Muslims who 
actively chose to live in Western countries ungoverned by Sharia,  fundamentalists  who  disdain 
the  professional  men  of  religion,  and   Muslim  rulers  who  do  not   apply  the  Sharia  in 
their countries.406    An obvious example would be Egyptian President, Anwar Al Sadat, who, 
despite employing increased Islamic discourse during the 1970s, governed Egypt according to a 
secular judicial system and, markedly, signed a Peace Treat  with Israel, the “arch-enemy of 
Islam” according to Khomeini.407    Nevertheless, neither Sadat nor any of the aforementioned 
‘apostates’ were sentenced to death through a fatwa or other means.
Piscatori and Pipes are right in their observations but, I argue, wrong about questioning the 
“theological validity” of Khomeini’s fatwa. I base this argument on both the tangible effects of 
the fatwa, - containing domestic discontent and spreading the Islamic Revolution; both in line 
with Khomeini’s foreign policy  doctrine - as well as the concept of maslahat, which holds that 
essentially  any act is permissible if in the interest of the Islamic state. With regards to the fatwa’s 
first tangible effect - containing, or even distracting from, the domestic discontent that was 
prevalent in Iran following the Iran-Iraq war. As noted previously, the Iran-Iraq war had initially 
strengthened Khomeini’s nascent Islamic Government by granting Iranians an issue to rally 
around; but its termination in the fall of 1988 left Iran economically  devastated, internationally 
alienated, and with a society that had lost confidence in the leadership and its ability  to govern 
(political leadership, around this time, publicly  disagreed on issues ranging from socioeconomic 
policy to foreign policy  orientation.)408  Issuing a fatwa, in February 1989, would have the effect 
of galvanizing Iranians around an ideological issue and thus distracting from their discontent. It 
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is not difficult  to grasp  why Khomeini anticipated the effect  of his fatwa to materialize as in the 
large-scale protests that it did. With practical experience from the Islamic Revolution ten years 
prior, Khomeini knew – better than anyone, probably - of the real possibility  of uniting Iranians 
under a common theme (anti-Westernism) by means of a familiar discourse (Islamic). One could 
even argue that Khomeini in fact replicated, insofar as it was possible, the narrative present 
during the Islamic Revolution by  which the apostasy of a Western-influenced figure infringed on 
the purity  and traditions of Islam. In 1979 this figure was personified by the Shah; in 1989 by 
Salman Rushdie. Similarly, and as alerted to in the previous section, Khomeini would depict 
Islam’s (or Iran’s, depending on the context) adversary, Saddam Hussein, as Saddam-i kafir, (or 
Saddam, the unbeliever) in attempts to emphasize that which was unrighteous about the enemy 
and, by extension also the sanctity of Iran’s war against Iraq war.409  So, negative portrayal of an 
enemy by way of emphasizing its atheism had been commonplace in Iran to intensify opposition 
to the Shah and Saddam Hussein, and it seems cogent, therefore, for Khomeini to have foreseen 
that a fatwa, which invoked a similar kind of sentiment, would galvanize the public to a point 
where they would be distracted from domestic grievances.
With regards to the second effect of Khomeini’s fatwa; spreading the Islamic Revolution. This 
refers specifically to the part  of the fatwa which calls for “all zealous Muslims” to execute 
Salman Rushdie and others involved in the publication of his book, which highlights Khomeini’s 
intent to reach Muslim audiences beyond Iran. This is made further clear in the reiteration of 
Khomeini’s fatwa, released a few days after    the    original one, which stated that “it    is 
incumbent  on  every Muslim to employ  everything  he  has  got  in  his  life  and  his  wealth  to 
send  [Salman Rushdie]  to  hell.”410  To be sure, international condemnation  and  protests  also 
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preceded  the  fatwa;  they   commenced  in  India  even  before  the  book’s  publication  on 
September  26, 1988, where Muslims learned about The Satanic Verses from two magazines that 
provided reviews of the book and excerpts from it, leading members of the Indian parliament to 
successfully    campaign   for   the   book’s   banning. Action spread to the UK following a 
letter from Aslam Ejaz of the Islamic Foundation in Madras to Faiyazuddin Ahmad of the 
Islamic Foundation in Leicester, in which the latter was    encouraged    to  “do    God’s work 
in   Great   Britain.”411  He did so by photocopying the offending passages from the book and 
proliferating them to U.K.-based Islamic organizations and Embassies of Muslim states, which 
instigated calls to have the book banned and its author prosecuted on the charge of blasphemy 
and, eventually, also book-burnings and protests. Serious death threats emerged in the US against 
employees of Viking Penguin publishing house in New York (who had yet to publish the book). 
Similarly, the Muslim community  in South Africa protested against  the book prior to its 
publication, and issued death threats against Rushdie. The most severe riots broke out in 
Islamabad, Pakistan on February 12, 1989 in which 10,000 protesters marched towards the 
American Cultural Centre and set  fire to that  building (ironically, given Rushdie’s    UK 
citizenship, British property was not assaulted; the demonstrations were presumably more 
connected to the forthcoming U.S. publication of The Satanic Verses.) In short, public Muslim 
mobilisation around this issue cannot be entirely attributed to Khomeini’s fatwa. The latter point 
only strengthens the argument, however, that Khomeini sought to signal his power, as it can 
reasonably be assumed that Khomeini might have foreseen the intensification of his fatwa’s 
international ramifications. Judging by one British Muslim comment, such intensification 
worked: “many  Muslims    didn’t  agree  with  the  fatwa  [but]  if  you  disagreed  with  the 
fatwa   it   was   as   if you disagreed with   the   Prophet    himself   and   your   faith   would   be 
lacking.”412
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5.5 Conclusion
From the material presented throughout this chapter, we can, as in the previous one, discern two 
primary roles of religion. Firstly, Khomeini’s religious beliefs - comprised by the interplay between 
the Ayatollah’s individual faith and the Twelver Shi’a interpretive strand of Islam - profoundly 
shaped his worldview, which was characterized by his adherence to Velayat-e Faqih (specific to 
Shi’ism) and a fierce anti-Westernism. Khomeini’s worldview reflected in his foreign policy 
doctrine, which focused on consolidating the Islamic Republic through non-alignment and fierce 
anti- Westernism,  and  spreading  the  Islamic  Revolution  beyond  Iran’s  borders.  This  doctrine 
moreover reflected in two of Khomeini’s important foreign policies, namely his insistence to 
continue the Iran-Iraq war past Iran’s nominal victory in 1982, as well as in his fatwa that death 
sentenced the British novelist Salman Rushdie; both of these foreign policies can reasonably be 
thought of as reflecting Khomeini’s intention to consolidate the Islamic Republic and spread the 
Islamic Revolution.
A second role of religion in the context  of Khomeini’s foreign policy, is one of legitimization. 
Khomeini consistently employed religious discourse to legitimize his foreign policies; something 
that reflects both his own religious beliefs as well as those of his constituents. To anyone who is 
vaguely  familiar  with  Khomeini’s  rhetoric,  his  adoption  of  religious  discourse  is  hardly 
surprising and to scholars like Gieling (1999), Pipes (2003) and Piscatori (1990), the contradictory 
elements  of  such  discourse  are  not  either,  as  they  are  assumed  to  reflect  a materialist pursuit 
of power to which religious legitimization is an important instrumental tool. I oppose the latter view, 
and argue instead that any such contradiction can be explained with reference to Shi’a Islamic 
concepts like ijtihad and maslahat that were surely well-known to Khomeini. When paired with the 
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Ayatollah’s unswerving faith it is all but plausible that Khomeini’s discursive and practical 
inconsistencies in the context of his foreign policy do not indicate a departure from his religious 
beliefs, but rather a development, and reinforcement, thereof.
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CHAPTER 6
RELIGION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN SAUDI ARABIA 
UNDER FAHD BIN ABDULAZIZ AL SAUD (1975-1992)
Fellow citizens: If God intends good to come to a people, He will guide them to what is 
most appropriate. God has favored us greatly, beyond measure, and the greatest favor of 
all is Islam. If we fully adhere to this religion, we shall never go astray.
- King Fahd’s on the issuance of the Basic Law of Governance, 1 March 1992.413
6.0 Introduction
These opening words might reasonably be taken as an extension of Ayatollah Khomeini’s discourse 
from the previous chapter, but they belong to someone who, in many ways, was quite his opposite. 
Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the fifth King of Saudi Arabia, was known to his Western observers as 
the monarch who brought modernization to the Desert Kingdom, enjoyed a special relationship with 
his US counterparts and, in a more private vein, was a regular on the exclusive party scene in 
Marbella, Spain; hardly a characterization fit for Khomeini. And yet, Fahd employed much of the 
same religiously-infused discourse as Khomeini, and was even seen by his domestic admirers - 
albeit mostly relatives that led similar lives to him - as a man of faith who, like his own words 
above suggest to be the case, was guided by  Islam and wanted the same for his people and 
Kingdom. I would be careful to depict Fahd in these terms, but his persona, worldview and indeed 
his foreign policy can by no means be understood outside the context of religion. This is not just 
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because religion features extensively in Fahd’s foreign policy discourse - as Gause III quite rightly 
observes in his discussion about the Kingdom’s foreign policy in general: “if the rhetoric of Saudi
leaders is taken at face value, we would have to conclude that Islam defines the role of Saudi Arabia
in the world.”414   Rather, it is because religion, for historical reasons with the utmost modern-day 
relevance, is decisive to how Fahd saw himself, and indeed how others saw him. Religion in the 
form of a belief-community refers, in the case of Fahd and Saudi Arabia, to Wahhabism; a branch of 
Sunni Islam that applies a staunchly conservative interpretation of Sharia aimed at emulating the 
seventh century community  in which the Prophet Muhammad lived, on the very same lands that 
Fahd, as King, was the Custodian of. As this chapter will discuss, its followers consider Wahhabism 
the only true emulation of the Prophet’s intended Islamic community  and be extension consider 
other interpretations of Islam - especially Shi’ism but also other Sunni branches, not to mention the 
non-Islamic Abrahamic religions - as  bida (innovations). Given the birthplace of Muhammad on 
the Arabian Peninsula, Wahhabi Muslims appropriate onto themselves the belief that they are 
“purest” followers of Islam and that the onus is naturally  on them to assume leadership in the 
Muslim world at large.   
In this chapter, I argue that the Wahhabi “belief-community” to which Fahd belonged comprised an 
important part of his worldview, though less as a result of his individual “faith,” than of the historic 
religio-political agreement forged between eighteenth century leaders of the Al Saud dynasty and 
Wahhab tribe, which Fahd, as a leading royal figure, necessarily had an interest in living by; if not 
for reasons related to his own “faith,” then for the sake of the Al Saud regime’s security  which was 
facilitated as a result of the religious legitimacy granted to it, by its relationship with the Wahhab 
tribe. This aspect of Fahd’s world-view interplayed with another important component which, for 
Fahd as a Royalist, demanded equal interest, namely a strong alliance with the US, whose expertise 
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and support  in defense and military matters, the Kingdom depended for its material security. Fahd’s 
worldview translated, roughly, into a foreign policy doctrine that aimed to maintain a strong US- 
Saudi Arabian alliance, on the one hand; and a leadership role in inter-Arab affairs, particularly in 
matters with a Islamic dimension, on the other.  The chapter looks at  two of Fahd’s major foreign 
policies. Firstly, Fahd’s foreign policy  vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, and the Palestinian issue 
more generally. In this context, religion assumed a constraining role in that Fahd, due to the 
religious identity vested in him as leader of Islamic Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the religio-politico 
symbiosis, which prevented him from following through on his preferred moderate policy  vis-a-vis 
the Accords.  Secondly, Fahd’s foreign policy vis-a-vis Operation Desert Shield and the subsequent
Gulf War. In this context, the chapter shows that Fahd invoked religion in his public discourse as 
well as an official fatwa granted to him by the Kingdom’s Ulema, in order to legitimize his 
invitation of foreign soldiers onto Saudi soil; an act that otherwise delegitimized him, again, by 
virtue of the religio-politico symbiosis.
6.1 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s worldview
A far cry from their characterizations of Ayatollah Khomeini, Western observers have by  and large 
associated Saudi Arabia’s fifth King, Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, with close ties to Western 
powers, above all, the US; and with a lavish life-style. Though toning down his reputation as a 
“womanizer, drinker and gambler” following his ascension to the throne in 1982, his memory 
remains one of an opulent leader whose “largesse [was] the stuff of legend.”415  A good example of 
the latter is Fahd’s commissioning of a White House replica in Saudi Arabia - one reportedly 
extravagant even for Gulf standards, despite it rarely, if ever, being used by  him416- which captures 
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both his affinity  for the US, as well as his largesse. Through Fahd’s efforts, not just as King 
(1982-2005),417   but also as Education Minister (1953-62), Interior Minister (1962-67) and Deputy 
Prime Minister (1967-75) and Crown Prince (1975-82), Saudi Arabia underwent significant 
modernization, especially, in the Kingdom’s education, technology and infrastructure sectors. It was 
Fahd who introduced modern universities to Saudi Arabia and, under his watch, the number of 
higher education institutions grew from one, with an enrollment of twenty-one students, in 1957, to
seven  with  roughly  64,000  students,  in  1982.418    Equally,  he  continued  King  Faisal’s  plan  to
modernize the technology sector, just as he encouraged prolific construction of hospitals, schools, 
roads and other “modern” services.419    In part for these reasons, he has been described as more 
Western and less traditional in outlook than his successor Abdullah;420   a result, perhaps, of his 
many international travels from a very young age.
While  Fahd  is  not,  in  Western  media  and  scholarship,  typically   associated  with  having  deep 
religious faith, probably because of his seemingly impious lifestyle, his family  has a markedly 
different understanding of him.  To one family  member, Fahd “was a believer [who] knew that God 
is the Lord and we are merely His servants.”421  Another family member observed that,
The Book of God and the Prophet's Sunna were [Fahd’s] utmost concern. 
Even in his private majlises he would always say "this state was founded on 
the Qu'ran and the Sunna and true monotheistic doctrine. He was also in 
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constant touch with the Ulema. Issues would arise and he'd immediately 
pick up the phone and call Sheikh ibn Baz or Sheikh ibn al-Uthaymeen or 
other sheikhs and ask them questions.422
Yet another family  member describes Fahd as “assiduous in his religion”423  and as “patient, [seeking] 
council and [asking] God for council.”424  His biographer, Kamal Al Kilani, similarly describes Fahd 
as “a Muslim of deep  faith and experience.”425  In his speech and action, Fahd is perceived to have 
been “always [keeping] the remembrance of God [on] his lips and [beginning] every deed he 
undertook [by] mentioning the name of our Lord.”426  Indeed, when Fahd changed his official title to 
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques shortly after his ascension to the throne in 1982, he publicly 
stated that “It gives me great pleasure to announce my fervent and deeply felt desire to drop the title 
"His Majesty" and replace it  with one closer to my heart [...]”427  Equally, in terms of action, Fahd 
expanded Al Masjid al Haram (the Grand Mosque) and Al Masjid an-Nabawi (the Prophet’s 
Mosque), the two most holy  sites on the Arabian peninsula, just as he established the King Fahd 
Complex For The Printing of the Holy Qu’ran; a printing plant that, as its name indicates, was 
established to print the Islamic Holy  book in Arabic as well as international languages for 
dissemination in Saudi Arabia and abroad. Fahd’s statement at the Complex’ inauguration in 1984 
all but confirm the earlier impressions given by his family:
Two years ago I was in this place to lay the cornerstone for this great project 
and in this city, which is the greatest of all cities: Madinah, whose people 
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were pleased with the advent of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) 
and were his best helpers in the time of hardship. It is the city, from which 
the call for goodness and blessing started for the entire world. This day, we 
find the dream coming true with the best achievements. So, everyone in 
Saudi  Arabia  should  thank  Allah,  may  He  be  glorified,  for  this  great 
blessing. I ask Allah to guide me to the service of my religion, my country 
and all Muslims, and from Allah I seek help.428
Fahd’s ambition to create a powerful Saudi Arabia, and the modernization efforts in the education 
and technology sectors that  he encouraged to grant the Kingdom such a status, were, in the eyes of 
his family, carried out “while respecting tradition,”429  with one family member stating about Fahd’s 
education efforts (for both males and females) that, “this is not Westernization, this is 
advancement.”430       Indeed,  it  was  the  official  line  across  the  ruling  elite  that  “economic 
modernization can be reconciled with the traditional cultural, religious and political values of Saudi 
Arabia.”431   In his efforts, he was moreover perceived to hold the citizens’ interest in high regard, a 
sentiment which he himself expressed upon his ascension to the throne, when he stated that "I will 
be a father to the young and a brother to the old. I am one of you. What pains you, pains me. What 
pleases you, pleases me."432  Such a proclamation is in line with what is expected from a King in 
Saudi Arabia  who,  by  religious  tradition,  rules  according  to  the  principle  of  baya’a  (oath  of 
allegiance to a leader), whereby  the ruler is bound to the ruled according to Sharia (Islamic law). 
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Through baya’a, the ruled are bound to give their loyalty to the ruler, except when Sharia is 
breached; the ruler, in turn, is bound to protect Sharia rulings and govern by them.432    By some 
accounts, he took this role very seriously; as one family member states “He worked hard and even 
brought his work home. Suitcases full of documents. He would work on them until dawn. Then he
would pray and catch some sleep. At 9 am, he’d be at the office.”433
Next to the characterizations above of Fahd as a lavish womanizer keen on maintaining strong US- 
Saudi relations, these family  impressions of him as a pious man, reinforced through his own 
discourse, paint  a picture of a man with two distinct, if highly contrasting, public personas. Though 
any personal reflections by  Fahd of his religious beliefs are hard to come by, just as impressions of 
his piety given by people outside of a royal family that is notorious for strategically seeking to 
represent a united front, Fahd’s worldview, given how extensively  it features in his public discourse 
and  around  his  persona,  cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  religion.  This  religious 
dimension  is,  according  to  virtually  all  Western  scholarship  and  commentary,  a  reflection  of 
tradition rather than belief. Robert Lacey, an authority on the Kingdom and its ruling regime, notes 
that, according to a minister who worked with Fahd, members of the royal family are "without 
exception [brought] up to have respect and to show respect towards the religious scholars."434 This 
respect, of Fahd and the royal family at large towards the religious establishment, must necessarily 
be understood in the context of the important position of the Kingdom’s Ulema in bestowing 
legitimacy upon the ruling King and the royal family at large.
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As discussed in chapter 3, the legitimacy  of the Al Saud dynasty as rulers of modern day  Saudi 
Arabia rests thoroughly on its long-standing alliance with the Ulema, which derives from a politico- 
religious symbiosis formed in 1744 between the dynasty’s founding father, Muhammad Ibn al-Saud, 
and the founder of the Wahhabi movement, Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab.435 Through what was 
effectively a power-sharing agreement between the two, Ibn Abd Al Wahhab promised to grant 
Muhammad Ibn al-Saud the religious legitimacy necessary  for his recognition as the effective ruler 
of the Saudi state, against both protection and a society led according to Islamic values.436   Were it 
not for this agreement, and for the religious legitimacy, that it provided, Al Saud would not have 
been able to unify his sources of support and gain an advantage over his neighbors who had those 
same sources of support, but no unifying call of religion. The founder of the modern Saudi state, 
Ibn Saud, faced a similar situation in 1932, when his attempted re-establishment of the Saudi state, 
depended on the success of a Wahhabi-Saud alliance. Specifically, Ibn Saud recognized the political 
implications of the expansionist agenda of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers), whose militant power he 
had relied heavily on in his territorial conquests of the Peninsula’s regions. Aware of the necessity 
to remain friendly with British powers in neighboring territories and to draw the Saudi state’s 
borders within the Arabian peninsula where great power desire for influence was largely non- 
existent, Ibn Saud needed the Ulema’s approval to crack down on the Ikhwan. Upon receiving this 
approval,  Ibn Saud, with his religious legitimacy intact, could pursue his state building project. As 
such, Ibn Saud effectively  implemented an approach to consolidating his rule similar to that  of his 
forefather in 1744.437 Moreover, the Ulema did the same, but for different reasons. As scholars like 
Kechichian  (1986)  and  Nevo  (1998)  have  argued,  pragmatism  on  the  part  of  Ulema  can  be 
explained with reference to the teachings of the medieval Sunni Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, 
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known to have had a decisive influence on Ibn Al Wahhab and the Wahhabi doctrine. Although 
promoting a strict  interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, Taymiyyah supported the notion of 
ijtihad (the right to interpretation), arguing that state and religion should be inextricably linked as 
the latter can only be protected through the coercive power of the state; and the former would 
become tyrannical if not ruled by Sharia.438
The Ulema’s exercise of ijtihad has been seen time and again in the Kingdom’s modern history, 
particularly in cases where doing so has been at odds with the views of religious fundamentalists.
Examples include the Ulema’s official approval of the regime’s use of force against religious 
extremists who violently demonstrated in the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, to call for greater 
Islamization of the Kingdom’s social, political and educational practices. Another example, which 
will be explored in detail later in this chapter, is the Ulema’s fatwa (religious ruling) to legitimize 
the regime’s hosting of Western troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War, which caused 
vociferous opposition, not just from the Saudi religious extremists, but from Muslims and Muslim 
leaders worldwide. Importantly, while these examples demonstrate the Ulema’s willingness to be 
pragmatic, which, given the Wahhabist  tradition’s adherence to Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings, is a way 
by  which  the  religious  establishment  maximize  their  own  security  so  as  to  be  able  to  exert 
influence, they are not to suggest that the regime in turn is unconstrained in its policy decision- 
making.  By  most  accounts,  the  religious  fundamentalists  just  described  being  one  of  few 
exceptions, the Wahhabi doctrine is fiercely  conservative. It follows a literal observance of Sharia - 
cases of ijtihad notwithstanding - which, as far as international relations are concerned, considers 
the world divided into believers (those that follow Islam, in its Sunni and conservative variant) and 
infidels (those that do not follow Islam, or do so in a way that is deemed too liberal). Notably, Shi’a 
Muslims fall under the latter category, because they are seen in the Wahhabi doctrine as illegally 
186
438  See Nevo, J. (1998) Religion and National Identity  in Saudi Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (3). p. 37 and Kechichian, J. 
(1986) The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: the case of Saudi Arabia. International Journal  of Middle East 
Studies. 18 (1). 1986. p. 63-65.
believing in bida (innovations); a reference to the Shi’a belief that the Prophet Muhammad’s 
rightful successor should be of his bloodline and not, as the Sunni belief holds, of his community.439
Moreover, a sort of demonization of everything that is different from Wahhabism, including other 
Islamic schools of thought or religious practices, above all Western culture and religion. According 
to one Saudi woman reflecting on her religious education in the Kingdom, “the mind of each of us
has been programmed since school age [...] that values and good deeds are ours only and that others 
lack them. They taught us that every  non-Muslim is an enemy of ours, and that the West is 
equivalent to decadence.”440
Relations with the West and incorporation of Western culture on the part  of the Al Saud regime is 
thus far from straightforward. When introducing changes towards modernization in the kingdom, 
for example, and met with resistance from the Ulema, the ruling King has needed to persuade the 
Ulema of the benefits tied to the proposed change, rather than implementing that change against the 
will of the religious leadership.441    In political matters, too, the Ulema’s approval has weighed 
heavily on the regime’s decision-making, such as when its consent has been required to carry  out a 
power-transfer in the decision-making elite, as was the case during King Saud’s deposition in 
favour of King Faisal, in 1964.442    Efforts to maintain a relationship with the Ulema have been 
essential to the regime’s religious legitimacy on which, as we have seen, its right to rule has been 
tied historically and continues to be so.
Accordingly, as Nevo (1996) amongst others has argued, ruling members of the royal family, 
whether espousing religious beliefs of not, is necessarily interested in maximizing its religious 
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legitimacy. To Fahd, that interest seemed to derive from his knowledge of the Ulema’s popularity 
amongst the Saudi Arabian populace, as can be deduced from his confidential statement to one of 
his colleague: "if an election were held [in Saudi Arabia] tomorrow, Bin Baz443    would beat us 
without even leaving his house."444 Whatever the motivation of the royal family’s ruling members
may be to maximize their legitimacy, it employs wide-ranging means to do so, all of which relate to 
promoting a strict observance of Islam.  Such means include adopting Islamic symbols, in a national 
context, such as a national flag that features the Shahada (the Islamic creed) which states that There 
is no God but God, and Muhammad is his messenger, against a green - the Prophet’s color - 
background, and above a sword in representation of the House of Saud’s military strength.445
Another example is the regime’s adoption of the Qu’ran as the state’s constitution, Sharia as the 
source of its legal system, and social regulations that prohibit  non-Muslims from becoming Saudi 
citizens as well as the public promotion, if enforcement, of Islamic norms and practice.446  Above 
all, perhaps, are the regime’s efforts to consolidate the national identity around Islam through public 
discourse. The Saud dynasty’s relationship with the Ulema, and its historical roots, is referenced 
extensively  by the former in public discourse, as the following excerpt from King Fahd speech of 
March 1993 exemplifies,
Muslims have been happy with the Sharia of Islam ever since it came to 
rule their affairs and daily  lives. In modern history, the first Saudi State was 
founded on the basis of Islam more than two and a half centuries ago, when 
two pious reformers, Imam Mohammed Bin Saud and Sheikh Mohammed 
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Bin Abdul-Wahhab (may  God have mercy on their souls!) committed 
themselves to it  [...] This State was set upon a clear course of politics and 
government. It was committed to propagating Islam and to fostering a sense 
of community. This is the course of Islam, the Creed and the sharia. Ever
since the establishment of this righteous state, the people of the country 
have enjoyed happiness, security and unity of opinion.447
By emphasizing the Saud-Ulema relationship  and its historical origins, and furthermore associating 
the governing system that it provides with happiness, security and unity  of the governed, Fahd not 
only legitimizes the Saudi state in this passage, but also reinforces a national identity  around an 
Islamic Saudi state. Fahd expresses this more concisely - and explicitly - in the final part of the 
speech, stating that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic State. With this discourse, he 
promotes a markedly different type of nationalism than that  seen elsewhere in the region where 
nationalism has largely  been attached to a secular and modernized notion of the state,448   though 
exceptions exist, as we saw in the previous chapter when, though only  sporadically, Khomeini 
intertwined notion of Islamism and Iranian nationalism. With reference to Fahd’s speech above, Al- 
Rasheed (1996) points out that the political rhetoric of Fahd, and that of the House of Saud in 
general, has consistently forged a triangular relationship between God, as the source establishing 
and governing the political process; the King, as he who enacts his holy mission by guarding God’s 
sacred laws; and finally, the Saudi nation which is required to be loyal to God and the King.449   In 
this way, Saudi nationalism is intrinsically tied not only to Islam, but also to the ruling Al Saud 
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family.  The  latter’s  role  in  leading  the  Saudi  Arabian  state,  Al-Rasheed  further  argues,  is 
emphasized in Fahd’s speech of 2 March, 1992, when he stated the following:
We remained faithful to Islam, belief and Sharia during the reign of King
Abdul  Aziz,  who  built  and  unified  Saudi  Arabia  on  the  basis  of  this
program, although he faced difficult  historical conditions. In spite of these 
difficulties, he insisted on applying the Islamic program in government and 
society.450
By  focusing  on  Ibn  Saud’s  role,  as  opposed  to  that  of  both  Ibn  Saud  and  the  Ulema,  in 
implementing Sharia governance, Fahd implies that Ibn Saud is the primary founder of the third 
Saudi state and thus not only legitimizes the dynasty’s right to govern, but also intensifies the 
connection between it and Islam.451
Alongside carving out a role for Fahd, and any Saudi Arabian King, as ruler of a conservative, 
Sharia-led Islamic state, that he must necessarily appropriate, history has also carved out a role for 
the King to maintain strong economic and, especially, defence relations with the US. Specifically, 
this role stems from the discovery of oil reserves in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1930s, and the 
collaboration with U.S. oil companies to extract and put it  to market, which led to significant 
economic growth in the Kingdom. Revenue from oil-sales were crucial for Ibn Saud to consolidate 
his state-building project  in that it enabled him to, amongst other things, provide benefits in the 
form of shelter, for example, to its citizens, in addition to his promises of ruling over the latter by 
Sharia.452  More importantly, the U.S.-Saudi Arabian alliance comprised a defence-agreement, albeit 
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an unofficial one, by which the Kingdom would enjoy protection from its American allies in 
exchange for agreements related to oil-sales. This was crucial for the Kingdom as its armed forces 
were weak, despite large expenditures on military equipment, as of result of Ibn Saud and his 
successors’ reluctance to build an army, in fear that such a force could instigate a rebellion against
the regime,453    as happened in Egypt during the 1952 Free Officers’ coup d’état, as well as in 
neighbouring Iraq during the Golden Square coup and again during the 1958 coup d’état which 
overthrew Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. Receiving his early education at Saudi Arabia’s Prince’s 
School - a school set by Ibn Saud specifically  for the Saud family’s education - alongside being the 
oldest brother of the important “Sudairi seven clan”-  the largest group of full brothers born to Ibn 
Saud’s favorite wife454    - Fahd can be thought to have appropriated the importance of US-Saudi 
economic and defense ties for regime security, from a young age, alongside that of the Saud- 
Wahhab ties.   Indeed, Fahd has been described as “more pro-American [than] many  of the other 
influential princes”455   and so important did Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the US become to Fahd, 
that it has been described as “his most cherished relationship.”456
6.2 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s Foreign Policy Doctrine.
Fahd’s worldview, comprised of his religious beliefs formed by  a Wahhabi belief-community, if by 
virtue of the Wahhabi-Saud symbiosis rather than his personal faith, alongside an affinity for both 
Western culture and diplomatic relations. This translated, roughly, into a foreign policy doctrine 
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which aimed, on the one hand, at maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S., based on the 
Kingdom’s dependency on the latter above all for defence purposes and, possibly, reinforced by 
Fahd’s personal affinity for the West. On the other hand, Fahd’s foreign policy doctrine aimed at
assuming a leadership role in the Arab world. Due to the indistinguishability between Fahd and
Islam as a result of the historic symbiosis between the Al Saud family and the Wahhabi 
establishment, as well as of the incessant discursive efforts by Fahd, and other ruling members of 
the royal family, to conflate the Al Saud family  with Islam, the tenet of Fahd’s foreign policy to take 
a leadership position in the Arab world necessarily  became one defined by Islam. The doctrine is 
reflected in Fahd’s statement to US leaders, “After Allah, we can count on the United States.”457
Reconciling the two foreign policy tenets - maintaining a strong US alliance and assuming an 
Islamic leadership role in inter-Arab affairs - was, given the Ulema’s conspicuous view of the 
Americans as infidels, far from a straightforward task, but one that Fahd necessarily  needed to take 
on. As Gause III (2002) and Piscatori (1983) have noted, this conundrum - faced not only by Fahd, 
but also by the Saudi Kingdom’s leaders that came before and after him - resulted in a non- 
sequential foreign policy by which foreign policy  leaders have gone back and forth between the two 
tenets; throwing their support behind an Islamic cause one day, and supported or reached out to the 
US on another, despite any apparent contradictions between such actions.458    As the following 
sections 4.4 and 4.5 will show, so too was the case with Fahd, who took on a leadership role on 
behalf of the Islamic, Arab world in the context of the Camp David Accords, opposing that initiative
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- in which the US was highly involved, and would have preferred Saudi support - at least partly, on 
Islamic grounds. In the context of Operation Desert Storm and the ensuing Gulf war, however, he 
invited US troops into the Kingdom, and kept them there, in spite of a growing opposition to that
decision from explicitly religious sources, including many from the religious establishment.
6.3 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the Camp David Accords and the “Palestinian
issue”
When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat entered into the Camp David talks with Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin in March of 1978, then, Crown Prince, Fahd joined other Arab and 
Iranian leaders in publicly expressing condemnation of the agreement and called for its 
abandonment. The Kingdom’s took the following official position:
The attitude of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Middle East problem 
and the issue of Palestine is firm and clear. It derives from the Arabs’ 
unanimous attitude that the issue of Palestine is the core of the Middle East 
problem, and that a just and comprehensive solution cannot be achieved 
unless  Israel  withdraws  from  all  the Arab  territories  occupied  in  1967, 
including, first  and foremost, Holy Jerusalem, to which Arab sovereignty 
must be restored.459
This position was different from that which Fahd had initially taken, at the Baghdad Summit in 
November 1978, when he was the only one amongst the Arab leaders there who argued to take less 
drastic measures against Egypt than the harsh political and economic sanctions that  the rest  of the 
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summit participants supported. When Fahd finally joined in the collective Arab condemnation of 
Egypt, Sadat was reportedly “personally annoyed at  Crown Prince Fahd, who he feels went back on 
his word at the Baghdad summit conference” and “refused even to receive a conciliatory message
from Fahd.”460 It was different, too, from the impression that he had given US President Carter, who 
when asked in an interview in 1978 about the lack of encouragement for the Camp David Accords 
from Saudi Arabia, said:
I have not been disappointed with the Saudi Arabians' response to the peace 
talks. We obviously would like for everyone in the world to endorse the 
Camp David agreements without any caveats at all. But none of the Saudi 
Arabian leaders […] condemned the talks or rejected them or closed the 
door for future support and encouragement. There are three elements that 
any Arab leader cannot, in good conscience, endorse or avoid. One is the 
matter of sovereignty over the West Bank, Gaza Strip. And of course, when 
I say "Arab leaders," I'm including President Sadat. The other one is the 
question of eastern Jerusalem and the control of the Moslem holy places by 
Moslems. And the third one is the resolution of the Palestinian question.We 
always use the phrase "in all its aspects." And I think that this concern by 
the Saudis has been expressed in very moderate terms. They have been 
complimentary  about the progress that might evolve from the Camp David 
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talks, and I have not detected any attitude on their part, even surreptitiously, 
to influence others to condemn the talks or to work against them.461
The perceptions of both Sadat and Carter suggest that Fahd, in line with his foreign policy doctrine, 
sought to take a leadership role in the joint Arab stance vis-a-vis the Israel-Palestinian issue. In
1981, he took a more public step  in that direction, by  announcing the Fahd Plan; an eight-point 
peace plan that was, at its core a reiteration of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and
338,462  proposing that  Arab states jointly call for Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories 
occupied during the six-day  war, including East Jerusalem. The Plan’s seventh point which called 
for “the right for all nations in the area to live in peace”, though welcomed by the Americans who 
viewed it as implicitly recognizing Israeli statehood, was denounced by  the Arabs for the same 
reason.463  Syria, Libya and Iraq demonstrated particular opposition to the plan’s seventh point, with 
the Libyan Foreign Minister, Adulati Obeidi, stating that “The Saudis are worse than Sadat [...] At 
least Sadat did it alone. Sadat was shot  for treason, and now the Arab states are being asked to 
endorse  mass  treason”.464    The  plan  was  ridiculed  by  hard-line Arab  opposition  states,  which 
referred to it as an “American proposal” and “Camp Fahd”.465   From across the Gulf, Khomeini 
attacked the Fahd Plan on the grounds that it was “inconsistent with Islam;”466  a message that was 
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reiterated by  Iran’s revolutionary  pilgrims who used their annual hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) to 
shout the slogan “Fahd, the Israeli Shah” whilst brandishing posters of Khomeini outside Mecca’s
Grand Mosque.467
Khomeini’s attack, and that of his followers, confirm what Carter pointed out in his interview years 
prior, namely  that “any Arab leader cannot, in good conscience endorse or avoid, [the] question of 
eastern Jerusalem and the control of the Moslem holy  places by Moslems.” Dawisha (1983) makes 
a further observation, noting that the stance Arab leaders took on this question constituted the 
standard by  which their merits and demerits were judged”468   which, for Saudi Arabia, due to its 
position as the Guardian of Islamic Holy  sites in Mecca and Medina, meant that it could not be seen 
to stray away  from the “Islamic line” vis-a-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That “Islamic line” 
was one set partly  by itself through, for example, the following official announcement by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a long lasting stance on the Palestinian 
Issue since the era of its founder King Abdul Aziz al Saud. This enduring 
stance was first declared in 1935, at the conference on the Palestinian issue 
(Madrid Round Table Conference), until the current era of the Custodian of 
the Two Holy  Mosques King Fahd bin Adbul Aziz. The Kingdom of Saud 
Arabia has been backing and supporting the Palestinian issue in all its 
different  phases and levels (politically, economically, and socially); since the 
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Kingdom strongly believes that these supporting efforts are an Arab and 
Islamic duty.469
In this statement, supporting the Palestinian issue in its political, social and economic aspects, is 
linked to an Arab and Islamic duty. In another statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 
similar rationale is presented; that  the Kingdom’s financial and moral support to the Palestinian 
people and the Palestinian Authority  was given “out of the Kingdom’s obligation towards both Arab 
and Muslim issues.”470 The Palestinian issue becomes particularly Islamized when the dimension of 
East Jerusalem is emphasized, due to it being the home of Islam’s third holiest site, Al-Haram al- 
Sharif (the Noble Precinct), from which the Prophet Mohammad is thought to have ascended to 
heaven.471   Had it not been so before, Jerusalem became framed as a decidedly Islamic concern by 
the Kingdom’s Ulema at an international gathering where it condemned the Israeli occupation of 
Jerusalem  in  1967,  in  the  following  terms:  “[The  usurpers]  tore  down  several  Muslim  sites, 
including mosques, schools, and homes, all of which were held by religious endowments [...]”472 As 
Quandt (1981) notes, being the guardian of the two Holiest  Islamic sites of Mecca and Medina, and 
the birthplace of Islam, placed an expectation from Arab and Muslim states in the region on Saudi 
Arabia to voice its condemnation of Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, given that city’s special status 
in Islam.473  Dawisha (1983) similarly  observes that, following Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem, the 
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Riyadh government, could not be seen “to be abandoning the struggle to restore the revered Islamic 
shrine to Arab sovereignty.”474 Very likely  due to this rationale, Fahd threatened a jihad to establish a 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, in response to Israel’s proclamation of Jerusalem as 
its eternal capital in August 1980.475 At a news-conference, Fahd’s foreign minister, Prince Saud al
Faisal, furthermore expressed that the Moslem world had hopes that  American President Reagan 
would alter his Middle East policy, and take Arab and Islamic demands about Israeli withdrawal 
from East Jerusalem, into account.476  Similarly, on the Kingdom’s Ministry  of Foreign Affairs, Al 
Qods (Jerusalem) is identified as a Holy site and, rationale to prevent its “Judaization,” based on the 
need to preserve its Arab and Islamic roots:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports Al Qods Fund in order to fights the 
Judaization  to  preserve  the Arab  and  Islamic  style  of Al  Qods,  and  to 
enhance  the  Palestinian  struggle  in  both Al  Qods  and  other  Palestinian 
Territories.477
Arguably more than at any other point in the Kingdom’s history, was the Palestinian issue an 
Islamic one, over an Arab one during the period of the Camp  David Accords. Khomeini’s discursive 
efforts to make it so, including his well-known proclamation that “Iran’s revolution would not be 
complete until the Palestinians won theirs,”478   played a large role in this, with implications for 
Saudi Arabia whose Palestinian and Shi’a populations were mobilized by the Ayatollah. Khomeini’s 
198
474 Dawisha (1983) Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Ups and Fowns of Pragmatic Moderation. International Journal.
38 (4).  p. 679.
475 Aikman, D.; Johnson, M.; Stewart, W., ‘Jihad For Jerusalem The Saudis try to lure Egypt's Sadat back into the Arab fold’, Time,
116 (8), p. 32.
476 Rome News Tribune (1981) Move to  regain sovereignty over Jerusalem. 'Holy war' is urged against Israel. [online] 27th January. Av 
a i l a b l e   f r o  m :    h t tp : / /news.google .com/newspapers?nid=348&dat=19810127&id=EJskAAAAIBAJ&sj id=- 
jIDAAAAIBAJ&pg=2975,3373315 [Accessed: December 10th, 2014].
477 SAUDI ARABIA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (n.d.) Kingdom Stance on the Palestinian issue. [Online] Available from:
http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/KingdomForeignPolicy/Pages/PalestineCause34652.aspx Accessed: 1 February, 2015.
478 Cooley, K.  (1978-79) Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf. Foreign Affairs. p. 1017.
Islamization efforts were furthermore echoed by the Kingdom’s own Ulema, with its paramount 
religious scholar, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, saying of the Palestinian problem that “[it was] an 
Islamic problem first and last [and Muslims] must fight an Islamic jihad against the Jews until the 
land  returns  to  its  owners.”479     Such  discourse  occurred  at  a  time  when  religious  sentiment 
intensified in    Saudi Arabia which manifested most conspicuously in the 1979 Grand Mosque
seizure by  a group of Islamist  extremists opposed to the Ulema’s perceived cooperation with the 
Westernized  Saud  regime.  Fahd  responded  to  religious  trends  by  reinforcing  his  religious 
credentials, including changing his official title from “His Majesty” to “Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques” to opening the the Islamic University of Umm al-Qura. As chapter 3 discussed, Saudi 
society more generally  saw a rise in religious television and radio programmes,480     just as the 
Kingdom’s financial aid to Islamic causes worldwide rose significantly.481
Clearly, this intensifying religious sentiment alongside the broader condemnation of the Camp 
David Accords on religious grounds emanating from both within Iran and abroad, did not altogether 
dictate Fahd’s foreign policy on the Palestinian issue. Had it done so, he would not, as Carter and 
Sadat perceived, have been willing to take a “moderate” stance on the issue nor gone against his 
Baghdad Pact agreement and sent a conciliatory  message to Sadat, much less proposed his eight- 
point Peace Plan in 1981. That said, Fahd certainly  did appropriate the “Islamic” line vis-a-vis the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue as far as his discourse was concerned, which rationalized his support of the 
Palestinian issue and, especially, Jerusalem, with reference to Islam. This shift, I argue, comes a 
result of Fahd’s identity, which - by  virtue of him being a royal leader of the Islamic Kingdom  - is 
necessarily and intricately tied to Islam, thus placing upon him, the expectation to respond to the 
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Camp David Accords, according to “the Islamic line.” This can moreover only be thought to have 
intensified in light of the Islamization trends in the region and within Saudi Arabia at the time.
6.4 Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Operation Desert Shield and the Gulf War
On 2 August, 1990 Iraqi President  Saddam Hussein launched an invasion into neighboring Kuwait 
and, having defeated the unprepared Kuwaiti Armed Forces within days, annexed the small Gulf 
monarchy declaring it the nineteenth province of Iraq. Iraqi presence in Kuwait  meant that Hussein 
and his forces were within striking distance of Saudi oil fields and could potentially conquer Saudi 
Arabia in its entirety  in a matter of three days.482  In combination with Hussein’s hostile rhetoric and 
existing  tensions  between  him  and  the  Saudi  regime,  Iraq’s  annexation  of  Kuwait   posed  a 
significant security  threat to Saudi Arabia and, by extension, to the U.S., its primary oil-trading 
partner and key ally in the Gulf following Iran’s Islamic Revolution. After a meeting with US 
Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, General Colin Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf in which 
King Fahd was shown satellite pictures of Iraqi forces moving towards the Saudi Arabian border, 
the King invited foreign troops to Saudi soil. According to then U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom, 
Charles Freeman, Fahd was “[...] shaken by  what he saw in those photos” and, following 
Schwarzkopf’s proposed American response to Hussein’s actions said “Come [to Saudi Arabia].”483
Ambassador Freeman recalls that when advised by then Crown Prince Abdullah to make further 
consultation before agreeing to the Americans’ plan of action, Fahd responded that “There’s no time 
[...] if we delay may end up  like Kuwait; there is no Kuwait anymore [...] its territory consists of 
hotel rooms in Cairo and Paris and London,” to which Abdullah said “I take your point; I agree.”485
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Shortly after, the build-up of forces and defense of Saudi Arabia, codenamed Operation Desert
Shield, commenced, bringing hundreds of thousands of foreign troops into the Kingdom. Most of
them were American and non-Muslim, and with them, to a country that otherwise forbade the 
practicing of non-Islamic religions, came Christian priests. Seemingly aware that their presence 
would seem at odds with the Ulema’s wahhabi doctrine which viewed non-Muslims as infidels, 
Fahd delivered a speech roughly a week after Operation Desert Shield’s commencement in which 
he  assured  citizenry’s  that  the  his  invitation  of  foreign  troops  to  the  Kingdom  was  based  of 
necessity rather than choice:
[you] undoubtedly know that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia had exerted all that it could in effort and attempts with the 
Governments of the Iraqi Republic and the state of Kuwait, for the sake of 
containing the dispute that has risen between the two countries.484  However, 
with great regret, matters developed in the opposite direction to what we 
were endeavoring; in fact, opposite to the aspirations of the peoples of the 
Islamic and Arab nations, and all the peace-loving countries of the world.485
Thus the Government of the U.S.A. and the British Government took the 
initiative, on the basis of the relations of friendship  which link the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia and these states, to send air and land forces in order to back 
the Saudi armed forces in performing its duty  to defend the homeland and 
the citizens [...]486
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Though not in nearly as much depth as in other speeches, Fahd here invokes Islam to reinforce his 
message to the Saudi people that the Kingdom, in line with Islamic teachings, is a peace-loving 
nation that has joined other peace-loving friends in expelling an aggressor. More significantly, Fahd
approached the Ulema - specifically  a gathering of 350 Islamic scholars and leaders, showing to 
them American satellite pictures of Iraqi troops moving towards the Saudi Arabian border - in order 
to for his decision to invite foreign troops into the country to be recognised by  Islamic law. 
Following the meeting, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz publicly released a fatwa decreeing that,
Even though the Americans are, in the conservative religious view, equivalent 
to non-believers as they  are not Muslims, they deserve support because they 
are here to defend Islam.487
Though Fahd (re)gained religious legitimacy from Bin Baz’ fatwa, that legitimacy would 
simultaneously  be denounced by  Saddam Hussein. In response to repeated calls by the United 
Nations Security  Council for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait through a series of resolutions, Hussein 
launched an “initiative” in which he tied his consideration of disengagement from Kuwait to the 
withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Palestinian territories and that of America from Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf region, just as he called for the liberation of Islam’s three holiest sites in 
Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina.488    Furthermore, Hussein described Saudi Arabia as an American 
protectorate and characterised its regime as infidel for allowing American troops in the birthplace of 
Islam.489  That such critique should come from Hussein, the leader of a decidedly secular-nationalist 
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Baathist state, was far from natural, and very  possibly speaks more of Hussein’s intention to secure 
political gains, than it does of his motivation to liberate Islam’s holy sites. His efforts to de- 
legitimize Fahd and the Saudi regime were, nonetheless, credible enough that they  mobilized 
Muslims near and far: for example, a preacher of Jerusalem’s Al Aqsa mosque condemned the
Saudi leadership before 10,000 worshippers, suggesting that  “Arab leaders are giving Moslem lands 
to the Americans”490    and Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood encouraged Muslims “to purge the holy 
land of Palestine and Najd and Hijaz [provinces of Saudi Arabia] from the Zionists and 
imperialists”.491    Outside of the region, reactions were similarly  condemning: protesters outside 
Saudi Arabia’s embassy in London shouted “shame” and “death to Fahd” in anger over the Saudi 
regime’s  willingness  to  host  “the  enemies  of  Islam,”  just  as  Muslims  in  China  thought  the 
Kingdom’s hosting of American troops to be a violation of Islamic territory’s integration.492 More to 
it, some regional governments took heed, if not to Saddam’s rhetoric, then to international populist 
displays of outrage. In the Organization of Islamic Conference, for example, Jordan, Sudan and the 
PLO refused to condemn Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, while Libya abstained from taking a stance on 
the issue.493 This marked a difference from a hitherto consensus around Saudi Arabia as a leader in 
Islamic international organizations, where its diplomatic efforts had moreover seen Muslim states 
agree to the idea of spreading and living by Sunni Islamic values.494   Indeed, it  such a consensus 
which constrained Fahd’s leadership aspirations vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, as we saw 
above.
203
490 Piscatori, J. (2011), Religion and realpolitik: Islamic responses to the Gulf War. In Volpi, F. (ed.) Political Islam: A Critical
Reader. New York: Routledge. p. 98.
491 Ibid.
492 NEW YORK TIMES (1991) War in the Gulf: Allies; Theme of Reaction: Unshaken Unity. [Online] 25th February. Available 
from:    http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-allies-theme-of-reaction-unshaken-unity.html  [Accessed:   3
February, 2015].
493 Kepel, G. (2006) Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 74 .
494 Ibid. p. 205-6.
When no Iraqi concessions had materialised by the 15 January 1991 deadline set by the UNSC, a 
US-led coalition launched a military assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait, code-named Operation 
Desert Storm. Hussein suffered defeat and Kuwait was officially liberated on 24 February 1991. As 
with Operation Desert Shield in the previous year, Sheikh Bin Baz issued a fatwa, this time to
sanction the use of force against Iraqis, declaring the fight  against Hussein, a jihad and sanctioning 
all Muslims and non-Muslims to engage in war with Iraq.495  So harshly  was the fatwa was worded 
that, according to one religious scholar who agreed to comment to the New York Times on the 
condition of anonymity, “the fatwa removes any doubt about the religious justification for asking 
non-Muslims to help this country attack another.”496  Around the same time, the regime nonetheless 
employed additional measures to reinforce its Islamic credentials, imposing restrictions on the 
religious practices that Jewish and Christian troops could practice whilst in the Kingdom, just as it 
went to great lengths to win the support of institutions like the centre of Islamic learning, Al-Azhar, 
and of the Muslim World League. Despite Bin Baz fatwas and the regime’s efforts to bolster its 
religious legitimacy, the domestic consequences of Operation Desert Shield and the subsequent 
Gulf war remained dire for Fahd. By the time of the Gulf war’s termination on 28 February, 1991, a 
segment of the Ulema who called for further Islamization of laws and regulations through a petition 
of February 1991, signed by the head of the Ulema, the spokesman of official Islam in the country, 
various judges, professors and teachers.497   Moreover, this opposition was decidedly opposed, not 
only to the regime’s hosting of foreign troops, which they  referred to as “an alignment of the 
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Kingdom and the enemies of God”498   and an “illegitimate [alliance];”499   but to part of the Ulema 
which had accepted and legitimized, in the form of a fatwa, the regime’s policy. This critique 
echoed that made years earlier, in 1979, by the Islamist extremists that attacked the Grand Mosque 
and one that would, eventually  culminate in giving rise to the same fundamentalist strand of 
religious dissidence.
Similarly  to above, when Fahd’s identity  as a leader of the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia placed 
an expectation on him to adopt an “Islamic line” vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, so too did his 
Islamic identity, in the context of Operation Desert Storm and the Gulf war, place expectations on 
him to act more “Islamic” than to invite the “infidels” onto Holy Islamic land. One can sense the 
wahhabi  teaching,  described  earlier,  of  Fahd  belief-community,  that  “every  non-Muslim  is  an 
enemy of ours”500   along with its  general demonization of the West, though, ironically, the Ulema 
itself was, by virtue of ijtihad, able to see the religious-grounded necessity  for Fahd’s foreign 
policy.  By  the  same  token,  Fahd’s  Islamic  identity  as  the  ruler  of  Saudi  Arabia  made  him 
particularly vulnerable to Saddam’s “initiative” by which the latter tied his withdrawal from Kuwait 
to the withdrawal of “infidel forces from the Holy Land” of Saudi Arabia; a position that many 
international Muslims seemingly  galvanized around. I argue that, like in the Camp David Accords, 
religion placed expectations for Fahd to take an “Islamic line” in his foreign policy vis-a-vis 
Operation  Desert  Shield  and  Gulf  War  and,  employing  religious  discourse,  Fahd  sought  to 
legitimize himself and his foreign policy (albeit unsuccessfully, in the eyes of many). Unlike above, 
however, religion did not constrain Fahd in implementing his foreign policy. Most unexpectedly, 
perhaps, though not in light of Ibn Tamiyya’s teachings on ijtihad, it was religious legitimation - not
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constraint - that came from the source - the Ulema - which habitually is a constraining force.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has argued, and shown, that Fahd’s foreign policy  cannot be understood without 
reference to religion. Though Fahd was not seemingly a pious man - he certainly  espoused nowhere 
near  the  level  of  piety  that  Menachem  Begin  and  Ayatollah  Khomeini  did  -  Fahd,  as  the 
embodiment of the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was, in many ways, an Islamic leader, above 
all else, if not in his own eyes then in the eyes of others domestically and beyond. The identity  of 
the Saudi state is intricately and necessarily tied to Islam, above all due to the politico-religio 
symbiosis forged between leaders of the al-Wahhab tribe and al-Saud dynasty  in the mid-sixteenth 
century. The steadfastness of this symbiosis through the centuries has meant that Saudi Arabia has 
not developed a national identity alongside its Islamic identity; as al-Rasheed (2010) alerted us to, 
the Islamic and national identity are one and the same; something which, moreover, is consolidated 
continuously whether through the discourse of the Kingdom’s leaders, including Fahd, or through 
“national” symbols like the Saudi Arabian flag in which Islamic symbols feature throughout.
As the chapter has shown, this had implications for Fahd who - as other of the Kingdom’s royal 
leaders - was expected to be the embodiment of the Saudi Arabian state. In the context of 
Fahd’s foreign policy vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, this meant that Fahd was expected to 
take an “Islamic line,” which - as promoted by himself and his Foreign Ministry  - drew a connection 
between the Palestinian issue and Islam. That was a line different than one Fahd might have taken - 
one that he seemingly did want to take - by  which he would have assumed a moderate role vis-a-vis 
the Accords. I have argued that, for this reason, religion’s role in this context was constraining. 
This constraint is moreover reinforced by the specifics of Fahd’s Wahhabist belief 
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community, which held that any bida (innovation) from the pure Wahhabi doctrinal 
interpretation is a deviation from the Prophet’s teachings - in this regard, the West 
and Jews in particular become a subject of hostility. As such, collaboration with them 
in the context of the Camp David Accord - by many accounts, an Islamic issue - 
would be, indeed was, unacceptable. 
In the context of Fahd’s policy vis-a-vis Operation Desert Shield and the Gulf War, Islam’s primary 
role, was not one of constraint, but  one of de-legitimization. Despite the fact that the Kingdom’s 
religious authority  issued a fatwa to provide religious legitimacy for Fahd’s foreign policy, it was 
the perception amongst radical Islamists within the Kingdom, but also Muslims throughout the 
world, that Fahd’s invitation of “infidel” troops onto Islamic land was out of line with the behaviour 
expected from an Islamic leader.  As above, this too can be related to Fahd’s Wahhabi belief-
community, in that it  was a specific article of the Wahhabi belief community  which allowed the 
religious establishment to condone Fahd’s invitation of US troops to the Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.0 Summary of research findings
This thesis set out to answer the research question “What was the role of religion in Israeli foreign 
policy under Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1977-1984), Iranian foreign policy under Ayatollah 
Khomeini (1979-89), and Saudi Arabian foreign policy under Crown Prince, later King, Fahd 
bin Abdulaziz (1975-95)?,” and did so with the aim of finding a pattern of regularity across the three 
case studies that would yield substantive insight into the role of religion in foreign policy. The 
thesis set out specifically to examine how religion played a role in foreign policy, and it thereby 
distinguished itself from existing literature in the “post-secular IR debate,” which mainly focused on 
whether religion played a role. 
As the case studies have argued, and shown, two primary roles of religion were evident across all 
three, namely that 1) Religion, in the form of “religious beliefs” (or tradition, in the case of Fahd) 
shaped the respective leaders’ worldview and by  extension their foreign policy doctrine and foreign 
policy outcomes. The foreign policies of Begin, Khomeini and Fahd cannot, then, be understood 
outside the context of religion; and, that 2) Religious discourse legitimized the leaders and their 
foreign policies.  The  leaders’ use  of  religious  discourse  for  legitimization  purposes may reflect 
their genuine interpretation of doctrine or a “disingenuous” act based on their perceived need to 
invoke such discourse in order to gain support  for a particular foreign policy (discussed further 
below). In either of these cases, religion’s role as one that legitimizes leaders and their foreign 
policy, is an important one. This is so as there is a direct  relationship between their religious beliefs 
and foreign policy, if their discourse is indeed based on a genuine interpretation of doctrine. If it  is 
rather a disingenuous act, then there is still an indirect relationship between the two, as a the foreign 
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policy that is sought to be legitimized would have been formulated based on a worldview featuring 
religion, in the first place. Moreover, religion’s role is one that is distinct from the modernist and 
Realist understandings discussed in the introduction, as neither of those understandings consider 
religion influential and, if they do, merely do so in a instrumentalist context. The nuances of the 
thesis’ argument discussed above is fleshed out over the following pages.  
The Constructivist-FPA theoretical framework provided a useful intellectual terrain on which to 
explore the research question and understand the findings. With its analytical focus on the individual 
foreign policy decision maker and especially insights from its cognitive branch,  FPA provided the 
analytical tools to shape the case study design. Specifically, it highlighted the importance of 
perception shaped by  the foreign policy  leaders‘ personal stories, environment and, in the context of 
the thesis’ case studies, “religious beliefs” made up of leaders’ individual “faith” and their respective 
“belief-communities.” Given the largely  unconstrained decision making environment of Fahd, 
Khomeini and Begin, and the willful and idiosyncratic personalities of especially the latter two, 
going below state-level and understanding specific leaders and their respective decision making 
environment has been crucial. FPA’s counterpart in the thesis’ theoretical framework, 
Constructivism, has, as the introduction stipulated, provided an intellectual terrain on which to 
explore how the religious worldviews of the leaders’ in question were shaped by the inter-subjective 
beliefs they shared with their respective belief-communities, and influenced their respective 
perceptions of national interest. For Khomeini, Begin and Fahd, respectively, this refers to Twelver 
Shi’a Islam, Neo-revisionism and Wahhabi Islam and, as the empirical chapters have demonstrated, 
the characteristics of those belief-communities were identifiable in those leaders’ foreign policy 
outcomes.  Apart from the roles of religion mentioned above, two further observations can made 
about religion in foreign policy, based on the case study findings.
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Religion’s interplay with nationalism
In all three of the thesis’ case studies there seems to be a fusion, at one point or another, between 
religion and nationalism. This is most apparent in the cases of Begin and Fahd, but also identifiable 
in the case of Khomeini. As chapter 4 discussed in detail, Begin’s religious beliefs were intricately 
tied to Jewish historical ties to Eretz Yisrael as well as to the nationalism that derived from them. 
While the excerpts from Begin’s private and public discourse drawn upon in the chapter purposely 
highlight the “religious strand” of Begin’s worldview, it does so to show the role of religion in the 
broader context of Begin’s worldview which was equally defined by nationalism. As the discussion 
of Begin’s worldview in section 4.1 of the thesis shows, the two necessarily interplayed with one 
another and neither can be understood without reference to the other.  Similarly, in the case of Fahd; 
as chapter 6 discussed, Fahd was the embodiment of the Saudi state, whose national identity that 
was - and is -    grounded in a historical symbiosis between Wahhabi Islam, the Al Saud family 
and the state that was formed as a result of this relationship. By extension, Fahd’s “religious 
tradition” and the worldview that  it informed cannot be understood entirely  separately from 
nationalism (nor the Al Saud identity, for that matter.) Of the three leaders, Khomeini religious 
beliefs were the most separate from nationalism, although, he too, conflated the two on occasions 
where, as chapter 5 notes, he spoke of, e.g. “the Iranian people” and “the Iranian nation.” This 
interplay  between religion and nationalism is not necessarily surprising considering the 
malleability of religious doctrine and the fact that the leaders operated within the context of a 
nation-state. Nor does it diminish the argument of this thesis which, most broadly, posits that the 
foreign policies of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia during the leaderships of Begin, Khomeini and 
Fahd cannot  be understood without reference to the religious beliefs of those leaders. It does 
however suggest that post-secular scholars, when conceptualizing religion and developing their 
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research agenda would benefit from considering the religious-nationalist relationship (this point is 
taken up in section 7.2 “pointers and avenues for future research.”) 
Religious beliefs are malleable, but important nonetheless
The case studies indicate that the religious beliefs of leaders generally  seemed to be shaped 
according to the context in which the leaders were operating at a given time. Examples from the 
case study chapters abound, but  the following three suffice to get the point  across. Begin invoked 
passages from the book of Ezekiel, to recall Biblical events during which the historic nation of 
Israel had a friendship or alliance with the cities of Tyre and Sidon in modern-day Lebanon, and did 
so  in  order  to  legitimize  the   Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  in  the  face  of  mounting  domestic 
opposition following IDF and Palestinian causalities in Tyre and Sidon. In the context of the Israel- 
Egypt Peace Treaty  some three years prior, and in the context of both public support and vocal 
dissent from the settler movement, Begin drew on the Prophets Yeshayahu ben Amotz and Micha 
Hamorashti and their teachings about the abolishment of war, to legitimize Israel’s  Peace Treaty 
with Egypt. A similar observation can be made in the case of Khomeini who, in the Iran-Iraq war’s 
early and middle stages invoked notions of jihad and martyrdom to encourage Iranians to fight, and 
to continue fighting, Iraq in the name of Islam; but who, in the context of mounting domestic 
discontent alongside a significant deterioration of Iran’s economic and military,  ended the Iran-Iraq 
war for the sake of Islam. Fahd too, through the Kingdom’s Ulema, drew on a fatwa to  condone his 
collaboration with “infidels,” just as he based his  opposition to the US-led Camp David Accords on 
religious grounds (albeit, reluctantly.)
Given these vastly  different, even contradicting, pro- and pre-scriptions of religion, given the 
religiously charged domestic context in which all three leaders were operating, it may be tempting to 
dismiss religion as but a convenient  discursive tool with which leaders could obtain legitimacy for 
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their desired foreign policy actions. In this context, the religious discourse employed by the leaders 
in question - or rather the foreign policy practices that it seeks to legitimize - can be thought of as an 
extension of the foreign policy doctrine that, as we have seen for each of the case studies, was 
shaped to a greater or lesser extent by the leaders‘ religious beliefs (or religious tradition, in the 
case of Fahd). In this light, those outcomes cannot be understood outside the context of 
religion. Whilst that  would by no means render the role of religion an unimportant one, I argue that 
religion, in the context of its role no. 2 introduced above, is very possibly  more “profound” than 
such, and that the apparent discrepancies in the leaders’ discourse - especially in the case of 
Begin and Khomeini given their seemingly “genuine” faith, compared to Fahd, as well as their 
honest personalities - in which said discrepancies are likely an indication of their genuine 
interpretation of the relevant doctrine, in a specific moment and context.
 Overlap between religious and “secular” foreign policy outcomes
At different points throughout the thesis, it  is suggested that secular leaders may have acted in a 
similar fashion to the religious leaders that this work focuses on. For example, the secular 
Jabotinsky in many ways promulgated - indeed he inspired - the same ideology as Begin, albeit in a 
less “emotionalized” variant. Like Begin, Jabotinsky held that Israeli sovereignty should extend 
across all of the Land of Israel and that  military force should, if necessary, be employed to ensure 
this. Similarly, Khomeini’s decision to prolong the Iran-Iraq war may equally have been formulated 
by a secular leader seeking to contain domestic discontent at a time when the nation’s new 
constitution and government was yet to be consolidated, just as Fahd’s decision to assume a 
leadership position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict could likely have been made by  a secular 
leader thinking along regional balance-of-power principles. This may raise the question of whether 
religion matters, then, for the final analysis and whether a theoretical move that incorporates 
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religion is at all worthwhile. I argue that it is very much worthwhile, and I must here refer to the 
nature of the research question and rationale which hold that the thesis seeks to explain the link 
between Begin, Khomeini and Fahd’s religious beliefs and their foreign policy outcomes. As 
detailed in section 1.1 in the thesis’ introduction, I show that a link exists between the leaders in 
question and their respective foreign policy doctrines and foreign policy outcomes, based on the 
important role that - as I show and argue in the case studies -  their religious beliefs (and tradition, in 
the case of Fahd) play in their worldview.  In this sense, the thesis is less concerned with what the 
foreign policy outcomes are  - even if they correspond to ones arrived at through “secular” foreign 
policy decision making - , than it is with understanding them within the context of religion. It is also 
for this reason that the research question is explored within the context of a FPA-Constructivist 
theoretical framework, as both of those paradigms stress subjectivity rather than outcome; that is, 
they  make no substantive claims about the nature of agents or content of social structures and 
interactions, but rather provide a framework for thinking about those properties.501  Moreover, the 
thesis does not set out to explain the role of religion against alternative explanations, be they 
“secular” ones or ones that  subsume religion in broader categories of culture or ethnicity. Whilst 
such explanations may certainly  provide valuable insight, this thesis seeks to address the gap in IR 
literature caused by the fact that it is precisely such studies  that currently exist. In other words, 
existing scholarship favour either “secular”, materialist interpretations,  or refer to religion as one of 
many influential variables.  The purpose of this thesis has been to move away from them. 
7.1 Pointers and avenues for future research
During the process of writing this thesis, a number of pointers and avenues for future research on 
the study of religion and IR, have crystallized. They are listed below.
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501 Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (2001) TAKING STOCK: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations in
Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science. 4. p. 395-8.
• In-depth case studies.
As noted previously, I adopted three case studies for this project which represent three states 
defined with reference to three distinct religions, and did so purposefully  with the aim of 
identifying patterns of regularity across distinguishable cases, as such scientific enquiry is 
particularly interesting for IR. For the post-secular debate, too, which has yet to fully move 
beyond discussing whether as opposed to how religion matters in international relations, it was 
particularly important to develop  a research question that would show religion’s importance across 
cases, due to the temptation to consider, as IR has done before, a phenomenon like the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in which religion has an ostensibly important role, as an anomaly. The aim of 
my research has, I hope, been fulfilled and, in the meantime, the post-secular debate has rightly 
grown in substance and reach, as the research initiatives listed in the introductory chapter suggest. 
Having established that religion matters and offered various studies, including this one, to show 
how it matters, the post- secular  debate  could  benefit  from  studies  which  prioritize  depth 
over  width - that is, studying one case-study in depth rather than various case studies at lesser 
depth. An interesting approach would be one which studies different foreign policy leaders within, 
for example, the Islamic State of Iran, over different governments or administrations, as this would 
allow for the identification of nuances and constants in the leaders‘ respective religious beliefs 
as well as in their foreign policies. 
• Adopting a common understanding of religion.
As chapter 2 of this thesis showed, adopting a common understanding or definition of religion is 
far from a straightforward task. The critical review and assessment of existing attempts that 
chapter 2 laid out  shows that existing attempts to do so adopt, what I argue, are flawed 
functionalist or essentialist approaches, or arrive at definitions that are so broad that they could 
potentially encompass a wide range of phenomena and, by extension, do little to push forward 
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the study of religion as a phenomenon in and of itself. The work of Sheikh (2012) is an 
exception to this, as her conceptualization of “communities of believers” allows for substantive 
study of a particular interpretive belief-community without succumbing to the flaws of the 
abovementioned approaches.502    My approach to understanding “religious beliefs” as an 
interplay  between the individual believer’s “faith” and the shared faith of his or her belief- 
community, builds on Sheikh’s work and, I hope, constitutes a useful effort  to progress the post- 
secular debate because only when post-secular scholar agree what we are studying, can we study 
successfully. Future definitional efforts moreover ought  to account for the interplay  between 
religion and nationalism. Due to the natural tendency for doctrine to develop and, even more, its 
malleability and nuances which allow for fluid, even contradictory, interpretations and practices, 
developing a definition of religion is admittedly  rendered a difficult task. However, that should not 
deter post- secular scholars from pursuing this task. Such an endeavor should undoubtedly be 
informed by scholarship  in the fields of Religious Studies, Theology and even Sociology, as 
scholars in these disciplines, especially the former two, have with few exceptions long a) taken 
religion “seriously” by acknowledging its importance for the individual and society, and related, b) 
studied religion as a social phenomena and not, like IR, as one that pertains to the individual only.
•  Encouraging, and keeping up, research on Religion and IR despite methodological and 
conceptual challenges.
In the post-secular debate’s early days, Fox (2001) and Thomas (2005) rightly pointed out that 
one of the reasons for IR’s neglect of religion was difficulties in measurement, which may 
particularly have affected Political Science scholars on the Western side of the Pond, who have 
typically preferred quantitative methodologies to qualitative ones.503  Add to this, of course, the 
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Studies. 38 (2).  p. 374.
503  See i.e. Fox, J. (2001) Religion as  an Overlooked Element of International Relations. International Studies  Review. 3 (2). 58-9 and 
Thomas, S. (2005) The Global  Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul  of 
the Twenty-First Century
dominant, post-Westphalian understanding of religion as a set of private beliefs that has prevailed 
in IR scholarship for most of the discipline’s existence, as well as the reflections of Euro-Centrism 
in IR theory. The post-secular debate has done a fair share to debunk the idea of religion as a 
privatized affair irrelevant to international relations and, importantly, shown how and why that  is 
the case. Equally, significant steps have been taken by Sheikh (2012) and myself to develop  a 
substantive definition of religion that moves beyond essentialist  and functionalist understandings 
of religion. That said, the study  of religion in international relations is and will remain a complex 
endeavor due to religion’s many and context-specific interpretive variants, not to mention the 
malleability that seems part and parcel of religion in any of its many forms. In the event that such 
complexity at any  point should discourage post-secular scholars and others from studying religion 
in the context of IR, it would be useful to recall the wise observation that won Friedrich August 
von Hayek a Nobel Prize in 1974:
While in the physical sciences it is generally  assumed, probably with good 
reason, that any important factor which determines the observed events will 
itself be directly  observable and measurable, in the study of such complex 
phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions of many individuals, 
all the circumstances which will determine the outcome of a process [will] 
hardly   ever  be  fully  known  or  measurable. And  while  in  the  physical 
sciences the investigator will be able to measure what, on the basis of a 
prima facie theory, he thinks important, in the social sciences often that is 
treated as important which happens to be accessible to measurement. This is 
sometimes carried to the point where it is demanded that our theories must 
be formulated in such terms that they refer only to measurable magnitudes. 
It can hardly  be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily  limits the facts 
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which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the 
real world.504
This statement is grounded in von Hayek’s specific observation, and indeed what won him the 
Nobel Prize, that the stock market crash of the early 1970s would not have happened, had scholars 
of Economics (a social science) been less reluctant to account for variables that were not 
immediately observable. In my view, international relations faces its own version of a stock market 
crash, should IR fail to understand the role of religion in international relations. If for no other 
reason than this one, post-secular scholars should continue in their quest to define and understand 
religion, just as they  should continue to develop research methodologies to understand religion’s 
role. To reinforce the relevance of religion to international relations and IR, I will end this thesis 
with on the same note that I started it with:
“God has proven to be alive and well beyond all question”505
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